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The Rhetoric of Expertise

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The Rhetoric of Expertise

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The Rhetoric of Expertise

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In American culture, reliance on expertise has become so commonplace that it is virtually impossible to avoid. It is the way we delegate the contents of our busy lives and defer authority in the interest of being efficient. Conventional wisdom defines an expert as someone who knows more about a subject or can perform better than the average person. However, expertise is not simply about one person's skills being different from another's. It is also fundamentally contingent on a struggle for ownership and legitimacy. Thus, it is subject to rhetoric. S/he who succeeds in persuading the public that s/he is an expert and that s/he is a better expert than any alternative, earns credibility, acknowledgement and power. Experts argue for the legitimacy of what they do. They articulate their experiences persuasively and always in the context of a rhetorical contest.

The public ultimately validates one form of expertise over the other. To be an expert is to gain sanctioned rights to a specific area of knowledge or experience.

My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. It investigates how expertise is negotiated as a function of the rhetorical situation, its participants and constraints. Specifically, I ask: What rhetorical strategies do experts employ to compete for authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another? Each chapter examines the rhetorical construction of expertise in a particular context—politics, history, medicine, and information. By drawing parallels between different experts from different chapters I ultimately identify a series of "unlikely allies." These are experts whose rhetorical strategies for constructing expertise trump differences of context and content. My rhetorical analysis demonstrates that, despite their apparent differences, experts have a great deal in common rhetorically. Indeed, the recurring use of the same rhetorical strategies through vastly different fields of specialization suggests that experts constitute a unique rhetorical genre.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE RHETORIC OF EXPERTISE

When I was a little girl, my ever-encouraging parents gave me a book titled *On the Other Side of the River*.[1] It was a wonderful tale about a town's social and professional interdependence. In the story, the town's folks were constantly at each others' throats. The baker bickered with the miller. The tailor fought with the farmer. None of them got along like good neighbors should. Through the middle of the town ran a big river, traversed only by a single bridge. One night during a terrible storm, the bridge was washed away and the town's folks had no way of crossing. Good riddance, they figured. Now everyone could live in peace on separate sides. But of course the baker eventually ran out of flour and the tailor of thread. In order to get more of what was needed, they would have to visit the miller and the farmer. And where were they? On the other side of the river! At the end of the book, the town's people naturally learned their lesson, rebuilt the bridge and lived happily ever after.

Aside from being a touching story about community, this scenario conjures up a fundamental question of *expertise*. The baker has a particular kind, a different kind than the doctor's, banker's, farmer's, and tailor's. Therein lie the nature of their exchange and the foundation of their relationships. In American culture, reliance on expertise has become so commonplace that it is virtually impossible to avoid. All of us depend on an assortment of experts in everyday matters. It is the way we delegate the contents of our busy lives and defer authority in the interest of being efficient. If you have ever had

[1] Joanne Oppenheim, *På Andra Sidan Ån* (Sweden: Litteraturfrämjandet, 1987).

computer trouble, for example, and turned to the office's "help desk," or experienced an insect invasion and called an exterminator, you have benefited from expert knowledge. If you have a family physician or your taxes are filed by a tax attorney, you have contributed to the American economy of expertise. If you vote, you acknowledge another person's capacity to represent your interests and speak in your stead; you have participated in the politics of expertise. Every citizen does not, indeed cannot, acquire expertise on all subject matters in a complex society like ours.

Expertise is not simply about one person's skills being different from another's. It is also grounded in a fierce struggle over ownership and legitimacy. And no one hands those things over without a struggle. Certainly, the complementary abilities of the town's people made for a functional collective; the baker was skilled at baking and therefore did so all day long while leaving other enterprises to someone else. The crux of the expertise issue, however, is that being recognized as an expert generates considerable status and power. Those who are deemed deserving of this label make money and appear on television. Their opinions are "expert" opinions. Their voices are heard above others'. To be an expert, in short, is to rhetorically gain sanctioned rights to a specific area of knowledge or experience.

Whose knowledge and experience, then, is worth the most? Whose is credible? Consider another, more contentious illustration. The United States is currently at war. That which has been called "the war on terror" is spreading across the globe. A new generation of soldiers return from duty. Their wounds and traumas are fresher than older veterans', but the experience of a divisive foreign war is similar. In conversations about

politics and military force, these veterans invoke the right to expertise of lived experience. “I was there,” they say. “I heard the bombs and saw the destruction. Call me an expert on warfare.” In the same conversation a young pacifist speaks up. She has studied social movements for global peace and contests the soldier’s claims. Her expertise comes from the “trenches” of political activism. “You have been brainwashed,” she insists. “Your expertise is founded on delusion.” Finally, yet another joins the argument. He is a presidential advisor and represents the gallery of experts that determine government actions. He reminds us that decisions of national security must be carefully calculated. “Leave it to the experts,” he admonishes. In this category, he does not count his two interlocutors.

The idea that expertise is up for grabs should alert us to the concept’s fundamental rhetoricity. All three participants in the prior conversation have to make a case for the validity of their perspectives. They have to articulate their experiences persuasively, and perform in a particular way to “earn” expertise. Importantly, those rhetorical strategies adapt to fit different audiences. Sometimes the solider, activist and advisor all address the same audience: the American public. Other times, they speak to an internal audience of their peers and confederates. The soldier, for example, speaks to other soldiers and the activist to other activists. Either way, the process of establishing oneself as an expert entails a judgment from an audience that is contingent on a rhetorical effort.

My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. It investigates how expertise is instituted and negotiated as a function of the rhetorical situation, its participants and constraints. Specifically, I ask: What rhetorical strategies do experts

employ to compete for authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another? In each chapter, I focus on a particular context in which two groups offer competing claims for expertise. These contexts illustrate matters in which expertise is particularly contentious. Both groups are after the recognition and power that come with general acknowledgement of their knowledge and experience. The objective of my dissertation, simply put, is to explore the clash of tropes and arguments in the rhetorical construction of expertise. This chapter explains in detail the nature and significance of the project.

What is Expertise? Who is an Expert?

All definitions of expertise are the function of particular motives and have different implications. Anyone who offers a definition shapes that definition to serve his/her interests. For example, academics may define expertise as synonymous with knowledge and accreditation. Notably, theoretical knowledge and accreditation are precisely the qualities that characterize academic expertise. In contrast, an artist may place more emphasis on lived experience as constitutive of expertise. This might deemphasize the importance of a certain degree or title. To her colleagues and followers, a body of works attesting to the life of an artist may be more compelling. Additionally, this may work in the artist's favor. She may be compensating with experience what she lacks in official certification. Whatever the case, any definition of expertise has social, political, and material consequences. It does rhetorical work for the person creating the definition.

Scholarship on expertise emerges from many different perspectives: psychology, sociology, political science, communication, history, and others. In this section, I survey

this research and outline several prevalent themes. This interdisciplinary overview suggests that a great deal is already known about the concept of expertise. The wheel need not be entirely reinvented. In the following section, however, I demonstrate what a rhetorical approach to expertise uniquely contributes. Specifically, I identify its contributions where cognitive, cultural-historical-critical, and political theories remain underdeveloped. It is my contention that a rhetorical approach to expertise does not replace frameworks from other disciplines. Rather, it responds to unaddressed concerns, even gaps, in existing knowledge about expertise.

Autonomy and Attribution

One of the most frequently recurring themes in expertise research is that there exists a tension between *autonomy* and *attribution*. Scholars across disciplinary boundaries repeatedly return to this issue. For some, expertise is entirely comprised of a person's relationship to her subject matter. An expert in astrophysics is one who has extensive knowledge of the topic. Expertise is the term for superior competence. For others, expertise exists entirely in the signs and symbols of a person's relationship to her environment and audience. It is an attributed state of being-with-others where one's performance is evaluated irrespective of so-called "real knowledge." When expertise is autonomous, other people's recognition is irrelevant. A person can possess expert knowledge without the others' acknowledgment. An expert so conceived is the proverbial tree in the forest; when she falls – or exercises her expertise – it is beyond the ken of the world. However, when expertise is attributed, it exists only as a symbolic relationship. One can be an expert only in so far as one is recognized as such. It is then a performance

that may or may not be indicative of knowledge. The astrophysicist may know her stuff, but it does not matter if she fails to persuade others. As long as she is symbolically persuasive, it may be of no consequence whether or not the expert possesses superior knowledge.

Some version of this autonomy/attribution theme emerges in several different fields of research. In the cognitive sciences, for example, expertise is strictly a measure of individual competence.[2] It is a mental state. An expert possesses skills or abilities that qualify her as more competent than others in specific areas, such as chess.[3] Status relative to others is irrelevant. The individual has acquired expert abilities through experience, practice and training. Anyone could achieve the same capability by going through the same process. Whether or not the person is treated as extraordinary is outside of the scope of cognitive psychology.

In cognitive science expertise is thus autonomous rather than attributed. Experts are those individuals who "remember more domain-relevant material relative to novices."[4] When the term "performance" is used, moreover, it is a measure of how well the expert executes her ability. This is the familiar notion by which a professional

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[2] Roland H. Grabner, Aljoscha C. Neubauer, and Elsbeth Stern, "Superior Performance and Neural Efficiency: The Impact of Intelligence and Expertise," *Brain Research Bulletin* 69 (2006): 422-439. Fernand Gobet, "Expert Memory: A Comparison of Four Theories," *Cognition* 66 (1998): 115-152. Jarrod Moss, Kenneth Kotovsky, and Jonathan Cagan, "The Role of Functionality in the Mental Representations of Engineering Students: Some Differences in the Early Stages of Expertise," *Cognitive Science* 30 (2006): 65-93. Remy M. J. P. Rikers and Fred Paas, "Recent Advances in Expertise Research," *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 19 (2005): 145-149.

[3] Willian G. Chase and Herbert A. Simon, "The Mind's Eye in Chess," in *Visual Information Processing*, ed. W. G. Chase, 215-281 (New York: Academic Press, 1973). Adriaan De Groot, *Het Denken Van Den Schaker* (Amsterdam: Noord Hollandsche, 1946).

[4] Karen R. Brandt, Lauren M. Copper, and Stephen A. Dewhurst, "Expertise and Recollective Experience: Recognition and Memory for Familiar and Unfamiliar Academic Subjects," *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 19 (2005): 1113.

athlete's performance is measured in time, distance, weight, etc. For example, we say that an Olympian "performed" at her best when she won the gold medal. More surprising, perhaps, is that a musical expert's performance is treated the same way. Instead of analyzing it with respect to audience, cognitive researchers focus on the relationships between the musician's training, "deliberate practice" and physiological and mental capacities.[5]

These capacities, most cognitive scientists agree, are contingent on the mental connections established during the development of expert knowledge. One of the most important and efficient ways of making such connections is semantically. Bransford and Johnson examine the role of semantic context in interpretation.[6] Their study provided subjects with linguistic information about a particular scenario. Some of the participants were also shown an image that related to the story. During the test, participants created "semantic products" that reflected reliance both on the contextual cues offered in the image and on prior knowledge.[7] This suggests that knowledge requires semantic representation. It is not contained in the mind unmediated. Studies in semantic memory document that experts process information from their domain of expertise at a deeper level than novices or laypersons.[8] They are able to access semantic representations that allow more advanced encoding of new information into pre-existing knowledge

[5] K. Anders Ericsson, Ralf Th. Krampe, and Clemens Tesch-Römer, "The Role of Deliberative Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance," *Psychological Review* 100 (1993): 363-406.
[6] John D. Bransford and Marcia K. Johnson, "Contextual Prerequisites for Understanding: Some Investigations of Comprehension and Recall," *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior* 11 (1972): 717-726.
[7] Bransford and Johnson, 718.
[8] Brandt, Cooper, and Dewhurst.

structures. This linguistic dimension of knowledge will be revisited later in the section on a rhetorical approach to expertise.

Conceptualizing expertise as an individual quality connects cognitive psychology with political science. Both study what seems like a matter of personal qualification. The notion of civic competence, for example, begs the question of being a qualified citizen. How much, and what sort of individual ability is requisite to productive citizenship? How ought those who have more and less expertise be ranked in the political hierarchy? Such questions illustrate the tension between expertise that is deemed valuable to the public and that which is considered peripheral or expendable. Hardly surprising is that this political dilemma has a long history in Western democracies, a history that directs attention to a nexus of democratic rights and political expertise. In the *Republic* and other dialogues, Plato insists that only the elite class, by virtue of its moral and intellectual superiority, is fit to govern.[9] Pellizzoni summarizes his exclusive view: "[S]ince political competence, which comprises moral capacities (determining the common good and favouring it over one's own interests) and technical capacities (determining the most suitable means to reach the target), is not equally distributed among all citizens, it is therefore appropriate to rely on the competence of a minority."[10] In the Greek polis, the minority included free men of the aristocracy; their expertise was necessary and sufficient to govern.

[9] Plato, *Republic*, trans. T. Griffin, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
[10] Luigi Pellizzoni, "Reflexive Modernization and Beyond: Knowledge and Value in the Politics of Environment and Technology," *Theory, Culture & Society* 16 (1999): 99-125.

Political participation has remained a crucial issue. The minority that Pellizzoni refers to is now less delineated by class than by specialized expertise. Nevertheless, the determining factor continues to be access. In the past, ordinary citizens' access to politics was restricted by socioeconomic status. Today, the same group is excluded from many of the most important political issues because of information barriers. The problems that our society faces are often so complex as to prevent mass popular participation.[11] As Pellizzoni notes: "No one has enough time, money or capacity to acquire acceptable competence in every subject."[12] Friedson echoes this sentiment: "Apart from the time it would take to be trained in every specialty, there is not the time in a single person's life to perform or otherwise be pre-occupied with each specialty often enough to sustain competence."[13] The increasing difficulty of being well-versed in all subject matters has complicated the classical notion of civic competence. It has made it harder to sustain expertise as an individual quality.

From a political standpoint, being an expert depends both on having a particular kind of knowledge and on other people's recognition of it. This realization moves us toward the other end of the autonomy/attribution continuum. It also begs the question: If expertise is an attributed state, what qualities does this assume? On what does the public base its attribution of expertise? A recurring concern for political scholars is the criteria

[11] Kevin M. Esterling, *The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American National Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).
[12] Pellizzoni, 109.
[13] Elliot Friedson, "Are Professions Necessary?" in *The Authority of Experts,* ed. T. L. Haskell, 3-27 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 15.

that citizens use to identify expertise.[14] Are citizens' attributions of expertise valid? Can the public tell the expert from the imposter? Huckfeldt writes: "The ability of citizens to make discriminating judgments regarding the political expertise of other individuals is centrally related to the potential for deliberative democracy."[15] The health of a deliberative democracy depends fundamentally on citizens obtaining political information from other citizens who are relatively more knowledgeable.

Attributions of expertise are a concern for political scientists not just in terms of individual citizens, but also with respect to political officials who rely on professional experts.[16] Politicians can no more maintain expert knowledge in all matters than their constituents. When making decisions, they too must defer to the content-specific expertise of political interest groups and other research agencies. Esterling optimistically notes:

> All other things being equal, society should prefer to be governed by expert-informed rather than ill-informed policies because the former are more often more effective and efficient in reaching social goals. To this end, academic researchers and professional analysts endeavor to apply the current state of research-based knowledge to solve the vast array of public

[14] Robert Huckfeldt, "The Social Communication of Political Expertise," *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (2001): 425-438
[15] Huckfeldt, 425.
[16] Andrew Rich, "The Politics of Expertise in Congress and the News Media," *Social Science Quarterly* 82 (2001): 583-601.

problems, developing expertise-informed proposals with the intent of advancing the public interest.[17]

Note that, in this discourse of experts as political advisers, expertise emerges as a product or service. A person who owns the product can provide it for those who do not. There exists, in other words, an unstated economy in which expertise is a personal asset. While political scientists treat civic competence as an individual quality, they also acknowledge that some citizens seem to possess more of it than others. Those citizens profit from this competence by selling their expertise to the citizenry and political leadership. However, as long as the attribution of expertise is made (whether substantiated or not), business is good for political professionals. Their expertise operates gainfully in the midst of the autonomy/attribution dialectic.

Reified or Problematized?

Another way to organize the literature on expertise is to determine whether scholars problematize the concept or buy it wholesale. By "buying wholesale" I mean the use of the concept of expertise as a reified operational variable. Some scholars take it for granted without questioning its historical "baggage." To illustrate: In 2005, *Applied Cognitive Psychology* published a special issue on "Recent Advances in Expertise Research" comprised of papers presented at a symposium of the American Educational Research Association. The introductory essay previews the objectives of cognitive expertise research: turning novices into experts.[18] As Ericsson obligates: "Our growing

[17] Esterling, 1.
[18] Rikers and Paas, 146.

understanding of what aspects distinguish experts from novices should translate into more effective training."[19] Thus, not only do the authors leave expertise unquestioned, they implicitly affirm it with their intent to create new experts.

This normative approach to expertise recurs in political science, particularly in the reification of political knowledge. Being politically competent is discursively moralized as a civic virtue. A high score of political knowledgeability, according to some, is necessary for being a productive citizen. Political scholars may therefore be said to have a conflicted view of expertise. On one hand, they ask that citizens keep themselves well informed in order to participate and be productive members of society. This is the definition's normative aspect. The relationship between knowledge and civic participation mandates educators to train good citizens.[20] At the same time, the scholars are anxiously aware of a powerful democratic myth, viz., that politics should be run by the people. Implicit in such a myth is the idea that ordinary citizens' knowledge and experience are sufficient – not despite limitations but partly as a function of them. In other words, it is the people who know what is best for the people. Experts have in some sense set themselves apart from the citizenry at large. With their expertise comes an altered perspective on public interest.

This dialectical tension is highlighted by those scholars who problematize expertise. "Problematizing" expertise refers to the systematic interrogation of the assumptions inherent in the concept. For example, while political scientists investigate

[19] K. Anders Ericsson, "Recent Advances in Expertise Research: A Commentary on the Contributions to the Special Issue," *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 19 (2005): 238.
[20] Michael McDevitt, "Civic Autonomy in Journalism Education: Applying Expertise to Political Action," *Journalism and Mass Communication Educator* 57 (2002): 152-160.

how experts supply citizens and officials with information, and what level of civic competence is necessary for participation, Chafetz and other more critical scholars go one step further and question the mere presence of experts in public dialogue.[21] Turner states the issue succinctly: "In the face of expertise, something has to give: either the idea of government by generally intelligible discussion, or the idea that there is a genuine knowledge that is known to a few, but not generally intelligible."[22] If the expert is somehow different from other citizens, should her opinion count as part of popular discourse? Put another way, if an expert recommends something, under what circumstances is adherence to her advice compatible with the (liberal) democratic ideal of individual autonomy and self-governance?

D'Agnostino responds: "Expertise is compatible with self-government when, and only when, it 'tracks' hypothetical courses of reasoning that 'we, the people' could have performed for ourselves, whether individually or collectively, as the case may be."[23] Following an expert's advice is not in conflict with democratic ideals if you yourself would have arrived at the same conclusion, given time and resources. The problem, of course, is that experts differ on what conclusion the people would draw. Many issues are so complex as to generate a multitude of preferences, all of which may be legitimate.[24] As D'Agnostino points out "there may be multiple, equally legitimate courses of

[21] Morris E. Chafetz, *The Tyranny of Experts: Blowing the Whistle on the Cult of Expertise* (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1996), xvi.
[22] Stephen P. Turner, *Liberal Democracy 3.0: Civil Society in an Age of Experts* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2003), 5.
[23] Fred D'Agnostino, "Expertise, Democracy, and Applied Ethics," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 15 (1998): 50.
[24] D'Agnostino, 51.

reasoning on the matter at issue. If expert advice prevails in these circumstances, then it may well be at the expense of contrary (or anyway incompatible) opinions that 'principals' would have arrived at if__."[25]

Nussbaum posits a similar argument with respect to the role of philosophers in public matters of justice and ethics. She writes: "Philosophers have a duty to serve the public good, and they perform this service in fruitful ways. But they should refuse a public role that appears incompatible with equal respect for the committed ethical searching of their fellow citizens."[26] According to Nussbaum, ethics fall outside the realm of "epistemic deference."[27] In a pluralistic society, she argues, citizens must not be asked to defer their own judgment in favor of expert authority; if they are, democracy is undermined. Therefore, experts should strive to consider a presumed popular view in ethical matters. "[T]he expert philosopher can offer some important benefits to the public culture of a democratic society, even though there is an important sense in which the philosopher is simply extending and systematizing belief that citizens already have in some form."[28]

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[25] D'Agnostino, 50.
[26] Martha C. Nussbaum, "Moral Expertise? Constitutional Narratives and Philosophical Argument," *Metaphilosophy* 33 (2002): 502.
[27] Nussbaum, 513. On "deference" see also J. G. A. Pocock, "The Classical Theory of Deference," *The American Historical Review* 81 (1976): 516-523. Michael Schudson, *The Good Citizen: A History of American Public Life* (New York: Free Press, 1998).
[28] Nussbaum, 511. Worth noting is that these scholars seem to go so far in problematizing the concept of expertise that they sometimes endorse its opposite. By insisting that "the same deep structures underlie the expanding role of experts and the drastic impoverishment of political life," they may moralize non-expertise. See Magali Sarafatti Larson, "The Production of Expertise and the Constitution of Expert Power," in The Authority of Experts, ed. T. L. Haskell, 28-83 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 30. This scholarship on non-expertise suggests that the concept is not an absolute good, an idea that the discussion of ethos will revisit.

Scholars who deconstruct expertise often do so by tracing its precedents in Western intellectual history. They argue that cultures have always privileged certain ways of knowing over others. Certain epistemologies have been deemed more expert than others. By associating themselves with such privileged epistemologies, experts strive to be more credible than their competition. In ancient Greece, Socrates' and Plato's characterization of philosophy, or dialectic, as the only means of discovering truth was established against its then-opponent: sophistry. As Sassower claims: "[S]ophistry was aligned with poetry that was thought expressive and imaginative worthy of those interested in twisting arguments to suit their purpose, with no regard to the standards of truth established by philosophy or the methods of inquiry deemed appropriate for the pursuit of wisdom and truth."[29] Nowadays, the argument goes, we still suffer the aftermath of this opposition. Those who associate themselves with a dispreferred epistemology struggle for credibility. Alternative forms of expertise continue to be suspect.[30]

In the process of historicizing knowledge and expertise, some critical scholars take on science. They remind us, for example, of the authority that the title "scientist" has wielded under the rule of objectivist epistemology. In the popular mind, science is a fact-driven, value-free enterprise wherein data is collected and compiled. While the outcome

[29] Raphael Sassower, *Knowledge without Expertise: On the Status of Scientists* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 54.
[30] Dominic Boyer, "The Corporeality of Expertise," *Ethnos* 70 (2005): 243-266. Boyer's discussion of expertise and the Cartesian mind/body dualism that academic research perpetuates is compelling. He asks: "Why is it that intellectuals experience (and are encouraged to experience) their mental activities rationalistically and to consider as genuine knowledge only that which originated in pure cognitive process?" 247.

of this process may be manipulated for any number of agendas, the scientist remains the unimpeachable expert. Haskell writes: "If the university provided the institutional keystone for the great expansion and elaboration of expert authority […], it was the scientist who possessed in fullest measure the authority to which every expert aspires."[31] When one's intention is to analyze and critique the power of experts, therefore, one does well to start with empirical scientists. Sassower attempts to debunk what she calls "the myth of expertise":

> Those who say that experts can make certainty claims regarding their fields are inadvertently perpetuating a myth about expertise – a myth, to be precise, about the certainty claims of experts and not about the obvious fact that there are people who are rightly perceived as experts or who may know more about a certain area than others. It is a myth because the view that epistemological certainty exists – one that ignores inherent margins of error – is untenable.[32]

Seeking Expertise

A third theme emerging from the literature concerns our culture's motives for seeking expertise. What benefits does expertise procure? What good do we desire that experts claim to possess? Some scholars argue that it is the illusion of certainty we want.[33] In a culture that has lost many of the institutions (churches, synagogues, bowling

[31] Thomas L. Haskell, "Introduction," in *The Authority of Experts,* ed. T. Haskell, ix-xxxix (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), xxvi-xxvii.
[32] Sassower, 64-65.
[33] Chafetz. See also Donald N. McCloskey, "The Limits of Expertise," *American Scholar* 57 (1988): 393-406.

leagues) that once provided answers, certainty is a rare commodity. Most of the time, scholars argue, we struggle with a general sense of ambiguity. If this strikes the reader as an overstatement, consider the staggering evidence in popular culture. Experts who sell neat and tidy, easily digestible tidbits of truth get primetime talk shows. Experts who speak in slogans get to run political campaigns. This, according to Chafetz, is the "tyranny of experts."

Chafetz argues that we worship expertise for the safe assurance that it promises to provide. The less certain we are about our own lives, the more we want to believe that there are those who have all the answers. Therefore, we are "fair game for anyone who offers […] comforting certainties, unambiguous rules of conduct, and ways to identify themselves within the complex, fast-moving society we live in."[34] The fear of death and mystery drives us to seek desperately the comforts of expertise. The experts, in turn, perpetuate this state of affairs as long as it guarantees them economic and political benefits.

As this section demonstrated, the notion of expertise is widely studied. It is important to take note of such research. To understand common attitudes toward expertise, it is furthermore important to understand its recurring themes. Certain questions continually vex scholars of expertise: Is it an individual competence or an attributed status? Is it an obvious measure of ability or a charged way of organizing people hierarchically? Is it something we should strive to increase or an embarrassing cultural legacy? Is it real or delusional? The research surveyed here provides some

[34] Chafetz, xiii.

answers. However, it leaves important dimensions of expertise unaddressed. The next section of my chapter demonstrates how a rhetorical perspective complements existing scholarship. It delineates a set of propositions indicating how a rhetorical approach to expertise fills in significant theoretical gaps.

Expertise as a Rhetorical Strategy

In contrast to the scholarship just reviewed, my dissertation argues that expertise is constructed rhetorically. It is rhetorical because it depends on the relationships between speaker, audience, and context. A speaker is only able to exercise expertise and enjoy expert status to the extent that she can persuade an audience to grant such things. This does not necessarily render the concept of expertise entirely symbolic. Expertise is not the label I use to designate only those superficial signs by which an expert might be identified. Rather, a person uses both her "real" knowledge and experience in a specific field and her rhetorical prowess to win over an audience. Reliance on substantive material "evidence" does not make expertise any less rhetorical. The effective rhetor relies on many different tropes; the more tropes (a title, a position, the ability to establish consubstantiality with the audience, etc.) she has at her disposal, the more likely she will be viewed as an expert. What follows is a series of propositions about the benefits of a rhetorical approach to expertise.

Artistic and Inartistic Means of Persuasion

A rhetorical perspective on expertise incorporates both artistic and inartistic means of persuasion. Consider three basic dimensions of expertise: a title, a subject

matter, and a performance.[35] Each can be adapted to fit specific examples. For instance, a professor of mathematics has all three dimensions at his disposal. His title: professor and doctor; his subject matter: mathematics; his performance: a dry wit, a penchant for jargon, a tweed jacket, and a wall of books. Moreover, the triad can be used to examine unconventional experts as well. Consider the activist from previous examples. Her title is likely linked to a position (president, chair, etc.) in a given organization. Her subject matter is her knowledge and first-hand experience of social agitation and mobilization. Her performance incorporates both appeals to this experience and the donning of a certain aesthetic. In order to distinguish the rhetorical powers of these three dimensions, I invoke Aristotle's vocabulary of artistic and inartistic means of persuasion.[36] The artistic dimension, which is fundamentally context- and audience contingent, requires more adaptation to an audience than does the inartistic dimensions of expertise – the title and the subject matter.

In Book 1 of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle explains that inartistic means of persuasion are those not supplied by the speaker.[37] His examples are witnesses, evidence given under

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[35] James Fleck, "Expertise: Knowledge, Power and Tradeability," in *Exploring Expertise: Issues and Perspectives,* eds. R. Williams, W. Faulkner, & J. Fleck, 143-172 (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 1998). Fleck presents an alternative to my template, though similarities are evident. His trialectics of expertise contain knowledge, power, and tradeability, 144-49. Knowledge, he explains, is the substantive content: "At its crudest, knowledge almost appears as a sort of substance held within the brains of individuals," 146. Power is grounded in institutions, organizational forms and processes involving sociologists, political analysts, organization theorists and some institutional historians. Fleck writes: "For those emphasizing the power or institutional perspective, the view of knowledge as being disinterested or value neutral is idealistic. Rather, knowledge is seen as embodying social relations within which power is mediated and reproduced," 147. Tradeability, finally, is Fleck's efficiency measurement for a particular sort of expertise. It determines whether a certain type of expertise can carry out a task or function more efficiently than a competing alternative.

[36] Aristotle, *On Rhetoric*, trans. and ed. G. A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[37] Aristotle, Book 1, chapter 2.

torture, and written contracts. They precede the moment of rhetorical invention. The two inartistic aspects of expertise, I propose, are the title and the subject matter. Because they exist beyond the expert's interaction with other people – at least in so far as she must convince them of her knowledge, skill, and status – they do not require rhetorical savvy. A person who has a degree in law or economics has some claim to expertise beyond social attribution. Behaving un-expert-like will not undo the license or (in most cases) make the institution revoke the degree. The same person, furthermore, has a subject matter in which she is an expert. She has mastery of a specially designated area of knowledge. She understands the intricacies of this particular content whether or not the neighbors know it.

The artistic aspect of expertise is that which is invented by the expert. Herein lies the importance of her performance. Performance is not a matter of theatrics or artifice. Rather, it is a vital part of being rhetorically successful. The expert is required to become her position, her knowledge, and her experience in a public manner while considering audience and context. This means that "knowing your stuff" simply isn't enough. We can all think of people whose brilliance goes unappreciated because they could not communicate it. They falter when it comes to persuading everyone else that they know things. Drawing on an Aristotelian vocabulary, a rhetorical perspective on expertise incorporates both artistic and inartistic means of persuasion.

Invention and Performance

A rhetorical perspective on expertise integrates invention and performance. The Western mind traditionally prefers to reserve the term expertise for cold, hard rationality.

It is deeply disconcerted by the idea that performance matters as much as substance. We are skeptical of appearances and the possibility that they may compete with other, more prized qualities like reason and logic. This distinction between form and content, or surface and essence, means that the appearance of something can either represent, distort, or disguise its reality. We find ourselves conflicted. On one hand, our culture is thoroughly preoccupied with aesthetics.[38] In a flurry of imagery and style, we use aesthetic standards to make judgments about experiences, objects and people. We frequently rely on affect over rationality. On the other hand, we have a long history of shunning aesthetics. Plato's scorn of mimicry resounds in our cultural heritage.[39]

The position of my dissertation is that it is both impossible and undesirable to separate the substance of expertise from its performance. Certainly, deception is possible. It is not difficult to feign or imitate the performance of an expert without the underlying substantive knowledge. For example, watching enough episodes of *ER* or *Grey's Anatomy* might teach you to perform medical expertise aesthetically. You could impersonate a surgeon. However, the performance would likely come to a screeching halt when the time came to execute that expertise which you actually lack. This distinction between expert knowledge and expert performance does not take away from the point: Anyone who wants to be believed has to behave in a persuasive way. Expert knowledge requires expert performance. The kicker for the Platonist is this: even if a person purports

[38] David Birch and Michael O'Toole, *The Functions of Style* (New York: Pinter, 1988). Mike Featherstone, *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 1991). Anne Norton, *Republic of Signs* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). Virginia Postrel, *The Substance of Style* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003).
[39] Plato, *Republic*.

to offer nothing but the "nuts and bolts" of knowledge, that is in itself a particular kind of performance. Minimalism is a style; being understated about your superior skill is a rhetorical choice.

Furthermore, invention – one of the canons in rhetorical theory – undergirds both the substance and style of expertise. Both require a productive effort on the part of the rhetor. Put differently, rhetoric is the art that integrates the expert's knowledge and effective communication. Rhetoric is more than oratorical flourish, more than the seductive packaging in which ideas are transported from mind to mind. In addition to its managerial function, in other words, rhetoric is a way of discovering and inventing. It is indeed epistemic.[40] It is as integral to scientific knowledge as it is to the humanities. Data and observations do not float about unanchored in language; they are gathered and managed in language.

The theories of expertise presented by cognitive, political and critical-cultural scholars do not deny this. Yet they do not devote much time to investigating the relationship between language and knowledge. For example, several cognitive scientists note that those research participants who have more sophisticated systems of representation for their expertise are better able to retrieve and communicate it (see 8).[41] For expert participants, new information is semantically processed in terms of stored knowledge.[42] As Ericsson states: "The development of high levels of skill requires the

[40] Richard Cherwitz and James Hikins, *Communication and Knowledge: An Investigation in Rhetorical Epistemology* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1986). Robert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," *Central States Speech Journal* 18 (1967): 9-17.
[41] Gobet. See also Moss, Kotovsky, & Cagan.
[42] Brandt, Cooper, & Dewhurst.

acquisition of representations that allow efficient control and execution of performance as well as mechanisms that support planning, reasoning and evaluation that mediate further improvement and maintenance of high levels of performance."[43] Language is part of knowledge, even to those researchers who do not typically emphasize it or give it much credence.

To be clear: I do not conflate knowledge with expertise. Being highly knowledgeable is not necessarily the same as being received as an expert, which requires a rhetorical effort. However, the success of that rhetorical effort is more likely if the expert makes credible references to knowledge. A rhetorical view of expertise thus accounts for a wide spectrum of inventive functions. It posits language as the representational system that cognitive researchers identify. At the same time, it explains the way that great oratory seems to sell expertise, as critiqued by some scholars. The term "rhetoric of expertise" can apply to both discovery itself and the language in which discovery is communicated to an audience. The invention of knowledge and the invention of a style through which to convey it are both just that: rhetorical inventions. The point, once again, is that a rhetorical perspective of expertise allows for both functions.

The Expert

A rhetorical perspective on expertise accounts for the complex nature of the expert. From classical times to the present, source credibility has been the focus of not only rhetorical studies but of persuasion and communication research. As McCroskey and Teven explain, "messages are interpreted and evaluated through the filter of the

[43] Ericsson, *Recent Advances*, 238.

receiver's perceptions of the message's source. No message is received independently from its source or presumed source."[44] Source credibility is profoundly important to the analysis of expertise. Faulkner et al. note: "[T]he role of the expert remains socially contingent: what is judged is not so much the content of the evidence or advice, as the credibility and/or legitimacy of the person giving that evidence or advice; if we trust the expert, we trust their expertise."[45] Because source credibility is so central, a productive theory of expertise must be able to account for the expert.

One of the contributions of a rhetorical perspective is that it lets us transcend the autonomy/attribution dialectic addressed above. The question of whether expertise is an individual quality or an attribution made by others becomes moot as soon as the rhetorical perspective reveals that it is necessarily and simultaneously a function of both. Specifically, source credibility, or *ethos*, is a concept that combines the expert's knowledge or competence with her trustworthiness and perceived goodwill.

An expert's *ethos* is a complex product of her reputation and her performance in a single rhetorical moment. Aristotle insists, however, that *ethos* must be constructed and presented publicly.[46] It should rely more on a speaker's "artistic accomplishments" in a speech than on the audience's awareness of a "well-lived existence."[47] Certainly, the

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[44] James C. McCroskey and Jason J. Teven, "Goodwill: A Reexamination of the Construct and Its Measurements," *Communication Monographs* 66 (1999): 90.
[45] Wendy Faulkner, James Fleck, and Robin Williams, "Exploring Expertise: Issues and Perspectives," in *Exploring Expertise: Issues and Perspectives,* eds. R. Williams, W. Faulkner, & J. Fleck, 1-28 (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 1998), 4.
[46] Brad McAdon, "Two Irreconcilable Conceptions of Rhetorical Proofs in Aristotle's Rhetoric," *Rhetorica* 22 (2004): 307-325. Jacob Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero* (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1989), 35-36.
[47] Michael J. Hyde, "Introduction: Rhetorically, We Dwell," in *The Ethos of Rhetoric,* ed. M. J. Hyde, xiii-xxviii (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), xvi.

audience's perception is to some extent based on preexisting knowledge of the rhetor, but "those qualities are crafted anew in the texture of the discourse."[48] For example, a politician's expertise depends on her knowledge and experience as well as her rhetorical ability to display competence. Theories of *ethos* likewise suggest that the rhetor must both possess a certain praiseworthy character and be able to present that character rhetorically in a credible manner.

Aristotle equips rhetoricians with a theoretical triad. He states: "There are three reasons why speakers themselves are persuasive; for there are three things we trust other than logical demonstrations. These are practical wisdom [*phronēsis*] and virtue [*aretē*] and good will [*eunoia*]."[49] As with the artistic and inartistic means of persuasion, these concepts are not definitively distinct. For example, displaying goodwill toward the audience depends in part on the rhetor's ability to perform a moral character. Likewise, as Noel argues, "moral character cannot be exhibited in practical situations without the use of *phronēsis*. Similarly, *phronēsis* cannot be undertaken without the existence of moral character."[50] An investigation of *ethos* is facilitated by a close examination of scholars' treatment of goodwill, good sense, and moral excellence respectively.

Phronēsis is the dimension of *ethos* that comprises the rhetor's knowledge. It has been translated differently to include such characteristics as good sense, practical

[48] John M. Murphy, "The Language of the Liberal Consensus: John F. Kennedy, Technical Reason, and the "New Economics" at Yale University," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 90 (2004): 145.
[49] Aristotle, Book 2, chapter 1.
[50] Jana Noel, "On the Varieties of *Phronesis*," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 31 (1999): 284.

wisdom, sagacity, expertise, and intelligence.[51] Aristotle explains that "prudence [*phronēsis*] is a virtue of intelligence whereby people are able to plan well for happiness in regard to the good and bad things that have been mentioned earlier."[52] *Phronēsis* is not conceptually identical to theoretical knowledge – *sophia* in Greek – or knowledge of scientific and technical principles – *techne* – or even knowledge of connections and associations – *dianoia*. Rather, it is a level of competence that incorporates multiple skills. It is "a capacity for discerning in the sphere of action the intermediate point where right conduct lies in any given situation. It is a capacity for applying a rational principle to practical situations that call for choice about action."[53] Note the importance that Aristotle places on kairotic sensitivity – a sense of fittingness for occasion. A performance of knowledgeability, intelligence, and good sense requires the rhetor's keen awareness of situational constraints.

The second component in Aristotle's theory of *ethos* is *eunoia*, or goodwill. Depending on the scholar's interpretation, *eunoia* can denote either the goodwill that the audience experiences toward the speaker or the goodwill that the speaker exhibits toward the audience. Ultimately, it is the extent to which the speaker is understanding, empathetic, and responsive in the audience's perception.[54] Aristotle compares *eunoia* to friendliness, primarily as the performance of friendly gestures generates credibility.[55] For Aristotle, goodwill and friendliness are defined as wanting for someone what is good for

[51] Craig R. Smith, "*Ethos* Dwells Pervasively: A Hermeneutic Reading of Aristotle on Credibility," in *The Ethos of Rhetoric,* ed. M. J. Hyde, 1-19 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), 10.
[52] Aristotle, Book 1, chapter 9.
[53] Smith, 10-11.
[54] McCroskey & Teven, 92.
[55] Smith, 11.

him rather than wanting what will benefit oneself. As he states: "[A]ll in all, [people like those] who are very fond of their friends and not inclined to leave them in the lurch; for among the good they most like those who are good at being friends."[56]

Recall, once again, that this desire for another's welfare pertains to *ethos* only in so far as it is performed before an audience. The rhetor must display goodwill in the rhetorical moment. In the construction of expertise, *eunoia* (along with *phronēsis* and *aretē*) allows the expert to be perceived as credible. For example, self-help gurus of all kinds build credibility by insisting that all their recommendations are in the follower's best interest. Oprah Winfrey and Dr. Phil excel at this ethical appeal. When Oprah starts a book club, it is because she wants to share her passion and "get the country reading" for its own edification. Oprah is every woman's friend. When Dr. Phil scolds bad parents on national television, it is for their own good; he only wants to help make families better. For both gurus, goodwill is "a meaningful predictor of believability and likableness."[57] Without those ethically-grounded qualities, experts cannot function.

Finally, virtue, or *aretē*, is the third of Aristotle's components of *ethos*. Compared to *phronēsis* and *eunoia*, it is the closest measure of a speaker's identity. It means personal excellence in producing and preserving the ultimate good, which Aristotle associates with happiness and contentment.[58] Aristotle states:

> Now virtue [*aretē*] is an ability [dynamis], as it seems, that is productive and preservative of goods, and an ability for doing good in many and great

[56] Aristotle, Book 2, chapter 4.
[57] McCroskey & Teven, 101.
[58] Smith, 7.

> ways, actually in all ways in all things. The parts [or subdivisions] of virtue are justice, manly courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom.[59]

Reading this definition, we must remember Aristotle's emphasis on *ethos* as performative and artistic. The skilled rhetor not only possess such qualities as manly courage, self-control, prudence, and the ability to do good, but he displays them in public speeches.

To translate *aretē* simply as "virtue," however, is to misunderstand the concept's implications. Classical Greek and Roman cultures did not distinguish, as we do, between private and public identity. Furthermore, they did not perceive virtue as a strictly moral concept.[60] *Aretē* means "excellence," specifically as it pertains to the active pursuit of a civic identity. To have *aretē*, in the classical sense, is to fulfill one's responsibilities to the community. As Finkelberg explains, citizens of the archaic and classical periods considered *aretē* as fundamentally dependent on action, specifically purporting to benefit the common good in the accepted ways of war and politics.[61] Thus, modern understandings of identity as private and stable across different contexts do not apply. We tend to think that personal identity remains unchanged, albeit hidden, when external circumstances prevent a person from acting on it. A rhetorical theory of expertise that accounts for the complex nature of the expert must also, it seems, address the expert's identity and identification with a community.

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[59] Aristotle, Book 1, chapter 9.
[60] Margalit Finkelberg, "Virtue and Circumstances: On the City-State Concept of *Arēte*," *American Journal of Philology* 123 (2002): 36.
[61] Finkelberg, 48.

Identity and Identification

A rhetorical perspective on expertise addresses identity and identification. This is only slightly distinct from the preceding one; *ethos* is fundamentally linked to identity. It establishes the rhetor's public character via "the distinctive voice of an individual and the spirit of a[n intellectual] community."[62] As Burke explains, identity is about both individuality and sameness. "In being identified with B, A is 'substantially one' with a person other than himself [sic]. Yet at the same time he [sic] remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he [sic] is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another."[63] The more individualistic a culture is, the more importance can be expected to be placed on an expert's personal construction and enactment of identity. At the same time, the expert is also obliged to ground these efforts in relation to an audience. On the subject of identity and expertise, I wish to advance two specific points.

First, a rhetorical perspective highlights the expert's personal relationship to her subject matter. An expert, I submit, is personally invested in her field of expertise; she is committed to her questions, methods, and assumptions. When considered in terms of rhetorical invention, expertise is "the establishment by the speaker or writer of a proper relationship to his [sic] subject."[64] Nuutinen's "Expert-Identity" construct illustrates

[62] Helen Constantinides, "The Duality of Scientific Ethos: Deep and Surface Structures," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 87 (2001): 65.
[63] Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 21.
[64] Elbert W. Harrington, "A Modern Approach to Invention," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 48 (1962): 377.

cognitive science's most comparable version of this personal relationship.[65] It comprises a sense of meaningfulness, self-confidence, and control in the context of high-stress work environments. It does not, however, account for the expert's identity across public/private boundaries. It furthermore has no way of analyzing how identity changes through language. A rhetorical perspective on expertise and identity provides such analyses.

Second, expertise is largely a collective phenomenon. It requires the expert to relate to a particular group. For example, an academic conference-attendee must persuade the audience of her panel presentation that she belongs. By playing the right language game, she may qualify as a member of the group. Likewise, a rhetor must be able to construct *ethos* as both a reflection of personal identity and an attachment to a social collective. The more a rhetor can draw on the culture in which she operates, the more successful will be her ethical appeals. Cicero states:

> [T]he whole art of oratory lies open to the view, and is concerned in some measure with the common practice, custom, and speech of mankind, so that, whereas in all other arts that is most excellent which is farthest removed from the understanding and mental capacity of the untrained, in oratory the very cardinal sin is to depart from the language of everyday life, and the usage approved by the sense of the community.[66]

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[65] Maaria Nuutinen, "Expert Identity Construct in Analysing Prerequisites for Expertise Development: A Case Study of Nuclear Power Plant Operators' on-the-job Training," *Cognition, Technology & Work* 7 (2005): 288-305.

[66] Cicero, "Of Oratory," quoted in *The Rhetorical Tradition*, eds. P. Bizzell and B. Herzberg (Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1990), 201.

Haskins examines this "language of everyday life" as it emanates from cultural lore.[67] She writes: "In an oral setting, epics and religious poetry served as chief vehicles of propagation of cultural beliefs and norms of conduct."[68] Thus, she argues, the philosopher and the orator alike necessarily rely on speech's aesthetic appeals to activate listeners' commonly held truths. "[T]he mythopoetic truth, *alētheia*, which has to do with remembrance through repetitive reenaction, is not opposed to the truth of the cosmic order contemplated and performed by the philosopher."[69] The philosopher and the orator both draw on familiarity with a community's history, myths, rituals and traditions in order to be persuasive. In particular, they use these discourses to construct an insider's *ethos* and credibility.

The same is true for an expert. In this sense, the expert's *ethos* is only viable in the context of a community; by attending to the audience's cultural identity, she adapts her own performance of character. Somewhere between the "mythopoetic truth" and the "truth of the cosmic order," the expert finds appeals that link her identity to that of the community. The audience's identification with the expert, her habits and values, in turn invites them to concede her ethical appeals.

The self-help experts favor this rhetorical strategy of identification. Their performances in various capacities go beyond goodwill to an appeal of consubstantiality. Dr. Phil once again provides a handy illustration. He does not give advice based solely on

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[67] Ekaterina V. Haskins, "Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Cultural Memory: Rereading Plato's *Menexenus* and Isocrates' *Panegyricus*," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 35 (2005): 25-45. See also Ekaterina V. Haskins, "Rhetoric between Orality and Literacy: Cultural Memory and Performance in Isocrates and Aristotle," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 87 (2001): 158-178.
[68] Haskins, *Rhetoric between Orality*, 160.
[69] Haskins, *Rhetoric between Orality*, 161.

noble intentions. Instead, by referencing his own marriage, parenthood, career choices, etc., he implies that personal experience provides a unique perspective. He assures the audience that he understands their troubles; after all, they have much in common. The expert's identification trope is very persuasive: "I can help because I know what troubles you," the appeal goes. Of course, this sort of appeal requires the audience's acknowledgement and participation.

The Role of the Audience

A rhetorical perspective on expertise emphasizes the role of the audience. Scholarship on expertise has largely ignored the role of those who consume it. The patrons or audiences of expertise are seemingly treated as a given variable, something to be implicitly assumed. A rhetorical perspective, in contrast, posits the audience as integral. The rhetor cannot succeed in her efforts to present herself as an expert without the audience's active consent. As with *ethos*, which is co-constructed by the rhetor and audience, expertise falters when the latter chooses not to participate.

This perspective entails a major shift in the traditional power distribution. To claim that expertise is a rhetorical agreement between the expert and the audience is to turn the whole phenomenon on its head. It means that the audience has the power to subvert expertise. Consider for example the practice of representative democracy. It assumes that the public elects those individuals it deems most qualified to speak in political affairs. The public, in other words, acknowledges that some of its members have more political expertise than others, and designates those members "representatives." But what if the public should wake up one day and decide that, in a democracy, there is no

such a thing as political expertise? They might insist that all citizens are equally qualified to make decisions, then refusing to participate in the election of some special individuals. Whether or not this trend is already underway, the point is clear: By not participating, not voting, not trusting, not obeying, the public has the power to thwart would-be experts.

It is this agreement between the expert and her audience that a rhetorical perspective foregrounds. Both parties acknowledge in some way that they willingly participate in the exchange of expertise for compensation. In some cases, the conditions of the exchange are written down. A consultant, for example, who comes into a corporate setting to evaluate and redirect the company's practices works on a contractual basis. The contract specifies the amount to be paid for services rendered based on the expert's qualifications. Elsewhere, the interaction is less formalized. A senior graduate student might help a junior prepare for a first conference presentation in exchange for beer. In both examples, importantly, there is a mutual understanding of an economy of expertise: I, the expert, have something that you, the layperson, want/need; if you compensate me, I will teach you how to obtain it. This exchange cannot take place without the agreement. A persuasive gesture, such as that when the expert persuades other that she knows something, requires the audience's assent. Otherwise the expert's persuasion fails.

Once the notion of an exchange has been introduced, the following questions become significant: What are the fruits of expertise? If expertise is indeed the function of a strategic rhetorical effort, what goods does such an effort procure? What benefits does the expert enjoy? The material payoffs of expertise may seem evident. A business person who can persuade the public that she is an expert in a totally new and absolutely

revolutionary area will make a fortune. More important in a rhetorical analysis, however, are the symbolic goods: acknowledgment, authenticity, credibility, status, legitimacy, etc. Being an expert means having the right to a certain chunk of human experience. It means that your version of that experience is recognized as the authentic one, that your perspective is acknowledged and believed, that your voice is heard. Ownership can be theorized in ways other than material property. To own an experience and thus call oneself an expert is to be validated. As my dissertation demonstrates, there is an array of rhetorical strategies that experts deploy to struggle with one another for such symbolic goods.

In light of these five propositions comprising a rhetorical approach to expertise, let me clarify my assumptions about the term "rhetoric." As is evident in my discussion of invention, I consider rhetoric to be first and foremost epistemic. It is the way that we experience and come to know the world. More specifically, my dissertation relies on an Aristotelian and Burkean definition of rhetoric. First, Aristotle underscores the rhetor's discerning and inventive capacity when he called it: "the faculty of discovering in any particular case all of the available means of persuasion."[70] To be successful as a rhetor and expert, one must be able to *see* the resources for persuasion, and do so even as they change with each new situation. Fuse this approach with Burke's definition of rhetoric as "the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols."[71] According to Burke, rhetoric is a means of deliberate

[70] Aristotle, Book 1, chapter 1.
[71] Burke, 43.

manipulation. Rhetors choose particular symbolic means because they fit the text and purpose. In addition, rhetoric is frequently a contest; it is product of conflict—as well as the conflict's site, means, and conditions.

My dissertation's analysis of expertise investigates symbolic strategies in the context of contest. It draws on the literature just reviewed as well as the notion of expertise as a rhetorical construct. As demonstrated above, a rhetorical approach to expertise interlocks invention and performance. It accounts for the complex nature of "the expert." It incorporates theories of identity and identification. And it emphasizes the role of the audience. Given this picture of expertise that the propositions paint, I ask: What do experts do rhetorically to induce cooperation and compete for authority and legitimacy? What rhetorical tactics do they employ in conflict with one another? What are the rhetorics of expertise? Pursuing these questions leads to a set of artifacts and a critical lens discussed in the following section.

Texts and Methodology

An analysis of the rhetoric of expertise should begin with the places where expertise is most salient. It should investigate especially how and when experts wield the most power and influence over our lives. The four contexts of expertise featured in my dissertation comprise some of modern society's most important endeavors: *the political*, *the historical*, *the medical*, and *the informational*. Many of the things we care about the most fall into one or more of these four categories. It is in these contexts that we become citizens and members of a community. We elect individuals to run our nation. We pay other individuals to heal our sick bodies. We acknowledge certain versions of the past

over others. We accept some people's knowledge as more credible than others'. Almost everything Americans value is entrusted to some kind of expert – political, medical, historical, or informational. In these four contexts, expertise is a way of organizing relationships and exchanges.

These relationships and exchanges of expertise, I contend, are rhetorical. They are the results of persuasion. When a political leader seeks popular support, s/he has to persuade voters that s/he is more competent, experienced, or savvy than the opponent. Displays of experience and high-power, Washington connections are tantamount to political expertise for politicians and activists. The same is true for medical experts. The medical establishment does not spend all its time simply practicing a craft. It simultaneously makes the public believe that medical practices are founded on science, and, moreover, that science is reliable. Since every one of us is a potential patient, the cohort of medical experts has a big audience. Again, rhetorical displays of knowledge and experience, for the doctor, coalesce as medical expertise. Likewise, Chapter Three illustrates the rhetoricity of historical expertise. Historians, in the process of writing historical scholarship, put forth persuasive appeals to make readers believe. At times the claims are implicit, but they nevertheless determine how the scholarship is received. Historical experts' claims about the past are filtered through a screen of credibility. Like other scholars, historians must acquire certain credentials by completing an academic degree, publishing in academic journals, etc. They are aware of competing forms of historical expertise. They understand that writing about, for example the Vietnam War, is not the same as being a veteran. The claims and warrants for this contested terrain of

expertise are different. Inherent in this awareness is the rhetorical task of making one interpretation of the past seem more credible, more expert-like, than its competition. These rhetorical struggles, and the strategies inherent therein, are the subject of my inquiry.

The structure of my dissertation is deductive. I began the process by staking out four contexts: the political, the medical, the historical, and the informational. Then, I organized each context according to an opposition; who, I asked, competes for expertise within these terrains? For example, who competes for the rights to medical expertise? Subsequently emerged a crucial choice: I could either find a text where the representatives' "attitudes" were explicitly stated, or designate a specific topic or issue where those attitudes were manifested implicitly. Either approach would require a close rhetorical criticism to reveal underlying claims to expertise. The first alternative would in effect require a theoretical playbook for each type of expertise. For several of the groups, such a playbook would be a strange proposition. Many experts do not explicate their foundational assumptions in a manner that is separate from actually practicing their expertise. Therefore, I selected four current topics of controversy, one for each context. For the political context, I chose immigration reform; for the historical, history and memory of 9/11; for the medical context, the diagnosis and treatment of depression; and for the informational context, the publication of (alternative) reference resources like *Wikipedia*. This issues-based approach was appropriate for two reasons.

First, it incorporates a more naturally occurring rhetorical phenomenon. Generally speaking, attitudes toward identity and practice are more often implicit than not. The

experts from each chapter reveal more about themselves and their expertise when they put it to use than when they explicitly comment on it. Additionally, only certain groups of people habitually explicate their own practices. For example, professional historians and medical doctors readily offer an explicit account of how and why they know things. Articulating these assumptions is inherent in their expertise. Trauma survivors, on the other hand, may be aware of their experience, but may never have had to rationalize it theoretically.

Second, the four issues are places where the two sides actually engage one another. Analyzing texts that explicate methodologies would miss the rhetoric of expertise in confrontation. For example, most historical scholarship is published far away from the messy world of survivor experience. As a professional historian, you may present a perfectly elegant account of your research practices without ever having to face a witness's disagreement. I wanted to seek this and other rhetorical frictions that bring expertise to a head.

Note that I am principally focused on the rhetorical strategies of expertise, and only secondarily concerned with each specific context. The objective of my dissertation is not to determine the validity of different epistemologies. I am not playing the part of moderator or judge in a fight between theoretical knowledge and lived experience. Both sides of each issue may be worth hearing. The question is not what these experts say about a given subject matter, but what their statements reveal about an attitude toward expertise itself. I am first and foremost compelled by the struggle for acknowledgement that those who compete for expertise wage. The following section overviews my

dissertation's artifacts as well as the set of critical probes I use to respond to the primary question: *What rhetorical strategies do different experts employ to compete for authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another?*

The Political

In the spring of 2006 immigration reform became a major topic of political debate. Politicians on the left were trying to persuade the public that they prioritized both humanitarian concerns and matters of national security. Politicians on the right were performing a balancing act between retaining conservative support, primarily in the Latino community, and appearing to be tough on border control. Activist groups discovered new and surprising alliances; Catholic priests and left-wing protestors were shoulder to shoulder against a hard-line policy reform. Those who got involved in the controversy were making public appeals to being compassionate and patriotically prudent all at once. Everyone in the discussion was vying for attention and credibility.

Immigration reform is a matter of policy, which makes it ripe for rhetorical criticism. Moreover, analyzing arguments made in the context of immigration reform allows me to examine the rhetoric of political expertise. It reveals what both sides of a controversial issue claim regarding political leadership and its requisite qualifications. Simply put, arguments about immigration lead directly to assumptions about political expertise, because both are about popular presence in the civic sphere. The immigration debate focused largely on the right to be present – legally in the country and symbolically in political discourse. Conversely, political expertise is a question of whose voice should be recognized. How, then, did politicians and activists make arguments in reference to

knowledge and experience? How did they construct different claims to political expertise?

In Chapter Two, I analyze public statements made by professional politicians on one side and immigrants' rights activists on the other. I single out the few most publicly present politicians and activist groups to represent them.[72] By investigating arguments about immigration through a rhetorical lens, I ask: What do these claims reveal of an underlying attitude toward political expertise (civic competence, leadership, democratic power)? When is it argued that national politics should be run by a small political elite? Who would make such an argument and why? Under what circumstances is the public advised to defer political power to "the experts"? On the other hand, when is the argument made that national politics should be run by the citizens who, in their lack of specialized training, might actually ensure diversity and democracy? By contrasting these attitudes as they operate in a debate about immigration reform, I investigate how both sides rhetorically construct political expertise.

The Historical

In 2006 America passed the five-year-mark of the September 11 traumas. On the date of the anniversary, commemorative ceremonies and events were held nationwide. There were speeches and honorific moments of silence, the intensity of which seemed to increase the closer one came to ground-zero. On that day, the entire country felt the

[72] To collect these statements, I will use names (both of individuals and organizations) as search terms in databases such as Lexis Nexis and Academic Search Premier. I will limit the search to documents in which the names occur in the title field along with relevant subject phrases such as "immigration reform" and "immigration debate." Additionally, the search will be constricted to publications between January and June of 2006, a six month time during which the issue was intensely and publicly debated.

significance of remembering. It recognized that the landscape of American culture and politics had changed. For many citizens it became a new milestone – our generation's Pearl Harbor. While a national trauma like this one may have brought the country together, it also created conflict between disparate interpretations of what happened. Those who were there may not necessarily share the same experience as those who read about it. Interpretations reflect different ways of knowing and experiencing the past, which raises the issue of historical expertise.

In Chapter Three I examine the tension between history and memory as they are used strategically to make expert claims about the past. Specifically, I focus on expert claims regarding the history and memory of September 11, 2001. By juxtaposing historians and witnesses, I ask: In recording and commemorating the past, what is the difference between the rhetorics of scholarly and first-person expertise? What sort of expertise does a historian's systematic methodology and predictable epistemology produce? In contrast, what sort is produced by seeking the embodied and affective roots of personal memory? Most historians assume that knowledge is ascertained through systematic methodology. These norms have been established by a discourse community of researchers. How might these attitudes emerge in claims to expertise? For the opposing side, how do memory and personal experience serve as a kind of expertise? How do they use them as means of challenging academic historical inquiry?

Two essay collections claiming historical expertise are juxtaposed. The first is *History and September 11th*, a compilation of articles written by academic historians.[73] The second text is *September 11: An Oral History*, which offers personal narratives by survivors, rescue workers and close friends of 9/11 victims.[74] In my analysis of these artifacts, I trace the arguments that both sides make about knowing the past. Specifically, I analyze the rhetorical strategies for claiming the legitimacy of historical expertise.

The Medical

Medical expertise is a long-contested cultural phenomenon. Historically it has moved around to different social groups—healers, elders, witches, and wise men. The notion of medical expertise today highlights the tension between those whose knowledge is based on natural science and those who understand illness through personal, lived experience. The former treat disease as the malfunctioning of a biological system; their rhetoric of expertise draws heavily on their philosophical grounding in empiricism. The latter appeal to an entirely different set of cultural beliefs; they reference the body as a producer of medical expertise. One of the most poignant contexts in which to examine the rhetoric of medical expertise is depression. The diagnosis and treatment of depression is currently one of the more controversial and hotly debated issues in medicine.

Chapter Four contrasts two sides of a controversial medical issue analyzing how medical expertise is constructed rhetorically. The context of depression facilitates a multifaceted comparison of expert arguments. On one side of medical expertise are

[73] *History and September 11th*, ed. J. Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003).
[74] Dean E. Murphy, *September 11: An Oral History* (New York: Doubleday, 2002).

physicians. Of them I ask: How is the basic assumption that health care is an extension of the natural sciences presented as a warrant? What claims to medical expertise become available by grounding this science in discovery, empirical truth, and progress? How does referencing specific epistemological and methodological practices generate expertise? On the opposing side are those who have experienced depression personally. To examine their rhetorical strategies, I focus on embodied experience, narrative descriptions, and the rhetorical use of "everyday life." I ask: Does a willingness to acknowledge that some human experiences cannot be verbalized separate depressives from the medical establishment? What claims to medical expertise come from rejecting the widely accepted practices of science?

To trace the rhetorical strategies of both sides, I analyze two sets of artifacts about depression. The first is *Understanding Depression* by Dr. J. Raymond DePaulo.[75] DePaulo is the Henry Phipps Professor and Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry and founder of the Affective Disorders Clinic at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. His book is designed for the general public, particularly addressing patients suffering from depression and their families. The second artifact is *Unholy Ghost*, a collection of first-person narratives written by self-identified sufferers of depression.[76] The editor is a mental health journalist and the sister of a long-time depressive. The contributing authors are novelists, poets, literary and cultural critics. These two texts provide uniquely

[75] Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002.
[76] Ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001).

instructive examples of the tension between different kinds of experience in the rhetorical construction of medical expertise.

The Informational

Something that has recently received much attention from both scholars and journalists is *Wikipedia*, the online encyclopedia.[77] In fact, the National Communication Association's list serve CRTNET featured a brief dialogue in the fall of 2006 between Shannon Vanhorn of Valley City State University and Richard Olsen of the University of North Carolina Wilmington. The issue at stake was instructional and scholarly policies regarding the use of *Wikipedia* for research and course assignments. Should college instructors permit students to use *Wikipedia* as a reference? How ought we use it ourselves? Professor Vanhorn elicited advice from the list serve and Professor Olsen made a reference to teaching "critical evaluation and appropriateness of sources." He also joked that "any discussion of the value of *Wikipedia* should be done only AFTER watching Stephen Colbert's wonderful discussion of 'wikiality'."

Wikipedia is a rhetorician's puzzle. Its "anyone can edit" policy is a radical departure from the traditional ways in which information is organized and disseminated. On *Wikipedia*, scholars and laypersons are indistinguishable; one edits the other's work with no special designation for degrees or affiliation. Remarkably, *Wikipedia* has been well received by the American public. Some praise it for being a new kind of public sphere with great democratic and interactive potential. They see the challenge it poses to existing practices, such as publication. Others like *Wikipedia* because it makes

[77] www.wikipedia.org

information easily accessible. For the purposes of my dissertation, *Wikipedia* offers a useful illustration of the complications surrounding expertise. It brings to the forefront all of our fears about privilege and the control of knowledge. The principal question is therefore about the rhetorical construction and disposition of information itself. Chapter Five investigates *Wikipedia*'s production of a new brand of expertise that may challenge that of more traditional reference publications. This comparative analysis turns attention to the possibility of knowledge that is popular. I take inventory of the strategic appeals that informational experts offer. I demonstrate how they go about persuading us to accept their dissemination practices over others.

The informational context explores the emergence of alternative reference sources and their innovative forms of publication. More specifically, it contrasts fundamental assumptions about expertise from *Encyclopedia Britannica* with the much-debated *Wikipedia*. By analyzing texts produced by and about these publications I examine how expertise is differently managed in each case. I rely on both primary and secondary sources, using, for example, both *Wikipedia*'s own texts and published commentary about it. I also compare the format of the entries in *Wikipedia* and *Encyclopedia Britannica* respectively. I examine differences between the two publications when they feature information on the same topic.

Critical Probes

While analyzing these four contexts and the eight forms of experts that occupy them, I deploy a series of critical probes. The answer to each of them supplies one piece of this dissertation's puzzle. The question that each probe poses often overlap, suggesting

that the rhetorical strategies for constructing expertise build on one another. In many ways, the probes reflect the benefits of a rhetorical approach to expertise described earlier in this chapter. For example, one of the probes inquires about the construction of *ethos*. Another focuses on the integral role of the audience. Examining different dimensions of each of the eight expert groups strengthens my understanding of their discursive strategies. It allows me to explain how these experts go about constructing expertise rhetorically. What follows is a description of each probe; I then explain how the probes generate the needed information to answer my dissertation's larger question.

Probe 1: How is the *topos* of expertise addressed?

This first probe comprises such questions as: Do experts refer to themselves and/or their work using the terms "expert" or "expertise"? If they do not, who and what do they subsume under this label? What is the purpose and outcome of placing this label on someone else? If they do call themselves experts, what other concepts cluster around this self-characterization (profit, leadership, service)? These questions examine which experts make explicit references to expertise and what they claim in doing so. Some experts theorize openly about what expertise is and how they themselves function within it. They lay their cards on the table, so to speak. Oftentimes, however, expertise is only present implicitly; experts do not always refer to themselves as such, even when they operate under that assumption. Considering that my dissertation is a first stab at the rhetoric of expertise, that its purpose is to describe, exploring what is said directly about expertise is critical.

Probe 2: How do experts address methodology and epistemology?

As explained earlier, my dissertation does not evaluate the soundness of expert epistemologies and methodologies. It cannot, however, separate itself entirely from those concerns. For while I do not compare one way of knowing or practicing expertise against another, I do explore how these are invoked as rhetorical strategies. For example, representatives of biomedicine may rely on the persuasiveness of scientific methods to establish themselves as medical experts. For them, referencing familiarity with predictable and replicable methods may be key to credibility. Likewise, political activists and historical witnesses both present lived experience as central to their expertise. They are experts by virtue of experience, which is rhetorically couched as an epistemology. Experts' practices and ways of knowing the world may thus be present in its persuasive appeals for expertise.

This probe includes questions such as: To what training or experience do experts attribute their expertise? Do they privilege theoretical education or first-hand experience? How do they organize hierarchically different orders of such experience (for example, the difference between apprentice-like training and "real world" experience)? Do they reference a methodology explicitly as in the case of the medical doctors? If so, how is that methodology presented? Is it something that can or should be taught?

Probe 3: With which *topoi* do experts associate and disassociate?

All experts strive to associate itself with certain ideals and/or commonplace arguments/assumptions, while disassociating itself from others. This is how rhetors create

an argument by association.[78] It is part of identifying the differences between these eight groups, their practices and personae. To again use medical expertise as an example, doctors associate themselves with such tropes as objectivity, empiricism, progress, discovery, and detachment. These ideas recur in their language. The professional historians similarly emphasize method and professional membership. Both groups simultaneously disassociate themselves from personal commitment, affect, and emotion. In contrast, these tropes are precisely what the witnesses in the historical chapter highlight. The question is: What is gained rhetorically by grounding claims to expertise in first-hand experiences? In doing so, how would one rely on affect and emotion? What persuasive strategies are available to those who disavow detachment as a way to interpret the past? To discover these favored and disfavored tropes, I analyze the terminology in discourses produced by and about experts and their practices.

Probe 4: What is the nature of experts' *ethos*?

Personal credibility is one of the most important dimensions of persuasion. For this reason, a rhetorical analysis of expertise must carefully study how experts present their personal relationships to the audience and subject matter. For instance, I examine whether experts rely more on artistic or inartistic *ethos*. The latter, as discussed earlier, are those persuasive appeals not supplied by the expert. To political experts, for example, inartistic ethical proofs may be a degree from a reputable university (complete with framed diploma on office wall) and/or a rank within the party. In my analysis, I pay

[78] For example, by repeatedly associating myself with the mind's superiority over the body, I align myself with both Cartesian dualism and Christian spirituality. I may simultaneously disassociate myself from for example hedonism and any other belief that physical pleasure is desirable or even permissible.

particular attention to references to these inartistic ethical proofs as a possible strategy for establishing credibility.

Artistic appeals to *ethos* are more rhetorically complex. They require experts to feature knowledge/skill, goodwill and virtue. To discover how experts invoke *ethos*, I ask the following set of questions directed at *phronēsis*, *eunoia*, and *aretē* respectively: Do experts emphasize their knowledgeability and/or skill as the core of expertise? Is the knowledge/skill grounded in practical and applicable wisdom? Do experts strive to persuade the audience that their expertise serves the greater good? How is the relationship between experts and audiences fashioned such that the former might appear as productive citizens? In other words, how does the expert persuade the audience members that she is "one of them" and has their best interest in mind? Finally, how do experts present personal virtue as part of a persuasive gesture? What personal triumphs or achievements are featured in order to demonstrate service to a community?

Probe 5: How do experts address a tension between teaching and persuasion?

Persuading someone that you have knowledge is not necessatily the same as teaching the person what you know. It is the difference between sharing and not sharing expertise. Some experts are profoundly concerned with conveying knowledgeability but not with extending it to others. Furthermore, not all experts agree that superior knowledge or skill can be taught. The ones who believe that it can tend to consider this teaching a mandate. It is the duty of those who have expertise to pass it on and multiply the total number of experts. This probe emphasizes the difference between striving to impart and striving to restrict expertise. Furthermore, it asks how experts convey

expertise – in effect demand expert status – while persuading an audience that the expertise cannot be shared.

The tension between instruction and persuasion is fundamentally rhetorical. Whatever the expert's approach in the matter, she must make an argument that supports it. An expert who is more concerned with persuasion than instruction has to persuade the audience that instruction would have no merit. She of course also has to persuade us that she indeed possesses the relevant knowledge and experience in the first place. Conversely, an expert who is principally concerned with instruction has to persuade the audience that we can and should learn these skills. Moreover, she must persuade us that she is the one who can best impart these skills.

Consider, for example, the difference between professional politicians and political activists. The former have vested interest in preserving the idea that political expertise is highly exclusive, that it is limited to the few and especially qualified. What incentive, then, do they have to spread political expertise and "dilute" this exclusivity? What benefits would they reap from persuading people that political expertise is inaccessible and complicated? Activists, in contrast, ground their political expertise in popular democratic ideals such as mass participation. They use their expertise mobilizing the citizenry. The question is, how do they construct political expertise as something that everyone can pursue? To analyze this tension, I examine whether differebt kinds of experts produce an invitational rhetoric or one that discourages participation. Do experts encourage members of the audience to join, for example, in a political or online movement? Do they present their expertise as something that anyone could learn and to

which anyone could gain access? Do expert discourses make expertise seem so difficult and unattainable that deference is the only realistic option?

Probe 6: What enthymematic appeals are made?

Rhetoric is co-constructed between speaker and audience. In this engagement, enthymemes play a central role by situating the parties in the same cultural context. This probe inquires when and how audiences are invited to participate in the rhetoric of expertise. Specifically, it focuses on participation that supplies certain unstated assumptions based on shared identity.

For example, Chapter Five features two groups that compete for informational expertise. When they reference one another, their arguments become enthymematically interdependent. When *Wikipedia* promotes itself as an expert by criticizing the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*'s antiquated informational disposition, it asks the audience to draw on familiarity with the cultural underpinnings of encyclopedic publishing. I ask therefore: How do informational experts dialogically reference each other to compete for expertise? If they advertise certain strengths in their publishing methods, what shortcomings do they simultaneously criticize? To analyze enthymemes in the rhetoric of expertise, one might assume that the audiences of expertise share certain cultural experiences. For example, when reading scholarly expertise by a historian or a psychiatrist, the audience knows that personal, lived experience is beyond the scope of academic research. Thus it does not offer a comprehensive account of historical or medical phenomena. How, I ask, does this familiarity provide a basis for engaging in enthymematic appeals? This probe registers the specific places and contexts in which

experts requests audience's involvement. It also inquires what cultural knowledge an audience would need in order to understand experts' enthymematic gestures.

Probe 7: Who is the implied audience?

This probe demonstrates, even more than the others, how rhetorically grounded expertise really is. It asks how an expert's message is tailored to the audience and situation. To investigate rhetorical sensitivity, this probe focuses on differences in how experts speak to lay-persons, to other like-minded experts, and to competing experts respectively. For example, when are professional politicians speaking to other politicians and when are they addressing the American public? Are *Wikipedia*ns writing to the computer-literate public at large or to other contributors who share an interest in a very specific subject matter? Note the rhetorical choices that experts would make signaling these differences; speaking to an audience of experts and speaking to a lay-audience may be distinguishable by more than time and place. In order to discover the deliberate strategies that reveal an implied audience, I analyze word choice, jargon, tone, metaphors, etc. I furthermore stress the arguments that mark identification between expert and audience.

Probe 8: What audience participation is elicited?

This final probe examines what experts request from an audience in response to message and performance. It incorporates insights from the other probes, primarily the last three, which focus on the collaborative relationship between the rhetor and audience. Some experts, for example political activists, invite the audience to get personally involved. What, then, is the desired response? Other experts may prefer that their

audience respond with deference. What arguments do they make in order to make deference the most sensible option?

This probe distinguishes between *hortatory* and *distancing* speech. It analyzes how the request for a certain response becomes part of a rhetorical strategy. Note that I do not measure effects to determine what response expert's rhetoric receives. The question instead is: Do experts use language that puts the audience in motion or keeps it at bay? If experts feature more hortatory speech, it may seek to incite its audience. If more effort is put toward distancing or placating the audience, the strategy may not include the audience's direct action.

Each of these eight critical probes focus on the rhetorical nature of expertise. They inquire about how experts persuade audiences of their own credibility, knowledge and experience. The probes ask a variety of questions: What is the rhetorical interaction between an expert and her audience? How does personal credibility, or *ethos*, serve experts? What different components of *ethos* serve different experts in different ways? How do experts use certain tropes like objectivity, replicability, methodology, experience, democracy, and popularity as commonplaces? With which tropes do different experts associate and dissociate themselves? Taken together, the probes allow me to answer the principal question of my dissertation, viz., what rhetorical strategies do experts employ to compete for authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another?

Conclusion

My dissertation provides a rhetorical theory and vocabulary for understanding one of the most important phenomena in contemporary American culture: the legitimacy and status rendered by expertise. In this chapter, I surveyed how expertise is theorized in the relevant scholarly literature. I also provided an introduction to a rhetorical perspective on expertise, demonstrating how it complements existing theories and extends what we know about expertise. Finally, I discussed my method of rhetorical criticism (including a series of probes) and previewed the following four chapters. In closing, let me emphasize that my dissertation is about what expertise does, rather than what it is. I investigate the rhetorical construction of expertise instead of pursuing a single definition. Identifying, mapping, describing, and analyzing rhetorical strategies is my objective.

For this reason, my dissertation begins with a broad exploration of the areas in which expertise matters the most. Then, it hones in on some of our time's most controversial issues: immigration reform, 9/11 memory and commemoration, the diagnosis and treatment of depression, and the disposition of information in reference publications. Each chapter is designed to discover within specific contexts those rhetorics that generate power and credibility. Grounding the somewhat abstract notion of expertise in these very concrete contexts reveals the significance of my research.

The sixth and concluding chapter offers a series of theoretical postulates responding to my dissertation's central question: What rhetorical strategies do experts employ? The postulates are a way of framing my theory of rhetorical expertise; by drawing parallels between different experts from different chapters, I identify recurring

trends in the rhetoric of expertise. The postulates reveal that experts that are connected by the similarities of their rhetorical strategies. While many of the experts analyzed in my dissertation seem quite different on the surface, my analysis demonstrates that they have a great deal in common rhetorically. Indeed, the recurring use of the same rhetorical strategies through vastly different fields of specialization suggests that expertise constitutes a rhetorical genre. Only a focus on discourse allows us to discern these patterns. By devoting rigorous scholarly attention to patterns in the rhetoric of expertise, we learn valuable lessons about how the nation's political world is run, why some forms of medical expertise are deemed credible while others are dismissed, what the differences is between historical scholarship and the memory of lived experience, and why new information producers are causing such a stir. By taking on the question of rhetorical strategies employed by competing experts, my dissertation theorizes how expertise functions through argument.

CHAPTER TWO

THE 2005-2006 IMMIGRATION REFORM DEBATE: THE RHETORIC OF POLITICAL EXPERTISE

A democracy expects the general public to make political decisions. As the world grows increasingly complex, the United States government asks citizens to take prudent courses of action by electing wise and trustworthy representatives. So we listen to their speeches and consider their messages. We make ourselves symbolic citizens, subject to political persuasion. In so doing we must ask, What is at the heart of this political structure? What foundation of wisdom and experience ought we to rely on when performing these civic duties? How do leaders assume and exercise the powers given to them? What is the nature of expertise in democratic politics?

In part, political expertise measures a citizen's capacity to participate productively in the national polis. It involves knowledge, experience and engagement. To a greater extent, however, political expertise is a discursive and relational concept. It is a comparative logic organizing citizens as leaders and followers. Because the United States is a representative democracy, we designate certain individuals to make political decisions. We defer to their expertise by voting for them. Importantly, the power that these political experts wield is fundamentally contingent on persuasion. A politician must persuade the electorate that s/he is more capable, more informed and more concerned with the common good than his/her opponent. Such a persuasive gesture is prerequisite for the delegation of political influence. Thus, the layperson/expert relationship between citizens and political leaders is ultimately a rhetorical relationship.

My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. It investigates how expertise is constituted and negotiated as a function of the rhetorical situation, its participants and constraints. Specifically, I ask: What rhetorical strategies do different groups employ to compete for expert authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another? In this chapter, I focus on the rhetorical strategies of political expertise, drawing upon the immigration reform debate of 2005-2006. I use this topic as a contextual foil, and analyze the rhetorical strategies used by professional politicians and political activists respectively. As noted in Chapter One, my primary concern is the rhetorical strategies of expertise. Put differently, my question is not about what these individuals say about immigration but what their statements reveal about an attitude toward political expertise itself.

For this analysis, I examine public statements made by professional politicians on one side and immigrants' rights activists on the other (see appendix). In the process of selecting appropriate representatives, there were two relevant axes: 1) whether the individual would best be categorized as a professional politician or as an activist, and 2) whether the individual expressed primarily pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant views.[79]

[79] A few notes on vocabulary: The public debate in 2006 used the phrase "immigration reform" to mean a revamping of the nation's immigration policies. Theoretically, that could mean a revamping in any direction. Reform could be drastically restrictive or inclusive. Thus, being "pro-reform" is an ambiguous term that creates confusion about the person's views. S/he could be in favor of a reform that improves immigrants' conditions in the U.S. or one that tightens the already strict regulations for entry and participation. Typically, those individuals who are described in the media as "pro-reform" hold relatively conservative opinions. To minimize the ambiguity, I use the terms "anti-immigration" and "pro-immigration" in my dissertation. Moreover, I use the term "immigrant" rather than "alien," "guest worker," "illegal immigrant," or "undocumented worker." This is because my primary interest is not legal status, but rather the impact that this group of people has on American culture and politics. Visa status and eligibility for work, while they matter to the individual immigrant, are not determining factors in a public discourse about political expertise.

This selection process produced a two-by-two grid. In the activist column are the National Council of *La Raza* and The Minuteman Project; in the professional politician column are Senator Edward (Ted) Kennedy and former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist.[80]

	Activist	**Professional Politician**
Pro-Immigration	National Council of *La Raza*	Sen. Edward Kennedy (D. MA)
Anti-Immigration	The Minuteman Project	Sen. Bill Frist (R. TN)

The four categories represented in the figure above are uniquely instructive in the immigration reform debate. In addition, they provide excellent illustrations of political expertise. On one side, the two activist organizations are important opinion makers and agitators for social change. NCLR is the largest Latino advocacy organization in the United States; the Minutemen and their founder Jim Gilchrist have received much media attention during times when immigration reform has been particularly salient. For the

[80] To collect Frist's and Kennedy's public statements, I used the *LexisNexis* database of political transcripts. I limited the search using the term "immigration" and each senator's name. Additionally, I restricted the time frame to December 2005 to December 2006 when several Congressional bills were debated and the issue received much media attention. This search resulted in a collection of statements from interviews, press conferences and public commentary. To collect public statements from the National Council of *La Raza*, I used the organization's website: http://www.nclr.com. The website has a searchable virtual library; limiting the search by topic to immigration issues and by time to December 2005-December 2006 I collected thirteen articles. In addition, I collected approximately fifteen textual excerpts from the rest of the website: news releases, policy statements and other miscellaneous publications. To collect text representing the Minuteman Project, I relied primarily on founder Jim Gilchrist's book *Minutemen: The Battle to Secure America's Borders* (Los Angeles: World Ahead Publishing, 2006). I also analyzed the Minuteman Project's website: http://www.minutemanproject.com.

politicians' side, Bill Frist is the former Senate Majority Leader. In mid-March 2006, he announced publicly that he was committed to addressing immigration legislation and introduced an "enforcement-only" immigration bill (S2454). One year prior (spring 2005) Ted Kennedy and John McCain introduced *The Secure American and Orderly Immigration Act*, which was partly responsibly for reenergizing the public debate.[81]

To unpack the statements made by each of the four representatives, I deploy a series of critical probes—all outlined in Chapter One. As I explained there, the probes underscore the distinctiveness of a rhetorical approach to studying expertise. For example, one of the probes inquires about the construction of *ethos*. Another focuses on the integral role of the audience. The eight probes are:

1. How is the *topos* of expertise addressed (implicitly or explicitly)?
2. How do experts address methodology and epistemology
3. With which *topoi* do experts associate/disassociate? (objectivity, detachment, connectivity)
4. What is the nature of experts' ethos?
5. How do experts address a tension between teaching and persuasion?
6. What enthymematic appeals are made?
7. Who is the implied audience?
8. What audience response is elicited (participation or deference)?

[81] Note that "professional politician" and "activist" are a shorthand terminology. It does not imply that activists are not political agents or that politicians do not agitate for their agendas. Both groups work for political causes. Therein lies the point of the comparative justification, viz. to examine the rhetorical strategies used by different types of political experts. In the category "professional politician," I include individuals who are popularly elected and cast a vote in the United States Congress.

I use these probes as a means of accessing a text and organizing my research findings, not as a mechanistic checklist of questions. In short, I consider the probes as a methodology for interpreting the rhetorical techniques featured in the texts. They are heuristically valuable tools revealing the strategies of political expertise.

I begin this chapter with an overview of immigration in the United States. I demonstrate how the debate surrounding immigrants' contributions and costs to the nation has a long and contested history. Then I explain the purpose of using this particular site of struggle to study the rhetoric of political expertise. The analysis section that follows is divided into two parts: the politicians' rhetorical strategies and those of the activists. Each section is subdivided according to emerging themes in the discourse of the politicians and the activists respectively. Finally, I conclude by explicating several similarities and differences between the activists and the professional politicians regarding political expertise.

American Immigration: History and Context

The history of American immigration is globally unique. Not at any other time in history, nor in any other place, have immigrants played a bigger role in nation building. I say this not to be naively celebratory—a violent past must not be over-sanitized by nationalism—but to illustrate how important immigration is to America's myth of origin. It is a great equalizer; millions of American families have a personal narrative about their immigrant ancestry. We treasure the collective memory of being a nation of immigrants. At the same time, Americans have a conflicted relationship with strangers and newcomers. We sometimes struggle to align a glorious and mythic past with complicated

present realities. And we worry that times have changed, that there are not enough resources to go around. Associating a personal immigrant heritage with immigration as a political debate is difficult.

The historical timeline of U.S. immigration policy reflects our fluctuating attitudes. It illustrates how this issue has been subject to social, political and economic developments: recessions, industrial expansion, technological advancement, etc. The early *Naturalization Act* of 1790 states that "any alien, being a free white person, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States."[82] Later, when immigration was restricted through labor laws and exclusion quotas, legal language illustrated the suspicion with which foreigners were regarded. For example, in the 1880s Congress enacted a fifty-cent head tax on all immigrants while banning entry for "idiots, lunatics, convicts, and persons likely to become public charges."[83] In prosperous times, a culture needs workers and entrepreneurs; it can afford to be hospitable. In times of downturn, such inclusive thinking is rare.[84]

Since the late 1980s, immigration has been the topic of heated debate. A quick survey reveals that it resurfaces about every ten years. Every decade, politicians make strikingly similar arguments about employment, enforcement, and social benefits. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed the *Immigration Reform and Control Act*. Its controversial legacy is attributed to the sanctions that could be brought against those who

[82] Carolyn Lochhead, "The Evolution of Immigration Standards," *Reason* 38, 4 (Aug 2006): 44.
[83] Lochhead, 44.
[84] For an insightful analysis of the correlation between labor and immigration politics, see Susan Martin, "The Politics of US Immigration Reform," *Political Quarterly* 74, 1 (Oct 2003): 132-149.

employed illegal workers as well as to the provisions of amnesty.[85] In 1996, these asylum policies were voided by President Bill Clinton's *Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act*. Clinton's act featured stronger border enforcement, regulations against alien smuggling and document fraud, deportation clauses, employer sanctions and welfare provisions.[86]

The most recent round of immigration reform debates occurred in 2005, when Senators John McCain and Ted Kennedy introduced the *Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act*. While this initiative received some support, the House of Representatives nevertheless passed the much more restrictive *Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act* (HR 4437) on December 16, 2005. This bill, authored by James Sensenbrenner (R WI) and Peter King (R NY), was criticized for being too reliant on border enforcement and not being adequately comprehensive. It triggered the surge of protest from immigrant communities across the country.[87] Then in late May of 2006, the Senate passed the more moderate *Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act* (S2611). This bill included measures for increased border security and employer verification provisions, but also a strategy for funneling illegal immigrants into visa programs and guest worker initiatives. As recent history suggests, in sum, immigration is a staggeringly complex issue in American

[85] Norman Binder, J.L. Polinard and Robert D. Wrinkle, "Mexican American and Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform: A View from the Border," *Social Science Quarterly* 78, 2 (June 1997): 324-337.
[86] Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., "The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: An Overview," *International Migration Review* 31, 2 (Summer, 1997): 438.
[87] Fetzer writes, "City after city across the United States witnessed near-record number of immigrants and their supporters marching in protest against the bill [HR 4437] in the spring of 2006. Around 300,000 people demonstrated in Chicago, 500,000 took to the streets in Los Angeles, and another 500,000 protested in Dallas." Joel Fetzer, "Why Did House Members Vote for H.R. 4437?" *IMR* 4, 3 (Fall 2006): 699.

politics; it goes to the heart of our national identity, and it throws into sharp relief questions central to our political system, including the right to be represented in the polis.

So why analyze immigration reform to understand political expertise? What does one have to do with the other? The emotive and occasionally irrational tone of the immigration reform debate may make the connection difficult to discern. Where is the level of expertise in hurling invectives and racial slurs? The answer is in the establishing of political legitimacy. Both immigration reform and the notion of political expertise are ultimately about the rights, responsibilities and qualifications requisite for participating in America's public space. Democratic politics always returns to the issue of participation. Because a democracy requires popular decisions, and every person is equal to one vote, we continuously must ask, Who is able to participate? Who should be allowed to participate? And who, by participating more than most, gets to lead the polis?

In addition, the rhetoric of immigration reform—the discussions that politicians, opinion makers, journalists and private citizens have on the subject—is highly instructive in itself. By analyzing a portion of it, I can identify the rhetorical strategies that individuals use to establish not only what political expertise is but why they possess it. The debate—beyond the subject matter of immigration—essentially amounts to a battle for political expertise. In short, a perennial (and peculiarly American) political debate is a perfect foil for studying rhetorical strategies used by different groups vying for the legitimacy granted by political expertise.

Analysis: Professional Politicians Ted Kennedy and Bill Frist

The immigration reform debate of 2005-2006 involved some of the most prominent politicians in the United States Congress, including Senators Bill Frist, a Republican from Tennessee, and Ted Kennedy, a Democrat from Massachusetts. As politicians, the two senators have quite different backgrounds and perspectives. Frist, a cardiovascular surgeon-turned-politician, left his medical practice to run for the Senate in 1994. Having served two terms in Congress (one as the Senate Majority Leader), he now has returned to practicing medicine. Ted Kennedy, by contrast, was first elected to the Senate in 1962. The brother of a former president, Senator Kennedy's family is widely associated with American politics. He is an icon for the democratic party. In this section, I analyze Senators Frist's and Kennedy's public statements regarding immigration reform. In their rhetorical construction of political expertise, I examine three specific themes: the political process, the American public, and several recurring tropes with which the two politicians associate and dissociate.

The Political Process

One of my first critical probes focuses on methodology and epistemology. These are crucial because expertise is so intimately connected to the practice and underlying assumptions of a particular craft. In the case of professional politics, methodology translates into the dynamics of a political structure. The professional politicians' methodology is their knowledge of and active participation in U.S. politics. For example, Ted Kennedy and Bill Frist both reference the internal processes of the American political system. They explain how Congress has responded to a particular initiative; they

discuss the phases of a debate and the ongoing conversations in various committees. This discourse is a way for both politicians to demonstrate their familiarity with a particular area in which they seek to establish themselves as experts. It allows them to explicate their methods as politicians. Consider two typical examples:

> Frist: After consulting our various caucuses and the people who are interested, […] in the very near future we will bring that bill back to the floor of the United States Senate, […] we will have appropriate procedure with debate and amendment, and then we will pass a bill that will be comprehensive.[88]

> Kennedy: This may be the most important vote that we cast here in the United States Senate, probably tomorrow, maybe late tonight, for national security and for our humanity. […] And it is the way that the Senate should work and has worked at the times that we dealt with the great civil rights issues and Medicare and education issues.[89]

Quite often, the explication of methodology comes in the form of a reference to expert-to-expert relationships. Kennedy and Frist both speak about their productive collaborations with other politicians, including the president. This rhetorical strategy is an

[88] "U.S. Senators Bill Frist and Harry Reid Hold a Media Availability After Meeting with the President," April 25, 2006, Transcript, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007). For clarity and consistency, all excerpts in this analysis are indented.

[89] "Members of the Senate Hold a News Conference on Immigration Bill Cloture Vote," May 24, 2006, Transcript, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com. (accessed February 27, 2007).

argument by association. Be demonstrating how closely associated the expert is with other experts, he is able to "borrow" legitimacy. This is particularly true when the personal, friendly aspects of the relationship are emphasized. Flattery and fraternity are part of this rhetorical move: [90]

> Kennedy: We had a very strong bipartisan participation. These are individuals who know this issue, and they are taking it very seriously. And I think with the kind of assurances that Senator McCain just talked about in terms of maintaining the basic integrity of this proposal in a comprehensive form and in the shape we have, I think the prospects of getting something very important in terms of finally signed into law.[91]

> Frist: Let me just say that at the outset that he [Sen Harry Reid] and I have had a start-and-stop relationship and a start-and-go relationship on this, but for the last two weeks have been hand in hand as we agreed in a

[90] The gendered dimension of these relationships is significant. When the senators reference collaborations that transcend party interests, they often characterize themselves and their colleagues as a collective with internal diversity. Frist states, "We, as a bipartisan, motley crew, a delegation of leadership, interested parties, people who have spent a lot of time studying the issue, challenging immigration reform, have just met with the president for the past hour and had a very frank and open discussion." See "U.S. Senators Bill Frist and Harry Reid Hold a Media Availability After Meeting with the President." However, the collective's common agenda is served by a cohesion that is noticeably male. For example, during the press conference that followed the Senate's vote on S. 2611, Kennedy refers to his fellow members of the Senate Judiciary Committee as a "band of brothers, Republican and Democrat alike, who saw the importance of the passage of this legislation, saw that American […] needed to relight the golden lamp." See "News Conference Following Senate Passage of Immigration Legislation," May 25, 2006, Transcript, The Federal News Service, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).

[91] "Members of the Senate Hold a News Conference on Immigration," April 6, 2006, Transcript, Congressional Quarterly, Inc. available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).

> bipartisan way to produce a bill that not only the Senate could be proud of but America could be proud of.[92]

The trope of bipartisan collaboration in these excerpts complements the politicians' expert-like magnanimity. Because bipartisanship is most significant during times of crisis, the trope also affords the issue a sense of national urgency. Using the term *bipartisan* indicates unity working toward the greater good. It is an ethos-building strategy for crediting oneself with the ability to put aside differences in the public's interest. Recall from my discussion of ethos in Chapter One that *eunoia*, or goodwill, is vital to a rhetor's relationship with an audience. Frist and Kennedy use the bipartisanship trope to construct a society of political experts that convenes around an important issue instead of along party lines.

> Frist: And it is a time for us to show contrast in terms of the president's leadership and Republican leadership. It's a time for us to work together across the aisle on issues like immigration reform.[93]

> Kennedy: We had a strong bipartisan outcome yesterday in the Senate Judiciary Committee that showed that there was overwhelming support

[92] "News Conference Following Senate Passage of Immigration Legislation."
[93] "U.S. Senator Bill Frist Holds a Media Availability After Closed Policy Luncheon," May 16, 2006, Transcript, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).

> among Republicans and Democrats alike for a comprehensive approach toward the problems of immigration and immigration reform.[94]

Subverting the usual Democratic and Republican agendas creates the impression of an expert in professional politics writ large rather than merely an advocate of an ideological agenda.

Of course these rhetors go beyond simply demonstrating political proficiency. Accurately referencing Congressional procedures and hierarchies would accomplish this. Frist and Kennedy, however, speak specifically about their own contributions and successes as political experts—as members of the political expertise establishment. They list their respective accomplishments:

> Kennedy: That's the bill that Senator McCain and myself [introduced]. And we have a broad coalition of Republicans and—president isn't quite where we are, but it's a great opportunity for the president to just to push this legislation over the goal line[95]

[94] "U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy Holds A Media Availability Following A Meeting With President Bush," March 28, 2006, Transcript, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).
[95] Senator Edward Kennedy, Interview by Larry King, May 7, 2006, *CNN Larry King Live*, Transcript, Cable News Network, available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).

Frist: As our legislative branch of government, we are responsible for oversight. We have been conducting that oversight. It'll be extended even further today with a briefing at the Senate Intelligence Committee.[96]

Kennedy: I believe, one, we're so much further than anyone ever thought that we'd be on immigration reform, so much further. Very few people ever thought we'd be able to get it out of the Judiciary Committee and get it through the Senate and by getting it through the Senate by the strong vote that we did.[97]

Frist: We have demonstrated what is the very best about this body. The deliberation, the amendment—the debate and amendment; the having a committee, the Judiciary Committee, generate a base bill that had as its foundation the work of many of my colleagues, a bipartisan effort.[98]

Kennedy: This legislation is a major, major, major improvement over the current conditions in terms of the exploitation of workers. […] And we worked very, very hard to get these provisions in and they are part of the

[96] Senator Bill Frist, Interview by Rene Syler, May 17, 2006, *CBS Early Show*, Transcript, The Federal News Service, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).
[97] "Conference Call with Senator Edward Kennedy," July 5, 2006, Transcript, The Federal News Service, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).
[98] "News Conference Following Senate Passage of Immigration Legislation."

comprehensive approach, and it will make a very significant, important difference.[99]

When Kennedy and Frist explicate their successful efforts in this manner, it affords them the ethos of a political expert in two ways. First, demonstrating competence in political matters generates *phronesis*, or the impression of practical wisdom. It persuades the audience that the expert can prudently determine a course of action based on his assessment of a given situation. The reader will recall the importance of *phronesis* to the classical theories of ethos discussed in Chapter One. Second, listing one's accomplishments in public affairs evokes *arête*, or an image of civic virtue. *Arête* is a measure of personal excellence, particularly when it serves the common good. For Frist and Kennedy, the status of political expertise is bolstered by a rhetorical construction of the politician's ethos. Note, however, that while ethos is part of the rhetorical construction of expertise, the two are not synonymous. Expertise is broader, requiring a more complex rhetorical effort. For example, it depends on how the expert defines and delineates her/his subject matter, and what response s/he elicits from laypersons.

In addition, Kennedy's and Frist's referencing political procedures and discussing their own accomplishments offer a record. They report to the audience what has recently happened in Congress and how they themselves have contributed. This reporting format resonates with the mindset of a representative democracy, particularly the place of political experts. The expert participates on behalf of the lay public, then returning to

[99] "Conference Call with Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Silvestre Reyes," August 29, 2006, Transcript, The Federal News Service, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).

describe and document his/her actions. Reporting is a particular type of expert discourse. It informs the public, but it does not necessarily instruct. Put differently, reporting lets the public understand what political expertise comprises, but without sharing it. It does not impart expertise to others. Recall that another critical probe focuses on the tension between teaching and persuasion for experts. The two politicians analyzed here are representative experts. They report and inform the public. They do not to any significant extent equip the public with the means to replicate the expertise. Citizens do not themselves become politicians by hearing Frist's or Kennedy's reports.

The essence of a representative political expert, reporting to a constituency, is evident in the way that both Frist and Kennedy characterize themselves. Both identify the duty of professional politicians as completing a task on someone else's behalf:

> Kennedy: We've tried to make a difference. We tried to work with Republicans in the Senate. I'm old fashioned in the sense that I think we were elected to get things done.[100]

> Frist: I don't know where I'll be, after doing 20 years in medicine and now 12 years. I'm just a citizen legislator. I said I'm going to Washington to serve in the Senate for 12 years, and I'm doing just that.[101]

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[100] Senator Edward Kennedy, Interview by Sean Hannity and Alan Colmes, May 12, 2006, *Fox Hannity & Co.* Transcript, Fox News Network, LLC, available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).

[101] Senator Bill Frist., Interview by Amy Robach, Sept 28, 2006, *MSNBC*, Transcript, The Federal News Service, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).

Frist's notion of the "citizen legislator" implies a representative mandate. It humbles him before the political process and citizenry. He chooses to serve the public as one of its members. Doing so, he insists elsewhere, is the only way to get something done. Kennedy suggests that the very purpose of a politician is to "get something done" on the electorate's behalf. Frist's statement emphasizes the relationship of the expert to his audience; by being a part of it, he represents its interests. Kennedy's statement, conversely, foregrounds the duty of the political expert. By virtue of being an expert, his responsibility is to fulfill the American public's expectations and needs.

The American Public

Frist and Kennedy construct a relationship to the American public that blends expert-novice and politician-citizenry dynamics. Much of both discourses are devoted to what the public thinks, expects and desires. By identifying these attitudes, Frist and Kennedy not only affirm, but determine the relationship between themselves and the public, as well as the identity of both. The non-expert public becomes those who wait for action and results. The political expert becomes he who has an answer for the non-experts' problems.

> Frist: The American people want us to secure the border. We can't have hundreds of thousands of people running across that lower border of the United States of America, and we've got to get control of it.[102]

[102] "Conference with Senate Republicans," Sept 20, 2006, Transcript, The Federal News Service, Inc.,available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).

> Kennedy: That's what the American people want. They want us to have a comprehensive approach that's going to be in the interest of our national security, understand the importance of this legislation in terms of our economy, and most of all, be true to our values about who has the opportunity of becoming a member of the American community and citizenship.[103]

The prescriptive tone of these statements is significant. It posits the audience in a way that legitimizes the expert's response. The expert justifies, even necessitates, his own role and actions by identifying a set of expectations. The politician institutes a rhetorical situation in which his intervention as expert is critical:

> Kennedy: On the 9th or 10th [of April, 2006] you're going to have close to a million people demonstrating in 10 cities across this country, basically in favor of this legislation. […] This issue has struck a chord in the country among people that reaches the whole essence of what they are about and what they perceive this nation to be about and what they want to be a part of in terms of this country. And that is a deep, burning feeling which people feel very, very strongly about.[104]

> Frist: We've got a responsibility, first and foremost, to govern, and to govern with the challenges that are out there today in a 21st century world

[103] "U.S. Senators Bill Frist and Harry Reid Hold a Media Availability After Meeting with the President."
[104] "News Conference with Senator Arlen Specter; Senator Edward Kennedy; Senator Joseph Liberman," April 4, 2006, Transcript, The Federal News Service, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).

> where terror does threaten our homeland, where we've got leaky borders to the tune of several million people hemorrhaging across those borders every day.[105]

Kennedy aligns April's mass demonstrations with the Senate bill, while Frist offers his own governing as the answer to the threat of terror. Through this strategy, both project themselves as political experts.

How, then, is the public to react to these prescriptive statements of attitudes and expectations? One of my critical probes asks what response experts invite with their rhetorical strategies. In the context of political expertise, this is typically a question of deference versus active participation. Frist and Kennedy do not associate themselves explicitly with either one; instead, they use their own declarations of the public's stance enthymematically. Statements of what the American people think become an invitation along the lines of "isn't this how you feel?" If the answer is yes, the audience must assume that deferring to professional politicians is appropriate. Consider two of Frist's quotations:

> Whether it's on the Republican or Democrat side, we all need to come together. It's what the American people want, what they expect, and what

[105] Senator Bill Frist, Interview by Steve Inskeep, June 9, 2006, *National Public Radio*, Transcript, The Federal News Service, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).

> they deserve. […] I think the United States Congress—the American people expect us to have fixed immigration problems today.[106]

> The American people don't want us to tolerate 2 million people crossing the Southern border every year and coming here illegally. It's our responsibility to act.[107]

Frist implies that if his interpretation—or prescription—of Americans' expectations is accurate, his role and responsibility as political expert is clear. According to this logic, deference to the expert becomes the appropriate response.

Tropes and Enthymemes

In order to be persuasive, rhetors associate or dissociate themselves with certain tropes and values. Often, this functions enthymematically, which means that the audience participates by granting that all tropes come with different implications. For example, both Frist and Kennedy associate themselves with the characteristic tropes of American mythology. They demonstrate a familiarity with the audience's culture as a persuasive strategy. By linking themselves and their respective political agenda with certain firmly established American tropes, they enable consubstantiality with the public:

> Kennedy: Americans have always had an ambivalence about immigration issues and immigration policy. We are a nation of immigrants. And when we're really at our best, we recognize the extraordinary contribution that

[106] "Conference with Senator Republicans."
[107] Frist, *MSNBC* Interview.

> immigrants have added to our culture, to our enterprise, to our initiatives, to our ideas. It has been profound.[108]

Whenever a phrase like "nation of immigrants" is used, it evokes a large discourse of mythic American history. This is something that political experts strive to attach themselves to in the interest of being persuasive. It means that the expert understands his audience and is a part of it. For obvious reasons, Kennedy does this more frequently than Frist; he has been in politics much longer and is widely recognized for it (see above). To illustrate Kennedy's use of this strategy, a lengthy excerpt is warranted:

> In Boston, Massachusetts, I can look out of my window in the JFK Building and I can look out and see the pier where, in 1848, eight of my great-great-grandparents arrived. I can see the pier. […] And I know that, in 1848, they walked up those golden stairs and they walked into East Boston. And their sons, one of them, the Fitzgeralds, went on to be elected as the first Irish Catholic Democrat to serve in the Congress of the United States. And he went on later to be the first son of immigrants to be mayor of a major city, the city of Boston. He was inaugurated in 1906, 100 years ago. And he threw out the first pitch in Fenway Park in 1912, which is not unimportant because in 1912, the Red Sox won the world series.[109]

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[108] "Members of the Senate Hold a News Conference on Immigration."

[109] "U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy Delivers Remarks on Immigration," June 28, 2006, Transcript, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).

Kennedy associates himself with thoroughly American tropes to present himself as a trustworthy political expert. Surpassing credibility simply by virtue of his actions, he invokes a mythological discourse that ties his expertise to core American values. In this country, a person cannot be elected to political office without knowing something about baseball. Put another way, s/he cannot function as a political expert without a firm grounding in cultural lore.

It is important to note that while both of these political experts use the tropes that one would expect from a Democrat and a Republican respectively, they also belabor the tropes' opposites. They go to great lengths to assure the audience that their grasp of the issue is sufficiently nuanced. This again is a strategy of transcendence; it generates the impression that political expertise encompasses more than partisan ideals. For example, Frist predictably emphasizes those tropes which belong to his Republican position—border enforcement, national security, etc. He also carefully incorporates the idea of compassion and humanitarianism. Kennedy likewise associates himself with the idea that immigrants make significant contributions; at the same time, he nods dutifully to more right-wing staples like law enforcement. These strategies allow politicians to appear objective, more expert-like than ideologically motivated.

> Kennedy: We welcome all of those that are going to contribute and help and build this nation and continue it. We need your strength. We need

your idealism. We need your contributions and the difference that you can make for our country.[110]

Kennedy: We are strongly committed to making sure that the border patrols are going to give focus and attention to the smugglers, to the criminals, and to those that would do damage to Americans, whether they be terrorists, or whether they be drug runners, smugglers, or criminals.[111]

Frist: We're out properly securing our borders. We remain vulnerable to those who may enter our country undetected. It could be criminals, it could be terrorists, it could be other individuals who may mean to do us harm.[112]

Frist: I think this is an issue or should be an issue with an economic issue, a humanitarian issue, a national security issue […][113]

As a rhetorical strategy to buttress their political expertise, both Frist and Kennedy raise arguments that traditionally belong to their party opponents. However defensive this tactic may seem, its primary purpose is to raise the speakers above petty discord. It suggests that an expert who is sophisticated enough to recognize and acknowledge

[110] "U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy Delivers Remarks on Immigration."
[111] "News Conference with Senator Arlen Specter; Senator Edward Kennedy; Senator Joseph Liberman."
[112] "Conference with Senate Republicans."
[113] "Conference with Senate Republicans."

different views is unbiased. His/her judgment is unclouded by entrenchment. It is beyond dogma. Such an expert transcends mere opinion into a seemingly higher level truth.

Analysis: National Council of *La Raza* and The Minuteman Project

The National Council of *La Raza* (NCLR) is this country's largest and most recognized Hispanic advocacy organization. Its top attorneys and political operatives exert considerable influence in Washington. The Minuteman Project (MMP), by contrast, is a rather marginal group. Most Congressional politicians distance themselves from its rather extreme views and practices. At first blush, juxtaposing these activist organizations seems paradoxical; they seem to have nothing in common. When taken together, however, they illustrate a pattern in the rhetoric of political expertise.

Upon examination, it is evident that what these activist groups have in common is the deliberate use of powerful rhetorical tactics. They exert influence because of the carefully crafted impressions that they make on the American audience. For instance, the fact that the American mainstream thinks of the NCLR as a Washington power player and the MMP as fringe vigilantes is a rhetorical strategy. The organizations' public personas are the result of their deliberate persuasive efforts. It behooves the NCLR to persuade the public that it collaborates and negotiates with ranking politicians. Doing so puts Hispanic interests at the forefront of national politics. Conversely, it serves the Minuteman Project's purpose to seem like mavericks. Nonconformity and a sort of wild west, anti-establishment rebellion are persuasive to their primary audience. Generating this popular impression benefits the organization. So while the NCLR and the Minuteman Project create different impressions, both are rhetorical artifacts with a target audience

and specific goal. Both organizations create their personae as part of a rhetoric of political expertise. In this section, I trace several recurring themes in the public discourses of NCLR and the Minuteman Project: the trope of urgency, the stark criticism against established political actors, identification with the American public, and the invitation to join the cause.

Trope of Urgency

For both the NCLR and MMP, creating a sense of urgency surrounding their cause is critical. It generates legitimacy to both the issue itself and to an expert organization devoted to it. It shows the public how serious the issue really is. In order to achieve this, the NCLR repeatedly underscores the dire consequences of poor political decision-making. They use phrases like "playing with people's lives" to warn the audience about bad legislation. The MMP likewise spends considerable effort creating the impression of urgency. They construct immigration as an imminent threat by comparing it to a flood and a military invasion:

> NCRL: The House Republicans have overreached and are playing with people's lives for political gain.[114]

> MMP: At the current rate of illegal immigration, which is increasing by 10 to 20 percent per year, within twenty years our nation will drown under the weight of the needs, wants, and demands of illegal aliens.[115]

[114] National Council of *La Raza*, "NCLR Terms Sensenbrenner Bill 'Appalling,'" News Release, Dec 8, 2005, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/news/detail/35482/ (accessed March 5, 2007).
[115] Gilchrist, xx.

> NCLR: Poll after poll shows that the American people want action, not grandstanding, on immigration. And poll after poll also shows that Latinos view the scapegoating of immigrants as a personal attack. These ads are not only inflammatory, they are counter productive.[116]
>
> MMP: Our current estimates put the number of illegal aliens entering the United States at over ten thousand per day along the entire 1,989-mile U.S. border with Mexico. That rate amounts to about seventy-five thousand illegal immigrants entering the U.S. per week—the equivalent of four army divisions.[117]

These excerpts identify an urgency that creates an immediate need for action. They suggest that serious problems require serious solutions. Or, more specifically, serious problems require serious experts on the job. Such a notion of the wrong-headed nation is a perfect warrant in the rhetoric of political expertise. In order to supply the implicit premise, the audience might wonder about a possible solution. Highlighting a crisis—of immigrant "invasion" or legislative consciousness—begs the question of who will be the nation's leader. Something must be done, but by whom?

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[116] National Council of *La Raza*, "NCLR to Both Political Parties: Don't Demonize Latinos and Immigrants in 2006 Campaign," News Release, Aug 28, 2006, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/news/detail/41841/ (accessed March 5, 2007).
[117] Gilchrist, 4.

Criticism of Professional Politics/Politicians

Before answering this question, both the NCLR and the MMP painstakingly discredit the expert efforts already underway. They reference past failures of immigration reform in order to criticize professional politicians. According to activists, politicians are ineffective and/or simply incompetent. A rigid political bureaucracy prevents them from achieving necessary and much-needed results. This argument is a refutation; specifically, it refutes the validity of politicians' methodology. Again, my critical probe regarding the nature of expert methodology reveals something important about expertise. By discarding the practices in which the government already engages, the NCRL and the MMP reject the political expertise of the establishment.

> MMP: If simple enforcement of U.S. law becomes too heavy a burden or too great a nuisance for elected and appointed members of government, then it is up to average citizens to fulfill the destiny envisioned by our Founding Fathers and to accept the challenge of exercising the right to self-governance.[118]

> MMP: This is a problem that our elected political officials, from the White House down to state governorships and local city councils, have ignored.[119]

[118] Gilchrist, 5.
[119] Gilchrist, 21.

> MMP: The United States of America is ripe for a powerful third party that could threaten the Republicans and the Democrats by putting the mission of the sovereignty of the country ahead of their greedy agenda to maintain party control over everything and everyone.[120]
>
> NCLR: The [Sensenbrenner] bill is a laundry list of mean-spirited and intrusive provisions concocted by the most radical immigrant restrictionists in Congress.[121]

The type of political expertise that the government represents is dismissed in these excerpts as thoroughly ineffective.

It should be noted that the MMP's discourse contains much more of this criticism, using much stronger language. The excerpts above are but a few of the illustrations. When scorning the enemies of the cause—including the American Civil Liberties Union, the Southern Poverty Law Center, The Anti-Defamation League, Senators McCain and Kennedy, and *La Raza* itself—the MMP does not mince words. Comparatively, the NCRL is much more diplomatic. Its tactful style manages to criticize the government while not alienating key allies. This is consistent with my earlier observation about the NCLR's relationships with major political institutions. So while the MMP's criticism posits itself as diametrically opposed to Washington bureaucrats, the NCLR repeatedly

[120] Gilchrist, 98.
[121] National Council of *La Raza*. "NCLR Terms Sensenbrenner Bill 'Appalling.'"

references its collaboration with the government. The rhetoric of political expertise frequently hinges on association and dissociation with other experts. The NCLR states,

> We are a strong nonpartisan, bipartisan institution which realizes that enacting legislation to improve the lives of this nation's 41 million Latinos cannot be done without the help and support of members of Congress from both sides of the aisle.[122]

> We will hold both parties accountable. […] If immigration reform is going to become a reality, it will require a bipartisan effort. We call on our leaders on both sides of the aisle to work together to get the job done.[123]

> We intend to work with members of both parties and the White House to produce positive results for our community, and our country.[124]

In short, while the NCRL does criticize electoral politics and demand stricter accountability, it also belabors its own close relationship with those politics. It is as though formal politics is a necessary evil in the struggle for political influence; it is therefore employed as a handy reference in the rhetorical strategy for constructing expertise.

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[122] National Council of *La Raza*, "New NCLR Voter Guide Accompanies Hundreds to Capitol Hill for Advocacy Day," News Release, March 9, 2006, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/news/detail/37081/ (accessed March 5, 2007).
[123] National Council of *La Raza*, "NCLR Urges Bipartisan Action on Comprehensive Immigration Reform," News Release, April 20, 2006, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/news/detail/38687/ (accessed March 5, 2007).
[124] National Council of *La Raza*, "NCLR Statement on the 2006 Midterm Election and Beyond," News Release, Nov 8, 2006, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/news/detail/43018/ (accessed March 5, 2007).

Activities and Contributions

The trope of urgency discussed above begs the question "Who?" If something has to be done about immigration, who should do it? If professional politics continually fall short, who are the experts best suited to solve a problem of this magnitude? In answer to this question both the NCRL and the MMP offer an extensive account of their own successes. Moreover, they describe and identify themselves as organizations of political experts by doing so. They are the alternative to politicians. They construct alternative political expertise using their organizational record of achievement.

> MMP: The president and most members of the U.S. Senate are wrong and, frankly, criminally incompetent on this issue. When it takes some average Joe Citizen like me, who comes out of some remote suburb like Aliso Viejo, California, to bring national awareness to this crisis, there is something incompetent or corrupt within your government.[125]

> NCLR: NCLR conducts immigration policy analyses and advocacy activities in its role as a civil rights organization. The primary focus of these activities is to encourage immigration policies that are fair and nondiscriminatory, to encourage family reunification, and to enact necessary reforms to the current immigration system.[126]

[125] Gilchrist, xxi.
[126] National Council of *La Raza*, "Immigration," available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/topics/detail/500/ (accessed March 8, 2007).

> MMP: The Minuteman Project was created to raise national awareness of the immigration crisis and to call on American citizens to act. […] Residents of all fifty states have been called upon to aid their country once again under the name of The Minuteman Project. These volunteers share the same patriotic mentality as those Minutemen who defended our original thirteen colonies.[127]
>
> NCLR: NCLR advocates on behalf of the entire Latino population regardless of immigration status. We believe that all persons deserve dignity and respect, and that the human rights and civil rights of all persons must be upheld.[128]

In these excerpts, differences between the organizations' relationship to professional politics are again conspicuous. Both are ways of explicating a particular expert methodology. As I argued earlier when analyzing Frist and Kennedy, a discussion of political practices and achievements is tantamount to a consideration of method and epistemology.

When the MMP and the NCRL explain their expert practices, they do more than simply lay their cards on the table. For both organizations, a powerful legitimacy argument can be made that connects today's activities with an historical precedent. This argument draws a trajectory from an event or group in America's past into the present,

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[127] Gilchrist, xix.
[128] National Council of *La Raza*, "Questions and Answers About NCLR's Immigration Position," available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/faqs/detail/43266 (accessed March 5, 2007).

generating in effect a mythic authority. Both organizations grant themselves an historical mandate. The NCLR does so by citing the "nation of immigrants" and the "American dream" tropes; the MMP naturally does so by celebrating their 18th century founders, the "original" Minutemen:

> NCLR: I am confident that our community will continue to be mobilized and focused on this important policy debate. Like many other Americans, we will demand a resolution—not just any result—but a real solution which honors our tradition as a nation of immigrants and reforms the laws with effectiveness, fairness, and respect.[129]

> MMP: The original Minutemen were unselfishly inspired citizens from the original thirteen British colonies who came to the aid of any colony facing trouble or invasion—even from Britain itself. Now, more than two centuries later, the fifty United States must defend California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas from invasion, this time by illegal immigrants. With America's first citizen-soldiers as its inspiration, The Minuteman Project was born.[130]

[129] In this quote, Janet Murguía, President and CEO of NCLR, aligns the Latino agenda with mainstream American identity. National Council of *La Raza*, "NCLR Commends Senate for Historic Immigration Vote," News Release, May 25, 2006, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/news/detail/39627/ (accessed March 5, 2007).
[130] Gilchrist, 7.

> NCLR: The work of NCLR and its affiliates on behalf of immigrants builds on America's identity as a nation of immigrants by promoting fairness in the law and advancing a number of ways to help immigrants fully enter the mainstream of American life. NCLR and its affiliates are on the front lines of carrying out the work that has always been essential to America's success as a nation, ensuring full respect for the contributions of immigrants and full access to the American Dream.[131]

As a rhetorical strategy vying for political expertise, this historical claim generates ethos, facilitates identification with the audience and establishes authenticity to method.

As mentioned in the section on Frist and Kennedy, explaining one's participation in political processes can serve different functions. It can be a form of reporting or a form of instruction. An expert might give an account of his/her actions either to report to an audience or to instruct them in his/her expertise. For the MMP and the NCLR—unlike the professional politicians—the purpose is dual. They seek both to report and to instruct, except that the reporting is designed more to impress the audience than to fulfill a mandate. The MMP and the NCLR impress by listing a series of accomplishments and contributions, particularly where others have failed. Building the impression that political experts represent the public's interests, the MMP and the NCLR expound upon their activities. More importantly, however, they take a pedagogical approach to their political expertise. To understand how these activist organizations instruct their audiences and

[131] National Council of *La Raza*, "Immigration."

encourage participation, we must examine their discursive relationship with the American public.

The American Public: Culture, Participation and Invitation

In the process of constructing themselves as political experts, the MMP and the NCLR appeal to a sense of identification with the American public. This is slightly different from the representative relationship that I described in the analysis of the professional politicians. The activists seek a much more egalitarian identification. Rather than the political expert who leads from the helm, these activists present themselves as experts who lead from the crowd. They seem to suggest that their expertise stems from communal agency. And, in order to construct this argument, they connect the experiences of their own group with that of the general public. For example:

> MMP: The grassroots Americans, the so-called 'silent majority,' would stand up and demand action from the federal government if they knew of the dangers posed by illegal immigration and understood how it affected the entire nation, not just the border states.[132]

> NCLR: Among its many provisions, H.R. 4437 would […] disrupt American communities and put all Americans at risk.[133]

[132] Gilchrist, 6.
[133] National Council of *La Raza*, "NCLR Terms Sensenbrenner Bill 'Appalling.'"

> MMP: When foreign nationals assemble on U.S. soil and march in the streets under a foreign flag, that demonstration appears to many middle-class Americans to be an open defiance of the rule of U.S. law, virtually a declaration of dominion over the United States. The message that many middle-class Americans hear is that these foreigners are not in the United States to assimilate, they are here to take over.[134]
>
> NCLR: It is very important not only to the Latino community but to the country that the Senate take up this issue.[135]

The Minutemen attempt to persuade Americans that the frustration we feel is their organization's driving force. They understand our resentment and they also feel it. *La Raza* persuades the public to realize that what hurts the Hispanic population hurts the country; what is important to the Latino community is important to every American. Inherent in these arguments is the suasory power of identification.

A closely related expert strategy that recurs in the rhetoric of both organizations is linking the American public's political wants and expectations with their own. Having established a sort of identification via cultural experience, the MMP and the NCLR proceed to identification through political interest. They demonstrate that they understand the public by explicating—almost assigning—its expectations:

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[134] Gilchrist, 75.
[135] National Council of *La Raza*, "NCLR Urges Bipartisan Action on Comprehensive Immigration Reform."

> NCLR: Member of our community, like all Americans, want their elected leaders to work in a bipartisan manner on issues such as education, health care, the economy, and civic empowerment.[136]
>
> MMP: In the opinion of millions of Middle Americans, the 'guest worker' program proposed by President George W. Bush is a *de facto* amnesty.[137]
>
> NCLR: At the end of the day, the Latino community and the rest of the country want effective immigration reform that brings order and fairness to our system.[138]
>
> MMP: Ranchers and homeowners along the border are fed up with the inability of any presidential administration, Republican or Democrat, to control our borders since the Eisenhower administration.[139]

This argument suggests that, not only do the Latino community and the Minuteman experience the same fears and frustrations as the American public, they have the same expectations from their elected politicians, the official political experts. And, as observed earlier, these expectations are not being met. A void is created where, when one form of political expertise proves inadequate, another form emerges. Activists project themselves

[136] National Council of *La Raza*, "New NCLR Voter Guide Accompanies Hundreds to Capitol Hill for Advocacy Day."
[137] Gilchrist, 98.
[138] National Council of *La Raza*, "NCLR Commends Senate for Historic Immigration Vote."
[139] Gilchrist, 183.

as the alternative experts, arguing that they have a superior method for meeting expectations.

The activists' method explicitly involves the public. One of the things that most distinguishes the activists' rhetoric from that of the professional politicians is the extent to which the former encourages the American public to participate in political affairs. Both the MMP and the NCRL, unlike Frist and Kennedy, invite America to join their ongoing efforts. For example, the NCLR speaks extensively about the mass protest that took place across the country in April of 2006. They praise this popular mobilization. Below is one brief example:

> The National Council of La Raza (NCLR), the largest national Hispanic civil rights and advocacy organization in the U.S., today applauds the Hispanic community's participation in the more than 136 rallies that took place in 39 states and the nation's capital. […] The rallies, which were part of the 'National Day of Action for Immigrant Justice,' represent the largest mobilization of immigrants in U.S. history. Following the county's great tradition of civic involvement, marchers participated peacefully in a family-oriented and positive environment.[140]

In this excerpt, the NCLR applauds popular participation and aligns it with the nation's democratic tradition. Note how this move popularizes political expertise. It demystifies politics by offering an open invitation.

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[140] National Council of *La Raza*, "NCLR Declares that April 10 Rallies Mark an Important Step for Latino Political Participation," News Release, April 11, 2006, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/news/detail/38380/ (accessed March 5, 2007).

The activists' rhetoric of political expertise includes a call to action. It encompasses popular engagement in all political matters. Moreover, both the MMP and the NCLR specifically instruct their audiences on how to become involved. Their explanations of the political process and celebrations of popular participation lead up to explicit information on ways of being politically active. These activists do not teach their expertise simply by explaining it; their instructions are hortative. They call the public to join and give them the tools to do so. The MMP's website includes links to an initiative called "Operation Fax Blast." By filling out an online form and paying a fee, anybody can "order" a faxed message to Congress. In addition, by following a set of specific instructions, anyone can start a new charter of Minutemen. Yet another example includes the appendices of Gilchrist's book: *The Minuteman Project Code and Standard Operating Procedures* and *The Minuteman Project Media Guidelines*. The MMP is a proselytizing organization; their activist type of political expertise grows stronger the more people it involves:

> We welcome to our ranks all who share our dedication to secure our borders and to preserve the United States of America, the nation we ourselves respect and love, for future generations.[141]

The Minutemen's invitation is a profound indicator of the nature of activist expertise. It demonstrates the difference between political expertise as a zero-sum game and political expertise as a strength-in-numbers tactic.

[141] Gilchrist, xxiv.

The NCLR excels at this instructional discourse as well, particularly on the organization's website. The website publishes a virtual library of continuous updates, articles and fact sheets. In an update on the Senate's immigration debate from May 2006, the NCLR outlines and explains the numerous amendments that were considered. The amendments and responses are put into accessible language and placed on a timeline. Additionally, among the articles are several lists of talking points that summarize the NCLR's position on immigration reform. These talking points are attached to the following words of encouragement:

> The voices of immigrants and their supporters are being heard; however, anti-immigrant groups are also injecting their voice into the debate. You must continue to be involved. Call and write your senators today! They need to hear from their constituents about the importance of comprehensive immigration reform and what is means to your families, neighbors, and communities.[142]

On the NCLR's website the need for the public to become engaged is established thoroughly. And the concrete tools for becoming an expert activist are there in the form of downloadable PDFs.

Two documents in particular illustrate the website's strategy for equipping the population for political action: The *NCLR Voter Guide* and the *Toolkit for Advocates*. The *Voter Guide*'s user-friendly format is divided into seven sections, each focusing on a

[142] National Council of *La Raza*, "Talking Points on Comprehensive Immigration Reform and Our Community's Response," March 31, 2007, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/publications/detail/38130/ (accessed April 1, 2007).

major topic such as education, criminal justice and economic opportunity. In each section, specific concerns are raised that the NCLR considers especially important to Latinos. Finally, each section includes a way of evaluating political candidates by their positions. In the section on economic opportunity the guide states that "A pro Hispanic candidate or incumbent supports tax and other incentives to help facilitate connecting low-income Latinos to high-quality financial advisors."[143] Moreover, this candidate or incumbent "opposes tax cuts for wealthy taxpayers but supports expanding tax credits, preferably those that are refundable as a more effective way of reaching Hispanic working poor families."[144] In short, the *Voter Guide* is a playbook on being an informed citizen. It both encourages electoral participation and equips the reader for it. As the NCLR states, "The best way to change the political and policy environment is to show our concern at the ballot box in a way which will make both political parties take notice."[145]

The *Toolkit for Advocates* is a much more localized manual. Unlike the *Voter Guide*, it emphasizes collaboration with community organizations over national elections. The toolkits are a series of issue-oriented instruction pamphlets, one of which focuses on immigrants' access to driver's licenses. The website explains:

> This toolkit provides immigrant advocates with tools needed to advocate effectively on behalf of immigrant communities and smart driver's license

[143] National Council of *La Raza*, *NCLR Voter Guide* (Washington, DC: NCLR, 2006), 10, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/publications/detail/37082/ (accessed April 1, 2007).
[144] National Council of *La Raza*, *NCLR Voter Guide*.
[145] National Council of *La Raza*, *NCLR Voter Guide*.

> policies. It contains talking points, information about building successful coalitions, model press materials, and much more.[146]

The point of the toolkit is to package political expertise in a manageable format. As activist experts, the NCRL invites, instructs and equips the public. Their expertise, like that of the Minutemen, grows the more it is proliferated and shared.

The fervor with which the activist experts invite the public's participation is remarkable. Having created a sense of urgency and need for concrete action, having scorned any ongoing efforts on the part of professional politicians, and having reported on their own success, the NCLR and MMP ask their audience to join. They encourage the public to become part of their political expertise. And they tell us what do to:

> MMP: Minutemen and women, stand your ground! By the power vested in us by our Founding fathers, we have an irrevocable right to peaceful assembly on U.S. territory. If it's a war our political governors want, then we will fight them with the First Amendment and within the rule of law.[147]

> NCLR: The key message for the community is that it is important [to] keep informed and stay in contact with trusted community organizations. Above all, the Latino community should continue its extraordinary activism on this issue. Every time we rally peacefully, carrying American flags and demonstrating the intensity of the desire for comprehensive

[146] National Council of *La Raza*, *Immigrant Access to Driver's Licenses: A Tool Kit for Advocates* (Washington, DC: NCLR, 2006), available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/publications/detail/36305/ (accessed April 1, 2007).
[147] Gilchrist, 17.

> immigration reform, we make progress in the legislative debate. We need to keep marching, keep contacting our legislators, and keep making progress. The April 10 events are a wonderful opportunity to ensure that our voices are heard in opposition to punitive measures and in support of comprehensive reform.[148]

Conclusions for the Rhetoric of Political Expertise

My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. It examines how this notion is a function of the strategies that different groups of experts use to compete with each other for status and legitimacy. This chapter focused on the rhetoric of political expertise. It juxtaposed two types of political experts: politicians Bill Frist and Ted Kennedy and the activists of the National Council of *La Raza* and the Minuteman Project. By analyzing the politicians' and activists' public statements about a given topic, viz., the immigration reform debate of 2005-2006, I demonstrated certain patterns in the rhetoric of political expertise. By comparing their characteristic strategies I identified several commonalities as well as differences between the two groups.

Remarkably, many of the rhetorical tactics that activists and politicians use to construct themselves as experts are very similar. They coincide in significant ways to reveal a recurring form. And this form—the rhetoric of expertise—is the heart of my dissertation. It may seem unlikely that a U.S. Senator like Ted Kennedy, who has over half a century of political experience, uses the same rhetorical strategies as those activists

[148] National Council of *La Raza*, "Update #2 for NCLR Affiliates, Latino Advocates on the Immigration Compromise," April 7, 2006, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/publications/detail/38228/ (accessed April 1, 2007).

who do political work "on the side." What could seem more different than an aging senator and a raging activist? It may seem equally unlikely that Kennedy, one of the most liberal senators in Congress, has so much in common with Frist. Nonetheless, the means of persuasion that are available to them as politicians trump their ideological differences. Even though the two disagree on almost every political issue, constructing the expertise of a politician unites them. Equally significant are the rhetorical similarities between the National Council of *La Raza* and the Minuteman Project. They oppose each other ardently, yet resonate profoundly in their construction of political expertise. They seek different end results, but their appeals before the American public draw on the same persuasive resources.

Three major characteristics in the rhetoric of political expertise unite activists and politicians. First, both groups demonstrate knowledge of and active involvement in the American political system. By discussing the institutions and procedures that comprise this system, experts prove their familiarity with it. Even the activists supply evidence that they are familiar with U.S. politics. By enumerating their own achievements, both expert groups establish a sense of competence. They generate credibility for their expertise by explicating a specific methodology. The activists' methodology is of course not the same as the politicians'; the progress that the NCLR proudly reports in terms of immigrants rights is not the same as the senators' press-conferences after a vote. The point, however, is that being an expert entails persuading the audience that you have a way of doing things, a set of practices that are well rationalized. Political expertise requires a

rhetorically-performed awareness of national politics as a system, as well as a record of participation that the expert can reference.

Second, both the activists and the professional politicians oscillate between opposing tropes. The rhetoric of political expertise does a sort of dialectical two-step. Both groups shift back and forth between the trope of their own ideology and the trope that represents a predictable accusation. This observation draws on my critical probe about experts associating and dissociating themselves with different tropes. For example, in the immigration debate Frist associates himself with the trope of enforcement. At the same time, he negotiates a balance between this trope and its logical opposite: compassion. Kennedy is faced with the same dialectic. He predictably links himself with a liberal and inclusive immigration policy; he also acknowledges the importance of law enforcement and national security. The Minutemen's trope of choice is patriotism and an historical mandate to preserve U.S. borders. But in a dialectical fashion, they effusively praise the nation's as well as their own immigrant heritage. Finally, the NCLR privilege tropes having to do with minority rights. On the other hand, they avow an Americanism that centers on the interests of the entire citizenry. These dialectics permeate the rhetoric of political expertise in all four discursive categories analyzed in this chapter.

The third characteristic that the activists and the politicians share is the continual referencing of the American public. Both types of experts constantly incorporate their respective relationships with the audience in their rhetorical strategy. They do this by demonstrating just how attuned to the public's needs and expectations they are. For example, both activists and politicians speak extensively about what the American people

want from its political leaders. They claim that Americans feel this way or the other in order to warrant a particular agenda. They insist that their experience with American culture—past and present—provides a unique perspective. For Kennedy and the Minutemen, the claim to such cultural familiarity is historical; they base their argument for legitimate expertise on precedents—a family legacy and a heroic posse. Frist's and the NCLR's are more grounded in the vernacular; they understand the American people by being a part of it. This identification strategy between the experts and the audience is prescriptive. It determines how the public *should* relate itself to political experts. While rhetorically enacting their sensitivity to the American audience, the experts chart what an appropriate response might be.

Beyond the abovementioned similarities, there are at least two important differences in the rhetorical strategies of activists and politicians. First, activists encourage political participation while professional politicians emphasize deference as a natural part of a representative democracy. Activists invite Americans to join them in their efforts. As political experts, part of their approach is imparting expertise. They explain, demystify, instruct, encourage and equip their audience. They tell us how to practice political expertise, whether by starting a chapter of the Minuteman Project or collaborating with community-based Latino organizations. For activists, political expertise is not scarce; it is an active way of being in the polis, one that everyone should embrace.

Politicians of course never state explicitly that the public should be uninvolved. They do, however, spend a great deal of time explaining why a complex issue like

immigration should be addressed by elected leaders, the political experts. When a bill is passed, they praise the political system's way of solving the public's problems. Once it is established how complex political problems are, and how apt Congress is at addressing them, the appropriate response is deference. We are implicitly encouraged to entrust politics to those who know best. Conversely, it is these elected individuals' duty to govern and assume responsibly for their constituents. The expert-novice relationship is deferential in the politicians' rhetoric and inclusive/instructive in the rhetoric of activism.

A second distinction between the activists' and the politicians' rhetorical strategies is the approach to established U.S. politics. I explained earlier in the conclusion that a similarity between the two groups is the continual referencing of the political structure. Let me now provide some nuance to that observation. While both groups do discuss their participation in American politics, they do so with quite different tenors. Activists focus significantly on criticizing it. They reject ongoing efforts as ineffectual and scorn politicians for their incompetence. Doing so generates a sense of urgency to their cause; it gives the audience the impression that nothing is being done about a serious issue. Politicians, on the other hand, couch their references to American politics in a conversation about personal relationships. Rather than criticizing the system, they spend considerable time discussing their extensive collaborations with other politicians, including the president. Both strategies do rhetorical work for the two groups; they function as a persuasive means of constructing political expertise. For activists, criticism is a way of creating a need for action and legitimizing alternative political leadership. For politicians, belaboring interpersonal relationships within the political structure establishes

the impression of general acceptance; Frist and Kennedy are acceptable political experts within a class of peers. Criticism and praise provide powerful strategies for different types of experts.

This chapter investigated political expertise and its rhetorical nature. The context of immigration itself, in addition, warrants rigorous scholarly attention. In the coming decades, immigration will be one of the most important challenges to U.S. politics. Immigration policy will shape the nature of the American polis. That is, each new regulation will determine who our political system recognizes as a productive member, and who it excludes. The immigration debate is not a theoretical exercise. It is the discursive field upon which those claiming political expertise struggle over critical issues: human rights, civic participation, social and economic infrastructure, etc. Political experts have the decision-making powers that will identify immigrants' place and identity in American culture. If the Unites States is to achieve a sound immigration policy, citizens will need to hear arguments from politicians as well as activists. In the process of evaluating alternative claims of political expertise, this analysis will provide a useful vocabulary and tool of interpretation.

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORY AND MEMORY OF 9/11: THE RHETORIC OF HISTORICAL EXPERTISE

Shortly before nine in the morning on September 11, 2001, an American Airlines passenger jet flew into the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. A few minutes later, a second plane hit the south tower and exploded. There was fire and chaos. Pedestrians around the crash site were frozen in shock or running away. People in the Trade Center tried to make their way down the narrow stairwells. Getting in touch with friends and family was difficult as cell phone networks quickly became overloaded. An hour and forty-five minutes after the first plane hit, the north tower collapsed sending a massive cloud of dust and debris through Manhattan. Over twenty-five hundred people died, including the one hundred twenty-seven passengers and twenty crew members onboard the two planes.

These are the basic facts of what happened on 9/11. They are verifiable and relatively undisputed. They are also rather inept at conveying the impact that this event had on the United States. The number of people who died does not convey the grief experienced by every family that lost someone. The exact time of the north tower's collapse does not tell us very much about the deafening sound reverberating through the island or the suffocating smoke billowing from what came to be called "Ground Zero." In short, facts are a small part of an historic event. Yet moving beyond them even a little is fraught with complicated choices. For example, once we have determined the number of deaths, we need a word to designate them. Are they casualties of war? Are they victims of a terrorist attack? Are they martyrs for the American way of life? Any decision

regarding the telling of a story is an interpretation of what happened. Any interpretation is a lens on history. Any lens is a form of historiographical expertise.

Historical expertise is owning the past by being persuasive. It means receiving general acceptance and acknowledgment of your version of what happened. It is a matter of interpreting the past in a certain way and persuading others of the validity of that interpretation. The process of such interpretation and the product of the process are inextricably linked; both are incorporated into a persuasive effort. And both are the subject of analysis in this chapter. For example, an historian may claim that Napoleon's surrender at Waterloo was a fatal blow to the commander's confidence, thus ultimately dooming his military campaigns. She may produce documentary evidence and explain in detail her method of historical research. Persuading you both of her conclusion and of her method is integral to historical expertise. More specifically, it is tantamount to academic historical expertise. There are other kinds of historical expertise. If you discovered a diary written by one of Napoleon's foot soldiers, you may accept his interpretation for different reasons. He may have an entirely different story to tell.

My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. It investigates how expertise is instituted and negotiated as a function of the rhetorical situation, its participants and constraints. I ask: What rhetorical strategies do different groups employ to compete for expert authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another? In this chapter, I examine the rhetorical strategies of historical expertise, particularly as they

operate in the tension between memory and academic history. Specifically, I focus on expert claims regarding the history and memory of September 11, 2001.[149]

In the following pages, two rhetorics of historical expertise are juxtapositioned; the texts that I analyze come from two essay collections. The first is a compilation of articles written by academic historians. The essays originally appeared in a special issue of the *Journal of American History* in September 2002, and were published in book format a year later under the title *History and September 11th*.[150] The other text is *September 11: An Oral History*, which contains eyewitness accounts gathered and edited by *The New York Times* journalist Dean E. Murphy.[151] It includes personal narratives from a variety of sources including survivors as well as rescue workers and close friends of the victims.

These texts provide uniquely instructive examples of the tension between academic history and memory in the rhetorical construction of expertise. They illustrate the strategies that scholars and witnesses respectively use in order to be persuasive.[152] For

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[149] As noted in the introductory chapter I am principally focused on the rhetorical strategies of expertise, and only secondarily concerned with the history and memory of 9/11. The question is not what these individuals say about the event, but what their statements reveal about historical expertise itself.

[150] Joanne Meyerowitz, ed., *History and September 11th* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003). In order to focus my comparative analysis specifically on academic historians, I exclude those essays that are written by scholars from other fields. For example, I do not include the contributions by Bruce Lawrence, professor of Islamic Studies at Duke University, Melani McAlister, associate professor of American Studies at George Washington University, or John Prados, senior analyst with the National Security Archive. Instead, I include for example R. Scott Appleby, professor of history at the University of Notre Dame, Nick Cullather, associate professor of history at Indiana University, Emily Rosenberg, professor of history at Macalester College, and several others. For the same reason, I specifically select those narratives from Murphy's book that represent eyewitness accounts. I include the sections devoted to survivors from the north and south tower and those labeled "On the Outside" and "To the Rescue."

[151] Dean E. Murphy, *September 11: An Oral History* (New York: Doubleday, 2002).

[152] To designate these two groups I use the terms "academic historian" and "witness." The former indicates that I am principally concerned with historiography as it is practiced within universities. Related terms such as "professional historian" are less specific, since this category includes for example museum curators and

example, each book is presented and marketed as the very best of its kind. In her introduction to the edited collection, Joanne Meyerowitz explains the selection of contributing authors,

> We chose scholars with noted expertise on issues pertaining to terrorism, anti-Americanism, the Middle East, fundamentalist religious movements, and foreign relations, and we asked them for deliberative essays, scholarly pieces with deeper research and greater intellectual engagement than typically found in newspapers and magazines.[153]

On the very first page, Meyerowitz begins articulating the nature of academic history. Conversely, the jacket of Murphy's book states that it is "the first and only oral history of September 11 that presents people from all walks of life." With this characterization, the book begins its persuasive appeal to expertise. Indeed, its cover boasts "real stories from real people." Like in Meyerowitz's text, the construction of historical expertise begins immediately.

To examine these artifacts, I deploy a series of critical probes. My probes correspond to the advantages of a rhetorical approach to expertise presented in Chapter

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archivists. I use the term witness for two reasons: first, it avoids the connotative complications inherent in labels like "survivor," "victim," etc. Second, it imports certain philosophical implications that I find useful for the purpose of my analysis. For example, to be a witness, especially of trauma, is to produce an account of the traumatic event just as much as it is to report it. As trauma theorists argue, witnesses "beget" the truth of a trauma in the process of testifying, see Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) and Shoshana Felman, "Education and Crisis: Or the Vicissitude of Teaching," in *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, ed. C. Caruth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 24. There is a dual meaning to the notion of witnessing, encompassing both seeing and subsequently reporting. To be a witness, in short, is often to fulfill a duty; something is protected from being forgotten. The historical witnesses that I examine in this chapter repeatedly express several of these concerns as part of their argument.

[153] Meyerowitz, 1.

One. For example, one of the probes inquires about the construction of *ethos*. Another focuses on the integral role of the audience. The eight probes are:

1. How is the *topos* of expertise addressed (implicitly or explicitly)?
2. How do experts address methodology and epistemology?
3. With which *topoi* do experts associate/disassociate?
4. What is the nature of experts' *ethos*?
5. How do experts address a tension between teaching and persuasion?
6. What enthymematic appeals are made?
7. Who is the implied audience?
8. What audience response is elicited?

I do not follow these critical probes point-by-point; that would be too mechanical for this complex issue. Instead, I consider the probes as a methodology for unpacking the rhetorical techniques featured in the texts. They are heuristic tools revealing the strategies of historical expertise.

This chapter begins by contextualizing the tension between different methods of interpreting the past. The following section introduces the reader to a history of memory, a history of history, and a history of their interaction.[154] Understanding the long relationship between these discursive practices has significant implications. It would be inappropriate to study the rhetorical construction of either one without acknowledging a

[154] The body of scholarship surrounding historiography, historical epistemology, and history-memory dialectics is immense. This section is not an exhaustive literature review or a comprehensive survey of the conceptual landscape. Instead, I wish to provide the reader with an introduction to some fundamental questions: What is history/historiography? What is memory? What is their relationship to each other? What discursive forms do they assume to be most persuasive, and to what audience is this persuasion directed? What, again, are the available means of persuasion for historical experts?

considerable tradition of historiographical research.[155] Next, I examine the rhetorics of the historian-experts and the witness-experts respectively. I identify and analyze how they talk about 9/11 in such a way as to make their interpretations persuasive. By doing so, I trace certain recurring themes in the rhetoric of historical expertise.

History and Memory: Tension in Context

People have always been concerned with the past. History is a repository of individual and collective experiences, stories and events. It is a resume of successes and defeats, injustices and lucky breaks, funny intermezzos and unbelievable coincidences. More than anything, the past is a producer of identity. Just as all the memories of my life make me who I am, the collective memories of my culture create a communal bond.

The relationship between individual and collective memory is both theoretically and practically complicated. Conceptually, the two are distinct in the simple sense that collective memory is common to a group of individuals and individual memory is singular. Individual memory, simply put, is "a group of psychic functions that allow us to actualize past impressions or information that we represent to ourselves as past."[156] It is the cognitive faculty studied by neurologists and psychologists. Beyond this definition, however, the distinction between individual and collective memory is much more muddled. Our memories, like all our cognitive and emotional processes, exist in a social context. We do not think or feel in isolation.

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[155] According to Johnson et al., historiography is an intellectual practice, distinct from the "movement of history itself." It is concerned not with the past but with the relationship between the past and the present, see Richard Johnson et al., eds., *Making Histories: Studies in History-Writing and Politics* (London: Hutchinson, 1982), 8-10.

[156] Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory*, trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 51.

All memory is to some extent intersubjective. Even the most private recollections are grounded in an interpersonal environment, because our mental ability to form those recollections is socially nurtured. As Halbwachs famously explains,

> Individual memory is nevertheless a part or an aspect of group memory, since each impression and each fact, even if it apparently concerns a particular person exclusively, leaves a lasting memory only to the extent that one has thought it over—to the extent that it is connected with the thoughts that come to us from the social milieu.[157]

Consider for a moment that the artifact I use to represent memory in my analysis is a series of personal narratives. To what extent, one might ask, do these narratives form a collective whole revealing something about historical expertise? The reason that they do work together is both cognitive and representational. It is a function both of the formation of cognitive capacities and the ways in which memory is symbolic. Private memories are formed in social cognition. And whether they remain private or become a collection, as with Murphy's text, private memories are shaped by public representations. They cannot be separated from dominant historical discourses or the representations of the past that circulate in the public sphere. In other words, when one individual tells her story about what happened on September 11, she necessarily reflects on that experience in light of news media, commemorative ceremonies, and current political trends. Memories—even

[157] Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, trans. and ed. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 53.

individual memories—are continuously filtered through symbolic screens and adapted accordingly.

Collective memory, as the phrase suggests, is the discursive activity of interpreting the past that people do in a group.[158] I use the term "activity" because it preempts the misconception that we "have" memory; memory is something that we "do." It exists in rituals and ceremonies like the Christian communion, the presidential inauguration, even romance and dating.[159] It is directly visible in monuments and memorials.[160] And it is something that we live with always, something that shapes our experience of daily life. Family legends are the products of collective memory, as are Halloween and college graduations. The functions of collective memory are multiple. For example, collective memory uses stories from the past to legitimate a present social order.[161] It generates shared identity. It provides communal cohesion and a sense of meaning and purpose. Halbwachs's definition of collective memory as "landmarks that

[158] It is easy to be confused by the circulation of different terms for a group's remembering: social memory, popular memory, oral history/narrative, public memory, vernacular memory, and so on. Scholars use these vocabularies to distinguish different kinds of activities but also to delineate different research agendas. Indeed, these disciplinary practices constitute their own rhetoric of expertise. For an informative and interdisciplinary overview of this literature, see Olick, Jeffrey K., and Joyce Robbins, "Social Memory Studies: From 'Collective Memory' to the Historical Sociology and Mnemonic Practices," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998): 105-40. I prefer the term collective memory because of its inclusivity. It encompasses the public and private, the popular as well as the official. In addition, collective memory is transmitted in oral, written and visual forms (including photographs as well as three-dimensional artifacts like monuments).

[159] John Bodnar, *Remaking America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Joseph Campbell, *Myths to Live By* (New York: The Viking Press, 1972); Lauri Honko, "The Problem of Defining Myth," in *Sacred Narrative*, ed. A. Dundes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

[160] Barbara Biesecker, "Remembering World War II: The Rhetoric and Politics of National Commemoration at the Turn of the 21st Century," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 88 (2002): 393-409; Carole Blair, Marsha S. Jeppeson, and Enrico Pucci, Jr., "Public Memorializing in Postmodernity: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial as Prototype," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 77 (1991): 263-288; Carole Blair and Neil Michel, "Reproducing Civil Rights Tactics: The Rhetorical Performances of the Civil Rights Memorial," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly 30* (2000): 31-55; Marita Sturken, *Tangled Memories* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

[161] Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 3.

we always carry within ourselves" is particularly compelling for this reason.[162] It bespeaks the constant presence of imagined pasts. These "landmarks" are the magnificent, earth-shattering disasters and triumphs as well as the mundane happenings that punctuate life.[163] September 11, 2001 is a landmark in American collective memory.[164]

The body of scholarship analyzing the differences between (collective) memory and (academic) history is extensive. In the interest of briefly synthesizing the relevant research, I rely on Pierre Nora's much-cited theory:

> Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition. Memory is life, borne by *living societies* founded in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of *remembering and forgetting*, unconscious of its successive deformation, vulnerable to *manipulation and appropriation*, susceptible to being long

[162] Halbwachs, 175.

[163] Not all historians share my enthusiasm for Halbwachs's work. Noa Gedi and Elam Yigal criticize his concept of collective memory for its lack of a concrete theory. They claim that it causes the deterioration of historical science: "Collective memory is actually a fabricated version of that same personal memory adjusted to what the individual mind considers, rightly or not, as suitable in a social environment. There is no mystery here; the mechanism of collective memory and the mechanism of personal memory are one and the same and located in the same individual mind. 'Collective memory' is but a misleading new name for the old familiar 'myth' which can be identified, in its turn, with 'collective' or 'social' stereotypes. Indeed, collective memory is but a myth." See Noa Gedi and Elam Yigal, "Collective Memory – What Is It?" *History and Memory* 8, 2 (1996): 47. While I agree that collective memory is closely related to myth, I do not concede that this leads to the conclusion that Halbwachs's theory is misleading.

[164] There is a considerable body of scholarship on the impact of trauma on national collective memory. See Kai Erikson, "Notes on Trauma and Community," in *Trauma: Explorations in* memory, ed. C. Caruth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 183-199; Ruth Leys, *Trauma: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Nancy K. Miller and Jason Tougaw, *Extremities: Trauma, Testimony, and Community* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000); Arthur G. Neal, *National Trauma and Collective Memory* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998). Some might argue that the collective memory of an event like 9/11 is different from the kinds of collective memory that a culture is constantly preserving, enacting and accumulating. I propose that it crystallizes the aspects of memory that I analyze regarding the construction of expertise. A trauma highlights the rhetorical differences between academic expertise of the past and that of a trauma victim.

> dormant and periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is the *reconstruction*, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to *the eternal present*; history is a *representation* of the past. Memory, insofar as it is *affective and magical*, only accommodates those facts that suit it; it nourishes recollections that may be out of focus or telescopic, global or detached, particular or symbolic—responsive to each avenue of conveyance or phenomenal screen, to every censorship or projection. History, because it is an *intellectual and secular* production, calls for *analysis and criticism*. Memory installs remembrances within the sacred; history, always prosaic, releases it again.[165]

Nora eloquently explains how memory and history are different ways of responding to the human need for understanding the past.

A few components of Nora's definition warrant attention; they are marked with italics in the excerpt above. I have already discussed the first, viz., that memory exists in "living societies." Second, memory is a dialectic of "remembering and forgetting," of "manipulation and appropriation." In order to serve various purposes, collective memory must be selective. It must choose among triumphs and defeats the things that are preserved for posterity. No culture relishes its sins. Instead, cultures use their accomplishments as a guiding light for future action. The good days are stretched out to represent an entire history; myth is strategically integrated with historical record. For

[165] Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire," *Representations* 26 (1989): 8-9.

example, there is an historical myth of social activism on American college campuses. For those who fancy themselves heirs to the 1960s hippie legacy, that myth is "eternally present," as Nora writes. The memory of these mythic figures is "affective" to the point of being "magical." Finally, Nora characterizes history as an intellectual, secular, and critical enterprise. He calls it a "reconstruction" and a "representation" of things that are no longer physically present. For Nora, history as critical analysis carries a mandate to be truthful. It cannot take the liberty of censoring or sanctifying. So, while the memory of student activism tells one story, historians may offer a different version. If their analyses refrain from censoring or sanctifying, that version may be quite disparate from the collective memory.

Having noted Nora's understanding of history and memory, it is important to recognize that there were historians long before there were academic departments of history. Put differently, historical expertise preceded the existence and certification of history professors. People were narrating and interpreting the past long before they had special licenses to do so. There have always been individuals who were uniquely knowledgeable about the past. We might think of them as proto-historians or memory-experts. In every community and tribe some persons are living records of the past. They may be the elders or the wise ones, telling stories and keeping track of significant events, places, objects, etc.[166] To some extent, these historical experts did have a methodology, a sense of praxis for knowing and teaching history. And, as George Iggers argues, this

[166] Halbwachs, 48.

methodology has long been grounded in the ideal of truth.[167] The notion that history should correspond to an external reality is ancient.

It is fair to say, then, that the developmental phases of historiography as an academic profession have little to do with memory—individual or collective. For this reason, outlining the history of historiography does not necessarily correspond to understanding memory practices. Different practices of knowing history, indeed different forms of expertise, exist simultaneously. It is possible, however, to create a tidy timeline of the historical discipline, while the same cannot be said for memory. One might begin for example in the late nineteenth century, chronicle a few significant scholars, then mark the inception of the American Historical Association and its flagship journal *American Historical Review*. Certainly, one would note the discipline's classical Thycydidean roots and identify how it was shaped by the emergence of science and two world wars. But such a disciplinary record is separate from the organic ways in which most people remember the past and engage with that memory in discursive ways. What historians do at work is something other than what people do when they remember and commemorate. Historians trace, examine and write about history; people remember.[168]

It is highly significant that the professionalization of history corresponds to the conceptualization of it as a science. Put differently, academic historians became experts when they could theorize and systematize their knowledge in scientific terms. In the mid-

[167] Georg G. Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century* (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1997), 11-12.
[168] To further complicate this, historians too are part of their society's collective memory. When they leave the office, for example, they go home to celebrate national holidays. Moreover, historians have a disciplinary or institutional memory that unites their professional collective.

nineteenth century, science and industrialization reshaped the Western mind. Historians, like other scholars, were pressured to adopt scientific practices by transferring "views and methods from the inquiry into nature to the inquiry into human phenomena."[169] They

> shared the optimism of the professionalized sciences generally that methodologically controlled research makes objective knowledge possible. For them as for other scientists truth consisted in the correspondence of knowledge to an objective reality that, for the historian, constituted the past "as it has actually occurred."[170]

There was an exigency for a positivist historiography, one that could provide answers to the "seemingly illogicality of life."[171]

As historiography became primarily defined by method, it transformed into a science of documents.[172] Preserved documents, or "sources" were long considered a historian's only reliable means of accessing the past. They are the lingering evidence. "In no case is what historians call an event grasped directly and fully; it is always grasped incompletely and laterally, through documents or statements, let us say through *tekmeria*, traces, impressions"[173] This approach was formalized in 1898, when French historians Charles Langlois and Charles Seignobos published a methodological handbook called *An Introduction to the Study of History*. It insisted that only documents embody past fact,

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[169] Ernst Breisach, *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 269.
[170] Iggers, 2.
[171] Breisach, 338.
[172] Paul Veyne, *Writing History: Essay on Epistemology*, trans. Mina Moore-Rinvolucri (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1984), 5.
[173] Veyne, 4

since they are the only things that remain. And of course the documents that history preserves are typically those that represent an elite culture. Le Goff explains,

> For a long time, historians thought that the true historical documents were those that illuminated that part of human history which was worthy of being preserved, reported, and studied, the history of great events (the lives of great men, military and diplomatic events: battles and treatises), political and institutional history.[174]

In essence, this emphasis on documentary evidence relegated historians to textual criticism.

There is a circular logic of academic historical expertise at work here. The formulation of a historical science called for a methodology, because methods are replicable. An empirical methodology turned historians' attention to documents, because documents are present and observable. Documentary criticism enabled claims to objectivity. And objectivity is central to a science. As the Popular Memory Group states, historical research is "seen as a dialogue between the historian and 'his evidence' [sic]. […] It is the 'source', the product of a now unchangeable past, that provides the possibility of a knowledge that is objective if it is honestly and critically interrogated."[175] The emphasis on documents and the formation of an objective methodology for studying them are key to historical professionalization. What is more, they are central to the rhetoric of historical expertise, specifically for academics. In the analysis section, I

[174] Le Goff, 180.
[175] Popular Memory Group, "Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method," in *Making Histories: Studies in History-Writing and Politics*, eds. R. Johnson et al. (London: Hutchinson, 1982), 220-221.

demonstrate how strategic references to sources and methods become part of this rhetoric. For now, let me simply note that the history of history and the history of memory have unfolded together but not in sync. Memory has always been and continues to be integral to any culture. Historiography as an academic discipline is only a few hundred years old. Nevertheless, it is powerfully persuasive.

There are two rhetorics of historical expertise in my analysis: memory and academic historiography. As this section demonstrated, they have a complex and much-theorized relationship. What I am concerned with are their ongoing arguments constructing expertise. I trace the claims that historians and witnesses rely on to stake their claims for expert status. History and memory are responses to our fundamental need for dealing with the past. What is most important for my analysis is that those responses contain different persuasive strategies. They use the available means of persuasion to make us believe.

Analysis: Academic Historians

Historical scholars are generally regarded as elite experts simply by virtue of their academic status. That is, being a history professor typically makes one an expert on history in the public's mind. The collection of essays analyzed here relies heavily on this perception. Part of the rhetorical strategy of academic historians, as I demonstrate, is to adhere to the practices of academic invention. The essays examined here were originally published as a special issue in the *Journal of American History* in 2002—one year after 9/11. The editor of the book Joanne Meyerowitz was the journal's editor-in-chief at the time. The other contributors are faculty members at prestigious research universities.

Having a *modus operandi* is vital to an expert community, especially for scholars. It binds the members to a consensus of practices and beliefs. Historians, like many other scholars, form this sort of expert collective through epistemology and methodology. They are defined and recognizable by the practices they follow in the pursuit of discovery and invention. It is like a professional code of conduct. More often than not, however, this code is implicit. The expert practices of historical scholarship are obeyed but unspoken.[176] Let me begin by focusing on the structure of Meyerowitz's book, whose very format illustrates academic standards. For example, the editor is the author of the introductory and concluding chapters; in the former, she discusses the history and conception of the project, previews each of the essays, and rationalizes the inquiry by situating it in an academic and sociopolitical exigency. She identifies the need for this particular text at this particular time. Furthermore, the book includes a table of contents and an acknowledgment to the editorial and publishing staff; the back-matter features a

[176] Most of the essays follow the academic standard for a book chapter without explicitly commenting on it. They exercise their expertise without stating its methods. An exception to this is Scott Appleby, whose essay specifically discusses historiography within religious fundamentalism. He defines academic historiography by indicating where it differs from fundamentalist religions. The chapter begins, "Historians are not alone in reconstructing the past. Richly imagined and ingenious documented versions of the past shape and sustain religious, social, and political movements." See Scott Appleby, "History in the Fundamentalist Imagination," in *History and September 11th*, ed. J. Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 157. Appleby goes on to state that "professional secular historians typically are reluctant to identify or even search for a transcendent meaning to the narratives they manage to piece together," 160. By describing "a supernaturalist reading of history," Appleby posits what academic history is not. For example, it does not "reach beyond the personal inclinations and biases that influence any historian to an external source such as Scripture that provides an inerrant, that is, a trustworthy, foundation for hermeneutics," 161. By explicitly discussing epistemology and methodology, Appleby argues that the historical expert is he who does not fit the characterization of a fundamentalist.

list of the contributing authors with brief biographical information as well as an index of terms.[177]

These are things that a reader may not notice, since they are not the book's primary content. However, they are profoundly important strategies in the rhetoric of expertise, particularly for scholars. Adhering to these formal practices is a way of performing scholarly identity. It is equivalent to how fluency in a particular language signals membership to that nationality. Being able to speak the community's language, or follow its epistemological practices essentially proves legitimacy both to the in-group members and to outside audiences. When Meyerowitz produces a scholarly artifact like this one, she demonstrates her expert identity both to peer historical experts and to a lay audience.

Just as the book's overall structure follows academic standards, so too do the chapters. Most of them are written according to the same pattern. Michael Hunt's essay on the clash of civilizations illustrates this discourse well.[178] He begins with a reader invitation—something "juicy" like tensions between the U.S. and the Middle East. This is rapidly followed by a thesis statement: "The argument advanced here is that the nature of the conflict sparked by the horrors of September 11 and represented by the 'war on

[177] The book also includes an appendix with numerous primary sources to which the essays refer: Samuel Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations" from 1993, former President Jimmy Carter's State of the Union Address from 1980, President George W. Bush's address to the joint session of Congress and the American people on September 20, 2001, and Laura Bush's radio address on women in Afghanistan from November, 2001. This appendix is particularly noteworthy in light of historiography's reliance on documentary evidence. As the abovementioned literature explains, documents are a historian's primary sources. Meyerowitz comments: "We also included a set of primary source documents, which supplement the essays with reports, speeches, and commentaries that illustrate the larger points that our historian essayists make," 1-2.

[178] Michael H. Hunt, "In the Wake of September 11: The Clash of What?" in *History and September 11th*, ed. J. Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003).

terrorism' has been ill defined historically by those who have declared that war."[179] The thesis is subdivided into two categories. Hunt discusses two types of myth surrounding the clash of civilization, and provides specific examples from American history. These examples are supported with dates, places and names of prominent individuals. He cites other scholarly works as well as his own, creating the type of scientific intertextuality that is characteristic of academic discourse.[180] He furthermore uses a writing style that is germane to scholarship in the humanities: it is dry and jargoned but occasionally flavored with the writer's creative indulgences. Hunt favors alliteration: "the brink of barbarism," "trapped in tradition" and "economy of explanation."[181] My point is that Hunt's essay is formulaic, and appropriately so. All of the abovementioned practices belong in traditional historiography. Like many of the other essayists, Hunt's obedience to them is integral to his rhetoric of expertise.

Academic Tropes

One of the tropes that historian-experts favor is dialectics. Dialectics is characteristic of scholarship writ large, and illustrates the manner in which academic arguments unfold. I mention above how Hunt organizes his essay according to two myths based on the clash of civilizations notion. Another author, Ussama Makdisi, does the same thing by parsing his object of analysis—Arabs' ambivalence toward the United States—into two categories.[182] Arabs, he argues, have a profoundly ambivalent view of

[179] Hunt, 8.
[180] Hunt, 14.
[181] Hunt 9, 16.
[182] Ussama Makdisi, "Anti-Americanism' in the Arab World," in *History and September 11th*, ed. J. Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003).

American culture. For the most part, they admire "its affluence, its films, its technology (and for some its secularism, its law, its order)."[183] What they do "hate" is U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East. He states,

> Whatever good Americans and the United States as a nation do in the region—from food aid to technological assistance to educational outreach to efforts at bilateral Arab-Israeli peacemaking—has been constantly overshadowed and tainted in Arab eyes by the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which Arabs do not see the United States as evenhanded.[184]

Finally, Emily Rosenberg proceeds in a similar dialectical fashion by dividing her analysis of gender and foreign policy into two arguments: a nation-state idea and a transnational network idea.[185] She posits two different "social imaginaries" in wartime discourses that link gender and politics.

This dialectical method is an expert strategy partly because it actually lets the analyst disassemble a complex object into smaller components, and also because it is persuasive. It is persuasive because it performs systematicity in an elegant and parsimonious way. Even the most complex argument becomes manageable when it is broken down at its natural joints and examined from several angles. Grasping Arab-American relations is easier for the lay audience if those relations are organized and deconstructed. Once a thesis has been subdivided, the scholar dialectician can let the two

[183] Makdisi, 132
[184] Makdisi, 152.
[185] Emily S. Rosenberg, "Rescuing Women and Children," in *History and September 11th*, ed. J. Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003).

parts play out against each other. Thus the dialectical trope is integral to an historian's rhetoric in two ways: it is a matter of methodology as well as a part of the relationship between expert and layperson. If the historian can handle her subject matter dialectically, that proficiency qualifies her for a community of scholarly experts. Moreover, it makes her expertise itself more accessible to a lay audience.

Refutation is another trope used by several of the authors. Like dialectics, it is a fundamental tactic in traditional argumentation. It allows the arguer to respond to the opposition by presenting counter-claims and evidence. Appleby, for example, uses refutation as an inoculating means of persuasion. By prefacing his argument with phrases like, "While some would object to my reasoning" and "Some might argue in contrast" Appleby constructs a refutational strategy as part of his rhetoric of expertise. Furthermore, the refutation almost implies a sense of respect. Recall that Appleby's essay analyzes the historiography of religious fundamentalism. He studies interpretations of the past that are extremely biased by most academic standards. Thus, the use of argumentative refutation is a sign that he takes these historiographers' work seriously, almost as potential colleagues. This historian responds to the fundamentalists' position the same way he would to a fellow member of the American Historical Association. He writes,

> The moral and political critiques that emerge from a historiography and historical method fundamentally different from that constructed and practices by professional historians are hardly incoherent or even

> unpersuasive. Rather, they shed a revealing light on what many historians consider "the real stuff of history."[186]

By taking such pains to critique fundamentalist historiography, Appleby ostensibly credits its practitioners. He extends a professional invitation from one expert to another.

In order to recognize the significance of refutation to the rhetoric of academic historians' expertise, consider its uniqueness. In what other context would one be expected to make the opposition's argument? Imagine for instance that I am describing a recent vacation with the intent to persuade someone to visit the same destination. Now imagine how odd it would be for me to explicate why my vacation was not as wonderful as I thought. In personal narratives or informal conversations, articulating the opposition's position is not appropriate or required. It does not make one more persuasive. On the contrary. Only experts within the academy, like historians, become more believable when they are able to speak to their adversaries' points of view.

Makdisi also illustrates how refutation works in the rhetoric of expertise; his agenda is corrective. He writes in order to correct what he considers a common misconception about the Arab mentality. Makdisi argues that the reason for Arab anti-Americanism is political rather than philosophical or "civilizational."[187] "Anti-Americanism is a recent phenomenon fueled by American foreign policy, not an epochal confrontation of civilizations."[188] Makdisi, in other words, is not refuting another expert's argument, but a popular belief. Nevertheless, he uses the trope as part of his rhetorical

[186] Appleby, 172.
[187] Makdisi, 153.
[188] Makdisi, 132.

strategy. Correcting the public's ignorance is by definition a function of experts. From the vantage point of historical expertise, Makdisi challenges—or refutes—the "clash of civilizations" thesis by historically contextualizing Arab-American relations.

Placing current events in an historical context is part of the historian's expertise. As Meyerowitz notes in her introduction, "Historians devote entire careers to placing the seemingly new in historical contexts."[189] In part, this performance amounts to a demonstration of knowledge: a historian can contextualize things that happen because she knows when, where, and why similar things have happened in the past. Hunts' essay contextualizes the 9/11 attacks by referencing World War I, the Cold War, and "half a century of U.S. intervention in the Middle East."[190] By drawing parallels between his object of analysis and other historical objects that he posits as analogous, Hunt exercises and demonstrates historical expertise. He writes, "The new patriotic consensus expressed itself in a wide variety of ways *familiar from previous* national trials."[191] He continues, "The post-September 11 nationalist upsurge in the United States with its impressive capacity to blank out an *inconvenient past* has *sturdy antecedents*."[192] Hunt presents this contextualizing gesture as a service, presumably to his readers, that brings historical precedents to light. It is shocking to him that "policy makers and most pundits" are able to repress an history of international violence.[193] "Well after September 11, most

[189] Meyerowitz, 1.
[190] Hunt, 12.
[191] Hunt, 11, emphasis added.
[192] Hunt, 13, emphasis added.
[193] Hunt, 12.

Americans still do not have the foggiest notion of this pattern of U.S. entanglement."[194] Hunt purportedly contributes to the nation's welfare by being an historian, connecting new violences to old ones.

Nick Cullather similarly aligns the calls following 9/11 for "fixing Afghanistan" with a long history of U.S. interventions.[195] He describes a series of modernization initiatives—airports, schools, suburbs, hospitals, and a massive dam project—that the United States undertook in the same region in the 1950s and 60s.[196] These initiatives, Cullather insists, sustained a Western myth of progress, capitalism, nationalism, and industrial expansion; the myth failed but the desire lingers. And the desire continues to be rationalized by the notion of spreading peace and global democracy. Cullather writes, "Proponents of a fresh nation-building venture in Afghanistan, unaware of the results of the last one, have resurrected its imaginings."[197] Notably, this ignorance coupled with a political exigence of international proportion justifies Cullather's expertise. He is writing in the hopes of staving off another tragic experiment. By demonstrating how nation-building has failed historically, he is attempting to prevent the United States from repeating past mistakes.

Expert Exigency

This contextualizing effort raises a number of issues regarding the rhetoric of expertise. Consider for example the notion of *ethos*, specifically *eunoia*, or goodwill.

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[194] Hunt, 13.
[195] Nick Cullather, "Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State," in *History and September 11th*, ed. J. Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003).
[196] Cullather, 22.
[197] Cullather, 48.

Recall from Chapter One that rhetors strive to generate the ethical impression that they have the greater good in mind. It is hardly surprising that many of the essayists indicate that their scholarship's rationale is a political or social exigency.[198] Such an exigency may validate the scholarship. As Meyerowitz states, "Our authors comment on the dangers of forging or analyzing policy without keen awareness of history, and they tell cautionary tales involving critical moments in the past."[199] Because something that is happening now has historical precedents, and because understanding those precedents would lead to more informed decisions, historians' expertise benefits everyone. Hunt summarizes this attitude,

> Acute problems attend the interpretive framing of an unfolding foreign policy crisis. Just when perspective is most valuable, it is also hardest for policy markers and commentators alike to find because of the pressure to act and the value of quick and simple ways of understanding. Historians have something important to say at such a moment.[200]

A research rationale allows historians to demonstrate goodwill. It demonstrates that they serve a civic purpose.

Political exigency also allows the historical expert to appear as an advisor. This is a persona that carries multiple implications for expert *ethos*, incorporating both *eunoia*

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[198] Note also that an appeal to social and political implications is part of the scholarly practices discussed above. Like other scholars, historians address the "so what?" question in their work as a matter of form. It demonstrates a purpose for historical inquiry that goes beyond preservation or antiquarianism. Furthermore, there is a discursive level of contextualization in the practice of scholarly citations. For example, Rosenberg contextualizes her argument 1) by giving historical examples of women's role in international politics, and 2) by referencing other pieces of historical scholarship. The former is a historian's move, the latter a standard for academic practices in general. Both contribute to her rhetoric of expertise.
[199] Meyerowitz, 2.
[200] Hunt, 8.

and *phronesis*, goodwill and good sense. The historian performs this persona to prove virtue as well as knowledge. This notion of an advisor-historian means that the audience of historical scholarship could potentially include political decision-makers. Often, this puts the historian in a bind. How might she persuade politicians to follow the advice of a history professor while maintaining academic objectivity? To understand this expert persona, consider the notion of a "Cassandra historian." She is a bringer of bad news whom no one believes. According to Greek mythology, Cassandra was given the gift of prophecy; however, she was also cursed with being unable to persuade anyone. As many of the essayists imply, historians have knowledge of the past that, by analogy, allows them to predict the future. Even in that pursuit, however, they seem worried about being discarded or ignored. They realize the slim likelihood that any prophecies will be believed. An example of this is Bruce Kuniholm's essay. He illustrates the expert persona in a postscript: "The National Security Strategy of the United States, released by the Bush administration on September 17, 2002, resonates with many of the arguments and addresses many of the concerns that I attempted to articulate in this article when it was written in the spring of 2002."[201] Kuniholm suggests that history proved him right; his arguments, even predictions, turned out to be true. This research rationale is based on a duty to inform and advise, two purposes that are integral to expertise.

This research rationale, however, is a balancing act for academic historians. To be sure, there is a justification for the inquiry, but that justification must carefully avoid

[201] Bruce R. Kuniholm, "9/11, the Great Game, and the Vision Thing: The Need for (and Elements of) a More Comprehensive Bush Doctrine," in *History and September 11th*, ed. J. Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 204.

subjectivity and bias. Appealing to informed decision-making is relatively safe; in other words, most historians can safely claim that the goal of their research and teaching is to create informed citizens. However, the idea that historical scholarship contains a moral lesson is potentially damaging to its scientific status. If historians have a motive, the argument goes, they are less scientific. Put simply, they are less objective. Peter Novick describes the "noble dream" of objectivity in historiography as:

> a commitment to the reality of the past, and to truth as correspondence to that reality; a sharp separation between knower and known, between fact and value, and, above all, between history and fiction. Historical facts are seen as prior to and independent of interpretation: the value of an interpretation is judged by how well it accounts for the facts; if contradicted by the facts, it must be abandoned. Truth is one, not perspectival. Whatever patterns exist in history are "found," not "made."[202]

As explained in the previous section on historiography, the disciplinary development of history as a social science has been influenced profoundly by epistemological positivism.

Historiographical Objectivity

Let me use Appleby as an instructive example of historians' approach to objectivity. In his essay there are at least two meanings of historical objectivity. The first is the focus on an object of study and the second is an attitude of detachment guiding the

[202] Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1-2.

study. Regarding the former: Appleby treats his object—historiography in/by religious fundamentalism—with impressive precision. In many ways this treatment of an object coincides with the use of dialectic (see above). Appleby begins by dividing his topic into two parts.[203] The body of the essay then lets three major religions—Christianity, Judaism, and Islam—play out against one another. He also includes several qualifying statements about vocabulary, particularly the word "fundamentalist," thus taking great pains to define his basic terms.[204] He identifies the defining features of his object of analysis, stating for example that "apocalypticism is a defining feature of fundamentalism."[205]

The second meaning of historical objectivity is integral to scholarly practices. It is therefore significant to the construction of academic historical expertise. Objectivity dictates that a researcher pursue science with empirical instruments, replicable methods, and an unaffected stance. These are positivist ideals, designed to eliminate bias and ensure reliable discovery. Again, Appleby is representative of the historical profession because of the way he approaches his topic. By definition, fundamentalism is difficult to separate from passion and affect. Yet those overtones do not resonate in Appleby's analysis. Granted, to the academic reader his essay is not especially "cold" or "dry." It is not any more or less detached than the typical scholarly publication. Yet there is value in detecting what is notably absent. The question we must ask if we are to recognize Appleby's expert style, his discursive performance of historiographical objectivity, is:

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[203] Appleby, 157.
[204] Appleby, 158. See Plato's discussion of dialectic in the *Phaedrus* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1995). Using Socrates as his mouthpiece, Plato characterizes dialectic as the "collection and division" of things into kinds. This is necessarily preceded by a dialogue in which the arguers agree to certain definitions of basic terms.
[205] Appleby, 161.

how might a member of these religious groups speak of themselves and their experiences? What language choices would *they* make? For instance, Appleby writes, "Apocalyptic or millenarian fervor takes on a decidedly therapeutic role in the lives and imagination of the modern antimodernists. The anticipated reversal of ordinary history is a source of great comfort for millions of believers."[206] Upon reading this, a rhetorical critic might wonder what affective language these "antimodernists" would use. Are Appleby's words a plausible reflection of how the "objects of study" themselves might speak about eschatology? The fact that they are not does not render Appleby a poor historian. On the contrary, it indicates that the historian's account of religious fundamentalism differs inevitably from the practitioners'. The difference is a function of objectivity, which permeates the rhetoric of academic expertise.

The object of study itself is a matter of expertise because it raises the issue of pedagogy. One of this dissertation's critical probes highlights the difference between teaching and persuasion in the rhetoric of expertise. Some experts are keenly interested in persuading the audience that they are experts, but less concerned about imparting the subject matter. To be sure, historical experts put great effort into persuasion; as I outline in this section, they adopt a number of strategies to persuade us that they are experts. The question is, how do academic historical experts approach instruction? Do they, like the activists analyzed in my chapter on political expertise, strive to share their expertise with the audience? Is it a proselytizing sort of expertise?

[206] Appleby, 161.

Historians teach the object of their expertise more than the process. Cullather teaches the audience about dam projects in Afghanistan and an history of American interventions. These are the objects of his expertise. The process of historical expertise, in contrast, is a matter of proving the ability to be a scholar. Cullather does not incorporate an effort to teach his scholarly practices. There is a "symbiotic" relationship between the practices of objectivity and the historical profession that makes the former an exclusive skill.[207] Objectivity for historians is a professional consensus, a code of expertise. Novick offers a version of this code: "The producer of these wares has been rigorously trained, and we vouch for both his competence and his ethics; the goods themselves have been subjected to the most rigorous testing and criticism; you may therefore take them on faith."[208] Using the code rhetorically is a strategy for invoking that professional membership. Thus Cullather is more than willing to impart the object of his expertise, but the process of historical inquiry is exclusive. The practice of scholarly objectivity is not something that Cullather teaches. He performs objectivity to be persuasive as an expert but he does not instruct the audience on being an objective expert.

There are a number of ways to perform objectivity, to prove that one adheres to scholarly guidelines. One that several of the essayists use is what I call the "silent historian." It is a strategy for muting the source of an argument; silence is part of the historian's objectivity. For example, Cullather's essay never once reveals the author. This goes beyond avoiding first-person phrasing; he does not grant the reader any access to his

[207] Novick, 51.
[208] Novick, 57.

interpretive lens. As an expert, Cullather does not expose himself to scrutiny. Unlike some of the other writers, he does not begin by laying out first assumptions.[209] Instead, he simply "tells the story." This is to say, he illustrates a myth of traditional historiography whereby it is possible to recount historical events without hermeneutic intrusion. Veyne theorizes this attitude when he states that

> facts do not exist in isolation, but have objective connections; the choice of a subject in history is free but, within the chosen subject, the facts and their connections are what they are and nothing can change that; historical truth is neither relative nor inaccessible.[210]

The silent historian is the expert who relies on Veyne's position to be persuasive.

Because it is silent, this strategy is a complex and powerfully persuasive gesture in the construction of historical expertise. It lets the historian present her arguments without revealing inevitable subjectivity. In part, this may be read as humility, a subservience to the study of history. Using such a self-effacing move generates *ethos* for the historian. It suggests also that the recounting of historical facts speaks for itself; the methodology is presumably so sound as to preempt interrogation. Cullather does not need to be present—his expertise is.[211]

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[209] Rosenberg is a good example of a scholar who does explicate her own interpretive frame before beginning her analysis.

[210] Veyne, 32.

[211] Cullather breaks his silence at the very end of the chapter, in an "acknowledgment" hidden in the footnotes: "This essay was researched and written between the beginning of the bombing campaign in late September and the mopping up of Taliban resistance around Tora Bora in early December 2001. Like many colleagues, I found myself called upon, without benefit of *expertise*, to place the war in a historical context," 48 emphasis added. By "expertise" the author presumably intends a set of specific insights into a unique political and military situation. The implication, however, is a covert rhetorical move. Saying "without expertise" arguably implies its own opposite. Cullather and his colleagues are in fact experts,

The silent historian and her performance of objectivity generate something that is rather unique to the rhetoric of academic expertise. It affords the expert the authority to be critical. This may seem like a paradox to anyone who is used to distinguishing critical scholarship from the notion of objectivity. However, it is precisely this perception that makes these historians' critical agenda such a persuasive part of their expertise. Kuniholm, for example, is one of the book's most critical authors. He is also one of the silent historians, ostensibly laying out the objective historical context for what he terms "the great game" metaphor. Because he is so explicitly critical of American politics and the Bush administration, Kuniholm's essay oscillates between a historical narrative and a current events commentary. This harkens back to the issue of the historian as expert advisor and the question of when history becomes history.

Most importantly, the objectivity that a silent author implies and performs lets the academic historian be critical. An expert can be critical of something that she can approach with detachment. Hunt can be critical of nationalism because he puts a certain distance between himself and the object of analysis. Nationalism is something that other people have and do; Hunt himself is above such folly. This gesture is part of his expert persuasiveness. He stands outside of his object of expertise. Hunt and the other historians do not critique their own experiences of nationalism; at no time in their essays do we read about the authors' personal nationalist sentiments. The critical posture of the academic historians' expertise prohibits such private disclosure. By contrast, the next section of my

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otherwise they would be unable to place anything in a historical context. Such is the professional calling of this group of experts. The footnote reads like a final grasp at the rewards for being an expert, viz. being able to claim the correct and preferable version of something.

chapter analyzes the rhetoric of expertise that witnesses construct for legitimizing their own experiences. In that discourse, being critical is not an asset. The 9/11 witnesses do not take a critical approach to their expertise. Their expertise is synonymous with their experience of the trauma.

Analysis: Witnesses

Dean Murphy's *September 11: An Oral History* is a collection of eyewitness accounts. The stories come from people who were inside the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 as well as rescue workers and bystanders. They describe what they saw, what they felt, what they smelled and breathed on the day of the attacks. Murphy comments on his editorial method: "My approach to the narratives was not to worry about the manner in which the information was imparted. My task was to assemble an eyewitness history of that day, not determine its content or dictate its form."[212] In the preface, he also includes one of his own newspaper excerpts: "To be in New York last week was to know the pounding in your chest, the hole in your stomach, the aching at the

[212] Murphy, 5. It is significant for my comparative analysis that Murphy is a journalist rather than an oral historian. An oral historian, after all, is still a historian. She is a member of the academic expert community. Comparing traditional historians' rhetoric of expertise with that of oral historians would be an interesting but entirely different project. While some argue that oral history and narrative have the potential to democratize history by foregrounding vernacular experience, I am skeptical. Traditional professional norms apply to oral historians as well, thereby perpetuating the genre of historical scholarship that their work is intended to challenge. Murphy on the other hand, is seemingly untroubled by the difficult editorial choices that oral historians inevitably face. He insists that his "uncompromising rule" when compiling the interviewees' stories was "accuracy" and "truthful recollections," 5-6. While he acknowledges the inherent challenge in this ideal, he does not address the extent to which an oral historian shapes her narrators' personal stories. Editing is an integral and inescapable part of historical scholarship. This is all to say that the rhetorics of expertise that this chapter compares are those of academic historians and witnesses. Murphy himself as editor and journalist is not in focus. To make this comparison, I read "through" Murphy to analyze the first-person narratives.

center of your being."[213] In this section, I demonstrate how this evocative quotation summarizes the rhetoric of historical expertise as constructed by eyewitnesses.

It is important to explain what I mean by the notion of witness expertise, specifically historical expertise. After all, it seems unlikely that the firefighters and stockbrokers that Murphy interviews would call themselves historical experts.[214] They understand that academic historians are the experts. Academic historians have accreditation and an established set of practices for knowing the past. Their expertise is culturally sanctioned via academe. Witness expertise, by contrast, exists in the persuasive nature of personal experience. The notion of witness expertise is not something in which one can earn a degree. It is not a title or a job. It is a matter of ownership. We own our experiences of the past like we own our feelings and bodies. Because our culture privileges personal experience as a way of knowing, we allow ownership of the past. As I shall demonstrate in this section of the chapter, such experiences are often located in the body. For instance, if I say that I have a stomach ache, my friends will believe me. They have no reason to think that I could not judge my own experience of pain. I own my stomach; I own the experience of a stomach pain. In that sense, I am an expert on my stomach and its ailments. I have first person expertise. I am not the same kind of expert as the gastroenterologist who treats my illness. However, the physician can never know exactly how the pain feels to me. The experience is exclusively mine.

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[213] Murphy, xviii.
[214] See the first of my critical probes, which asks about explicit uses of the words "expert and "expertise."

This privilege that our culture grants to personal experience is visible in a variety of contexts. When a hurricane strikes, the survivors are interviewed on television. They typically describe how the wind felt, how scared they were, how they saw rooftops flying around with their own eyes. In short, they explain how their five senses created a real, true experience of an event. This, I propose, is a powerfully persuasive rhetoric of expertise. It contains a number of strategies, all of which make an experience of the past believable. Moreover, there is an inherent contention in this rhetoric; it challenges the rhetorics of other forms of expertise. Hurricane refugees may try to argue with the meteorologists over the severity of a storm. The meteorological experts say it was a category three on the Saffir-Simpson scale; they have training and titles to substantiate a claim to being right. They have radar and scientific methods. But eyewitnesses are in a unique position to say, "But I saw it with my own eyes! It must have been at least a four!" Two rhetorics of expertise stand against each other. The question is: What do the 9/11 witnesses do to make us believe? What are the rhetorics of expertise that frame their experience of an historic event?

Lived Experience as Expertise

The witnesses in Murphy's book indicate that they subscribe to the primacy of personal experience. They know that they are privy to something exclusive, an experience that is gone now. It is history. One man says, "You have no idea what that scene was like. No picture or video can convey the pandemonium."[215] Another concurs,

[215] Murphy, 116. When excerpting these quotations, I do not mention the speaker. In the interest of analyzing how witnesses talk, I have chosen to frame all of Murphy's narrators as one "character."

"People don't really understand what I've been through, which is probably better. I hate sitting down and telling people. […] What do you say when someone tells you a story like that?"[216] A women who lived on the edge of New York's financial district, and was confined to her apartment for four days, states,

> It was two cities; those who lived outside this zone were slow to grasp what we were faced with. While they were of good faith, the fact that they "didn't get it" was frightening and frustrating to many of the people here who felt our situation was not understood.[217]

These quotations speak to the idea that outsiders cannot possibly understand such a traumatic experience. Pictures cannot convey it; even telling the story seems to fall short.

As with Meyerowitz's book, the structure and layout reveal a lot about different types of expertise. Unlike historians' essays, which offer different angles of scholarly analysis, each of Murphy's chapters is dedicated to a specific individual who is identified by name. In the chapter introductions, a brief biographical note contextualizes the individual story. For example, the reader learns that Gerry Gaeta was an architect who worked for the Port Authority of New York on the 88th floor of the North Tower.[218] Teresa Veliz was a facilities manager for a software development company of the 47th floor.[219] Recall that most of the historians' essays began with a thesis statement, a literature review, and/or an explication of theoretical assumptions. This format is rather unthinkable as part of a personal narrative. No one begins a personal story with an

[216] Murphy, 139.
[217] Murphy, 143.
[218] Murphy, 49.
[219] Murphy, 9.

explication of theory. Instead of stating a thesis, witnesses become familiar to the reader on a personal level. They tell a story: "Once upon a time…Then this happened… I was so frightened… Then someone else came along…and finally I was safe."[220] Such narrative coherence would be foreign to historical scholarship, particularly critical historiography. In Murphy's text, we are first introduced to the story's main characters; we recognize their identities and lives as average and normal. We then are exposed to their non-normal experience. Within that contrast, the historical event becomes transposed into the lives of "ordinary people," just as the book jacket promises. Whereas historians locate 9/11 in a long series of political decisions and international relations, witnesses frame their experiences in the context of life. The structure of the book turns the reader's attention to the individual and her story. In doing so, it foregrounds those things as primary to the event. It lets them be the experts.

There is a strong appeal to identification with the audience in the references to ordinary life. When witnesses describe that fateful Tuesday morning, they do so in the context of all the other things that were happening. This trope privileges personal experience as discussed earlier; specifically, it invites the audience to consider our own normalcy and our daily routines being interrupted by a trauma. For example, one man says, "I had taken off my shoes, like I do most every morning. This pair was new and in particular need of being broken in."[221] Another man says, "It was a very nice day, beautiful and clear. I had started a new book. I read a couple of books a month while

[220] The narrative pattern is noticeable throughout most of the accounts. One particularly instructive example is a story that a man tells about being trapped under debris and rescued by a co-worker. See Murphy, 166.
[221] Murphy, 80.

doing my workout. I was […] feeling this was going to be a very special day."[222] A woman says, "I went to the cafeteria every morning to get Ed's breakfast. That was the routine. Everything for me that morning was like clockwork."[223] By representing everyday details like new shoes, a workout, and a cafeteria breakfast, witnesses invite the audience to imagine the experience. It is in a sense an enthymeme of historical experience and expertise. Communicating such first-hand experience completely is impossible. You couldn't know unless you were there. But identification is the next best thing; witnesses let us know the context of their experience thereby allowing us to connect.

By far the most common trope in the rhetoric of witnessing is bodily or visceral experience. Our sight, smell, taste, feel, and hearing are points of entry. They are the sensory producers of personal expertise. They are the core expert practices—methodological and epistemological. Almost all of Murphy's narrators make reference to the senses: "I can still hear that horrible noise in my ears."[224] "You could smell the jet fuel. Lots of smoke. Lots of confusion. Lots of sunlight from the windows illuminating both."[225] "I was getting hot and there was no air circulating. A lot of people were having difficulty breathing. It left a burning and scratching sensation in the throat."[226] "I was blown across the concourse but managed to stay on my feet. Eventually, I was thrown

[222] Murphy, 113.
[223] Murphy, 32.
[224] Murphy, 9.
[225] Murphy, 18.
[226] Murphy, 19.

against a wall."[227] "There were these firemen standing there with hoses spraying everybody. The water was ice cold."[228] "The scene on that plaza was so upsetting that when I first saw it my stomach turned, my legs became rubbery and I almost blacked out."[229] As a strategy for constructing expertise, citing bodily experience is effective in several ways. First, the audience has prior experiences of bodily reactions like being very hot or ice cold, having trouble breathing, slamming into something hard, and legs turning into rubber. We know what that feels like and we can recall possible causes of those experiences. Thus, we can confirm witnesses' personal experience as a way of knowing. Second, because we trust our own bodies we must allow others the same privilege. If a witness tells me that she has "never seen fire like that. It was thick with dark red and black colors," I trust her eyes.[230]

Witness Ethos

There is an urgency and vulnerability in the witness's references to bodily experiences. For this reason, the references also serve as *ethos*-based expertise appeals. Because of the trauma that the witnesses endured, the audience is implicitly asked to suspend judgment. The idea is that no one would lie about this kind of tragedy. The witnesses become virtuous as experts by sharing what must have been a devastating experience. One woman says, "My hands were so sweaty that the phone kept slipping from my grip."[231] She later admits, "I stopped to look at my reflection in a window. It

[227] Murphy, 45.
[228] Murphy, 56.
[229] Murphy, 90-91.
[230] Murphy, 63.
[231] Murphy, 65.

was just my eyes—everything else was covered in white ash. I had urinated on myself."[232] The inference that the audience is asked to make is that no one would voluntarily share this information if it were not true. The only reason to tell the story is historical; many of the witnesses attest to the significance of having their ordeals preserved. They are sharing their expert perspectives—at the cost of personal humiliation—in the service of the greater good.[233]

Ethos is a primary concern for witnesses. All three dimensions of it that were presented in Chapter One—*arete*, *phronesis*, and *eunoia*—emerge as significant. Witnesses draw on each to generate the impression of personal credibility. For example, many of the stories contain some sort of confessional. The narrators, like many trauma survivors, express a tremendous sense of guilt. They say, "I also have no idea how or why I made it out. That is what is most frightening now: Was I just lucky? I don't think there is any special reason that I am here today, alive while so many others are not."[234] "I thought about my staff. I realized I had gotten out early, ahead of them […]. I started to think about everybody I knew who worked in the complex. The nightmares in my mind started to roll."[235] Several of the witnesses distance themselves from the event and their own behavior by claiming that they were acting uncharacteristically or out of ignorance: "There was a man having an epileptic seizure. I looked at him. I can't help him, I said.

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[232] Murphy, 68.
[233] This vulnerability of witnessing is especially powerful in the context of trauma—as with the stories analyzed in this chapter. As stated above, audiences might perceive witnesses' expertise as persuasive because publicizing it is potentially risky. However, vulnerability in some sense is a part of any historical witnessing, regardless of whether the historical event was a crisis or not. Disclosing personal experiences always entails a vulnerability that buttresses witnesses' credibility.
[234] Murphy, 15.
[235] Murphy, 55.

[…] I don't know what came over me, but I wasn't myself anymore."[236] "I'm fine,' he said. And he was. There was no smoke on the 27th floor. Nothing was happening there, except for everybody leaving. I never knew that the building would fall on them. How could I have known?"[237]

These confessionals are a strategic ethical trope because they alleviate guilt. They make witnesses appear virtuous and credible even in the face of less-than-heroic actions. To resolve the dissonance between an immoral act and a good person, the narrators suggest that they were not being themselves or that they could not have known what would happen. They "could only think of all the people who had been back there" but they "went crazy with fear."[238] Either way, the impression of an ethical person is intact, which is what allows her to remain persuasive. The part of *ethos* that depends on *eunoia*, or goodwill, is present insofar as witnesses demonstrate their concern with the welfare of others.

Even more clearly noticeable are the appeals to *phronesis* or practical wisdom. Witnesses talk frequently about their mastery of the dire situation and attribute it to common sense. One man says, "My mind focused like a laser beam and I knew what we had to do."[239] Another says,

> We had fire drills every six months and we knew exactly what to do to get out. I was one of the volunteer fire wardens on the floor, so I had a

[236] Murphy, 34.
[237] Murphy, 33.
[238] Murphy, 30, 62.
[239] Murphy, 17.

> flashlight all ready to go. I was rounding up people when the strobe lights started to flash and the sirens sounded, just as they were supposed to.[240]

A priest and a firefighter link their respective *phroneses* to a professional identity: "I could see little figures jumping to their death from the North Tower. I knew at that moment I had to get back there. I am a priest."[241] "In my profession you notice clothes because so often you have to cut them into pieces to save lives. That was the first thing that came to mind: This lady is well dressed."[242] Whether or not these *ethos*-appeals make witnesses more believe in terms of the trauma is debatable. It makes them personally credible, but that credibility may not transfer to their narratives of what happened on 9/11. More than likely, however, audiences do not distinguish between a person's general ethos and his/her credibility in a specific context, such as the recounting of an historic event. Appeals to phronesis—argument for why a person has generally good sense—spill over into that person's historical expertise. The audience likely grants that a person who knows fire protocol can speak with credibility about an incident involving a fire.

There is a particular type of *phronesis* that suggests the intervention of a higher power. When witnesses describe their abilities to act wisely in the middle of chaos, it is not uncommon that they locate the source of this wisdom outside themselves. One witness says, "I sensed something immediately. Maybe there was a noise or a rumble I subconsciously detected. […] In any event, I knew even before the elevator doors slid

[240] Murphy, 70.
[241] Murphy, 115.
[242] Murphy, 150.

open."[243] Another says, "I will state clearly to you: There were some powerful things going on that Tuesday. […] I was living in a bubble of some sort. I was being protected in a miraculous way. […] I am not bragging. I am stating the facts."[244] Others are very explicit about their interpretations: "I feel I am lucky and I thank God for saving my life. I have responsibilities to my family and I have a lot of things I want to do with my life. I am glad God saved me."[245] While this reference to a higher power may seem like the witness is displacing credit, it nevertheless is a part of the rhetoric of expertise. It introduces another element of the experience that only a first-hand account could incorporate.

There is a parallel here between the two rhetorics of expertise, the historians' and the witnesses'. For the former, external influences are an important factor in historical analysis. Historians are concerned with the ways in which large social, political, and economic forces determine events and actions. In the case of Meyerowitz's essayists, the emphasis is on the international relations that produced 9/11. This macro-perspective is to be expected from academic historical experts. They establish credibility by demonstrating knowledge of a large body of interconnected facts. Much more remarkable is the counterpart in the other rhetoric of historical expertise. Witnesses too use external forces to construct themselves as experts, specifically as experts on their own experience. By integrating divine intervention as a trope, they build persuasion on an experience that cannot be refuted. No one can refute the experience of smoke inhalation or blistering

[243] Murphy, 100.
[244] Murphy, 72.
[245] Murphy, 39.

heat, much less the religious experience of being saved. Who would argue that there were *not* guardian angels in the towers that day?[246]

Along with a reference to divine intervention, many of the witnesses frame what they are doing as a moral obligation. They have a responsibility to tell their stories. In this sense, the first-hand experience that constitutes their expertise calls them to testify. This testimonial aspect of being a witness again raises the question of teaching and persuasion. One of my critical probes asks how experts negotiate persuading others that they are experts and imparting that expertise. For witnesses, this is a highly emotional issue. As explained earlier, teaching the epistemology of personal experience is impossible. Witnesses cannot teach us how they know what they know or recreate the experience for us. Such knowledge comes from the body, specifically from the body having been present in a particular circumstance. First person expertise can be taught only as an object, not as a process. A 9/11 survivor cannot explain how they know heat or fear. They can only state the thing that they know, and ask us to take their word for it.

The witness-experts teach the product of their expertise. While they cannot teach us a visceral experience (i.e., they cannot produce it in or for an audience) they can describe what that experience produced. They can pass on the knowledge that the experience generated. Recall from a footnote to this chapter's introduction that the

[246] Several witnesses use the word angel: "Then an angel appeared. His name was Lou. No dust was on Lou. He had a mask on his face. 'Go down this hallway and into the room at the end,' he instructed. 'You'll be all right in there.' Sure enough. Turns out Lou was a janitor and had been in this little locker room with a drinking fountain and a fan," 23. "This gentleman, Carl Galito was the name on his business card, was my angel. He walked me all the way to Brooklyn. He talked to me and comforted me the whole way," 35-36. "The truth is the truth. I had a guardian angel that morning and that angel made sure that a man I did not know named Stanley, and I survived. I know that in my heart," 72. "I will never forget that man in the blue suit and red tie. I think of him as my angel in heaven," 108.

implication of the word "witness" is two-fold. First, it means to see something first-hand. Second, it means to report what one has seen, to bear witness. Bearing witness is an historical function; it frequently connotes a moral mandate. As one witness states, "I watched, helpless to do anything but that. I could have closed my eyes, but I didn't. It was like she needed to be seen. Maybe it would keep her alive." Just as this woman watched another person die out of inexplicable obligation, so do many of the other witnesses tell their stories out of duty. Murphy confirms this in his introduction when he mentions that some of the narrators

> appreciated the history of the moment and wanted it preserved for generations to come. "Thanks for taking the time to try and tell our part of the story," another of those interviewed wrote. "I think it is an important job, and people in the future will be glad to you did."[247]

In this brief quotation, several of the themes I analyzed in this section emerge. The witness recognizes the moral significance of the oral narratives; she predicts that future generations will be grateful. Moreover, she confirms the power of personal experience; she positions it relative to alternative interpretations of the past. By calling attention to "our part of the story," she builds the rhetoric of experience, an alternative rhetoric of historical expertise.

Conclusions for the Rhetoric of Historical Expertise

Expertise is rhetorically constructed. It is claimed by individuals and groups who compete with each other for credibility and authority. It is about being more persuasive

[247] Murphy, 6.

than the alternative; it is about whose version becomes acceptable to the public. My dissertation examines the rhetorical strategies that different experts rely on when they conflict. Specifically, this chapter focused on the rhetorical construction of historical expertise. I compared two types of historical experts: academic historians and witnesses. By analyzing how historians and witnesses discuss 9/11, I identified several tactics characterizing each group. These tactics constitute two different rhetorics. In this final section, I highlight a few recurring themes, and comment on how they unite and divide historians and witnesses.

First, there are significant structural and stylistic differences in the ways that these groups present their messages. These are things that are easily overlooked because they are most often taken for granted. We rarely notice how differently an historic event is recorded and remembered by different groups. For example, historians operate deductively. Meyerowitz's book, as well as each of the individual chapters, are written in accordance with academic standards: a thesis is followed by a theoretical position statement and a literature review; refutation and dialectic are common tropes; a critical tone and a research rationale are requisite for the piece's credibility. All these practices apply to historians' treatment of 9/11 as much as any other subject matter. They are a professional code of conduct, a way of rhetorically framing oneself as a credible expert. Indeed a demonstrated ability to follow these codes signify membership in the scholarly community.

The structure and style of witness accounts are much different. Murphy's book locates the individual narrators at the center. He introduces them by name and offers

biographical notations for each. The stories themselves emerge from individual experience. There are no claims to general principles or critical analysis; it's just witnesses telling their stories. These rhetorical choices are as unstated as the historians' methodology. It is implicitly "natural" that personal stories comprise an oral history of 9/11. Thus, the same event is treated in radically different ways by two groups competing for expertise. Historians follow the practices that define their professional community; witnesses approach the event from the only vantage point available to them, viz., personal experience.

Thus the notion of epistemology is central to both groups' rhetorical strategies. Note that the difference I identified in my analysis does not lie in epistemology proper; of course historians have a different epistemology than ordinary people when it comes to interpreting the past. What I am concerned with is a rhetorical difference. It is a difference in the way that the groups talk about their historical discoveries. Both take great pains to demonstrate how they come to know what they know. Therein lie their persuasive powers. Historians incorporate a variety of references to objectivity. They perform objectivity by emphasizing method over scholar. This is how they prove to the audience that their ways of knowing and the product of those ways are sound. Witnesses offer their bodily experiences as epistemic. Their claim, in short, is that, because I experienced the event with my five senses, I have unique expert knowledge of it. Anyone who was not physically present could not know what I know. This argument is persuasive because our culture places a great deal of faith in lived experience. We do not require or invite people to doubt their eyes and ears. At the same time, historians are highly

persuasive because they are social scientists. They associate themselves rhetorically with other scientific experts, and take advantage of the overwhelming power of that connection. The audience is left to settle the discrepancy between two bodies of evidence, both of which we consider credible.

Both historians and witnesses distinguish between their expert epistemologies and the products of those epistemologies. They teach the latter—the object of their expertise—but not the former. Both teach what they know but not how they know it. They strive to persuade us that they are credible experts, but the means of access remain exclusive. Witnesses, for example, share their narratives of personal experience but also imply that such experience is restricted. It cannot be obtained without being sensorily present. They cannot impart their epistemology, the bodily ways by which they arrive at expert knowledge. Similarly, historians teach what they know about history but not their methods of inquiry.

Another theme in the rhetoric of historical expertise that both unites and divides historians and witnesses is motive. Both expert groups have an ostensibly noble reason for sharing their expertise with the public. This nobility, as I demonstrated earlier, is a powerful *ethos*, specifically in the creation of *eunoia*. For historians the motive is advisory. They present themselves as potential advisors to political decisions-makers—possibly to the citizenry writ large. The idea is that knowledge of the past can be analogously transposed to predicting the future. If there is nothing new under the sun, if historical situations repeat themselves, then knowing those repetitions is extremely valuable. This in turn assigns historians a civic duty to prevent a society from repeating

its mistakes. Historical scholarship like Meyerowitz's essay collection is offered as a means toward this end. Conversely, witnesses have a moral obligation to share their expertise. They argue that future generations will want to hear "another side of the story." They will want to hear from the ones who were there. As stated earlier, lived experience guarantees a unique perspective. Therefore, any account of the past would be incomplete without witnesses' input. Such is the nature of their claim to historical expertise.

My analysis demonstrated that both groups are concerned with contextualizing their expertise. Witnesses and historians both position what they know in a larger plot, something continuously ongoing. Historians achieve this apophantically, by demonstrating that one object of analysis is like something else. Meyerowitz's historians for example draw a parallel between a current event, 9/11, and other historical moments of crisis: World War I, the Cold War, 1950's Afghanistan, etc. In addition, they trace the larger political and economic forces that caused such a volatile situation, such as U.S. intervention in the Middle East. Unlike historians structural emphasis on political forces, witnesses contextualize while inviting identification. They place 9/11 in the trajectory of an ordinary life and everyday routine; this is something to which the audience can relate. In most of the witnesses' narratives, the trauma ruptured a day of normalcy—walking to work and picking up muffins. To the audience, this is at once frightening and reassuring because it means not only that the same thing could happen to us, but that we realize what the experience must have been like. We construct the witnesses as historical experts because we find their stories credible.

This sense of acknowledgment is at the heart of my argument. To be acknowledged and accepted for one's interpretation of the past is tantamount to historical expertise. And this is the result of a rhetorical effort. Historians and witnesses create powerful discourses to compete with each other for the public's recognition. Both want to be persuasive. Those who survived 9/11 share their stories, not calling themselves experts but deliberately constructing their version of the past. They want to be believed. Historians likewise offer interpretations of the event with a variety of rhetorical devices generating scholarly credibility. What is remarkable at the conclusion of my analysis is that two groups who are so different in many ways share such important features in their rhetorical strategies. On the surface, it is easier to find differences than similarities between a history professor at Notre Dame and a facilities manager at the World Trade Center. What they have in common are certain rhetorical themes; both use the available means of persuasion to construct a rhetoric of historical expertise.

It has been suggested that we live in a post-historical time, that history as a single and continuous narrative is no longer possible. While the latter may be true, the former certainly is not. Modern Americans are just as concerned with the past as previous generations. We struggle to come to grips with it, particularly with those significant events that reshape our understandings of reality. September 11, 2001 was one of those events; it remains an indelible marker in history and memory. Each time we attempt to make sense of that trauma, we are faced with a choice between different credible sources and their rhetorics of historical expertise.

CHAPTER FOUR

DEALING WITH DEPRESSION: THE RHETORIC OF MEDICAL EXPERTISE

Few experts have as much direct influence over the general public as medical doctors. Few enjoy the same level of esteem and approbation. Indeed, few are as persuasive. Doctors are professionals. Doctors are experts. Doctors give orders that are obeyed. As George Carlin allegedly said, "I recently went to a new doctor and noticed he was located in something called the Professional Building. I felt better right away." Americans attribute a remarkable amount of expertise to a person with a professional degree in medicine. With our decision to visit their offices, wear the backless robe, take a deep breath and hold, we grant doctors almost unrestricted access to our most private parts. Why? When my doctor tells me to wear sunscreen, to exercise and eat more spinach, I follow her advice. Why? When I tell my doctor what the pain in my chest feels like, or that my foot has been hurting, and she explains the cause of the discomfort, I believe her and accept her explanation. Why? And why do I believe Dr. Malik and not Dr. Jensen? On what grounds do I deem the former more competent, perhaps more doctor-like, than the latter?

Consider a concrete example: I know a young man who suffers from chronic depression. Every day, he takes a concoction of prescription drugs to manage his condition. He is not sure about the purpose of each pill, but he takes them because they make him functional—because his psychiatrist said to do so. The expert prescribed a course of treatment and medications to go with it. She explained in detail that his brain needs a little help with certain chemical processes. She showed him charts and a plastic

model of a human brain; she wore a white coat and spoke patiently in words he could understand. Now he takes the medicine; he follows her instructions. The patient follows the medical expert's advice to feel better, do his job, and be with his family and friends.

Let us now transpose the doctor-patient relationship to a different level and consider the relationship between society at large and the medical establishment. The lay public is distinct from and simultaneously related to a specialized sub-group. These relationships between doctors and patients and between the medical establishment and society in general are profoundly rhetorical. They are constituted in an ongoing dialogue between doctors and patients and between the public and the community of medical experts. Moreover, this dialogue is a high priority because health and illness concern everyone. Medicine is an economic concern when companies regulate sick-leave and health insurance. Medicine is a political concern when Congress awards funding to medical research. And medicine is a social concern when, as a culture, we decide whether or not obesity, addiction and erectile dysfunction are diseases. The rhetoric of expertise shapes society's relationship to the medical community in important ways. That is, society defers to medical experts much like individuals do. It is persuaded by the rhetorical strategies of medical expertise much like a patient in a doctor's office. When Congress votes on funding for cancer research, for example, they hear expert testimony from the scientific community. When a person learns that she has cancer, she consults an oncologist. These interactions, dialogues, and relationships between medical experts and the lay public are fundamentally and powerfully rhetorical.

My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. Specifically, it investigates how expertise is instituted and negotiated as a function of the rhetorical situation, its participants and constraints. I ask: What rhetorical strategies do different groups employ to compete for expert authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another? In this chapter, I examine the rhetorical strategies of medical expertise. I focus on expert claims regarding depression—living with it as well as its diagnosis and treatment. By juxtaposing a psychiatrist's rhetoric with the rhetoric of those who draw from personal experience, I ask: As a means of persuasion, how does personal suffering function differently than specialized training as kinds of expertise? How do different rhetorics of expertise define medical experience? What warrants do they offer as evidence of their claims to expertise? Drawing on Lawrence Prelli, I analyze of how medical experts of two different types employ "an identifiable, finite set of value-laden topics as they produce and evaluate claims and counterclaims."[248]

In this chapter, two rhetorics of medical expertise are juxtaposed. The first is *Understanding Depression* by Dr. J. Raymond DePaulo.[249] DePaulo is the Henry Phipps Professor and Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry and founder of the Affective Disorders Clinic at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. His book is designed for the general public, particularly addressing patients suffering from depression and their families.[250] The second artifact is *Unholy Ghost*, a collection of first-person narratives

[248] Lawrence J. Prelli, *A Rhetoric of Science: Inventing Scientific Discourse* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 5.
[249] J. Raymond DePaulo, *Understanding Depression* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002).
[250] When selecting this text, I searched for book reviews in the last five years in the *American Journal of Psychiatry*—one of the field's most prestigious journals. The scope was limited to books with the word

written by self-identified sufferers of depression.[251] The editor is a mental health journalist and the sister of a long-time depressive. The contributing authors are novelists, poets, literary and cultural critics.[252] Their stories and metaphorical descriptions of living with depression constitute, I argue, a rhetoric of expertise, one that is distinct from the rhetoric of expertise employed by the medical establishment.

These two texts provide uniquely instructive examples of the tension between different kinds of experience in the rhetorical construction of medical expertise. They illustrate the strategies that psychiatrists and depressives respectively use in order to be persuasive. Moreover, the texts illustrate how different strategies function for different rhetors addressing the same audience. It is significant, for example, that the psychiatrist's book is written for a lay audience rather than an audience of peers. This format is relatively rare for someone in his position. As Wander notes, scientists mostly write for

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"depression" in the title. The search produced eight hits, which I evaluated for general applicability and suitability for a lay audience. Based on these criteria I did not include, for example, the book on depression in children and adolescents. Nor did I include a book that was characterized as "of interest to clinicians," or another that would be "best suited for a graduate-level course on depression." The journal's reviewers described the intended audience of DePaulo's book as "people who suffer from depression and their families."

[251] Nell Casey, ed., *Unholy Ghost* (New York: Perennial, 2001).

[252] This book is an edited collection of essays by authors who have either suffered depression personally or been in a close relationship with a depressive. In order to provide as much focus as possible to my analysis, I selected the essays by depressives as particularly relevant. These include Virginia Heffernan, Chase Twichell, Larry McMurtry, Lauren Slater, William Styron, Meri Nana-Ama Danquah, A. Alvarez, Lesley Dormen, and Maud Casey. I chose to exclude "secondary" experiences of depression, such as Rose Styron's and Russell Banks's essays about coping with their spouses' illness. I also excluded those writers who would have access to a different rhetorical paradigm when talking about depression, for example Kay Redfield Jamieson, , a professor of psychiatry at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, Martha Mannig, who holds a Ph.D. in clinical psychology, and David Karp, a professor of sociology at Boston College. It is worth noting that the included authors are, in a sense, experts not only on the experience of depression, but also on the deliberate use of language. As I suggest later in the chapter, it is possible that a highly ambiguous topic like mental illness requires this kind of aptitude. Even in the absence of medical degrees or training, the writers' experiences are highly persuasive because of strategically aesthetic language.

other scientists.[253] "The archetypal speaking situation for the scientist occurs in addressing an audience of fellow scientists, and the archetypal form of discourse is the research report."[254] This audience selection is intentional; speaking almost exclusively to an internal audience of peers is key to the kind of rhetoric that doctors produce. A heavy emphasis on publishing for an expert audience in the form of a journal article or convention paper, is the discourse community's rhetorical choice. Scientists typically choose this format against other alternatives, such as writing for a lay audience. For this reason, my juxtaposition in this chapter is promising. Identifying a space in which psychiatrists and depressives address the same audience—the lay public—allows conflicting rhetorical strategies to emerge most clearly.[255]

In the next section, I offer an introductory literature review of the scholarship on rhetoric, science and medicine. The goal of this review is to situate my inquiry in an extensive, ongoing theoretical and critical conversation, noting specifically that: 1) rhetoric is integral to medicine and science, 2) medicine and science reference each other as a means of persuasion, and 3) medical experts comprise a discourse community whose cohesion and professional practices are rhetorically constituted. Understanding this scholarship is imperative to the rhetorical analysis I undertake. A comparison between the persuasive strategies of a patient and the persuasive strategies of a doctor makes most

[253] Phillip C. Wander, "The Rhetoric of Science," *Western Speech* 40 (1976): 226-235.
[254] Wander, 230.
[255] A note on vocabulary: To designate the group of essayists representing the patients' side of medical expertise, I use primarily the word "depressives." This implies nothing more about them than that they self-identify as suffering from—or having in the past suffered from—depression. In addition, using this term circumvents the image of a "patient," which risks suggesting passivity. I use the term patient only in hypothetical examples, or when discussing the relationship between doctors and patients on a macro-scale, that is, as social roles.

sense in the context of a much-theorized tension between rhetoric and science/medicine. Following a review of the literature is a two-part analysis wherein I examine Dr. DePaulo's book and the essay collection containing personal stories of depression. To examine these artifacts, I deploy the series of eight critical probes used in Chapters Two and Three. These probes serve as a methodology for unpacking the rhetorical techniques featured in the texts. Finally, I offer concluding remarks about the rhetoric of medical expertise based on similarities and differences found between the two artifacts.

Rhetoric, Science, and Medicine

In his major treatise on the arts, Plato distinguished rhetoric from medicine.[256] He inaugurated a categorical separation that, buttressed by Empiricism, lingers in modern times. There is a still a strong cultural assumption that nature—including the human body and its processes—exists beyond human understanding. To simplify: galaxies and mountains and planets and molecules exist, not because humans study them; humans study them because they exist. Our methods of observation and ways of talking, while useful and important, do not construct the natural world. Our ways of understanding and rhetoricizing the body are not constitutive. This view of the world is common both in the scientific community and the popular mind. Even in the rhetoric of science literature this attitude survives. J. E. McGuire and Trevor Melia caution against "the too easy assumption that scientific texts are as susceptible to rhetorical analysis as are texts in other disciplines."[257] There is a difference, they insist, between "what is constructed out

[256] Plato, *Gorgias*, trans. Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987).
[257] J. E. McGuire and Trevor Melia, "Some Cautionary Strictures on the Writing of the Rhetoric of Science," *Rhetorica* 7 (1989): 87.

of science's practices and what can be referred to through those practices."[258] Natural referents are not constructed by, or dependent on, the practices of a community. McGuire and Melia acknowledge the trend to examine science as a social and discursive production, but insist that "it would be a mistake, however, to replace an arrogant scientism with a rampant rhetoricism."[259]

As a response to this "scientism," rhetorical scholars have studied extensively the relationships between rhetoric and science (or inquiry), as well as between rhetoric and medicine.[260] Alan Gross argues against McGuire's and Melia's reliance on recalcitrance

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[258] J. E. McGuire and Trevor Melia, "The Rhetoric of the Radical Rhetoric of Science," *Rhetorica* 9 (1991): 310.

[259] McGuire and Melia, *Some Cautionary Strictures*, 88.

[260] For literature on the rhetoric of science, see Paul N. Campbell, "Poetic-Rhetorical, Philosophical, and Scientific Discourse," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 6 (1973): 1-29; Alan G. Gross, *The Rhetoric of Science* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Michael A. Overington, "The Scientific Community as Audience: Toward a Rhetorical Analysis of Science," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 10 (1977): 143-163; Herbert W. Simons, *Rhetoric in the Human Sciences* (London: SAGE Publications, 1989); *The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences*: *Language and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs*, ed. J. S. Nelson, A. Megill and D. N. McCloskey (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Phillip C. Wander, "The Rhetoric of Science," *Western Speech* 40 (1976): 226-235; Walter B. Weimer, "Science and a Rhetorical Transaction: Toward a Nonjustificational Conception of Rhetoric," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 10 (1977): 1-29. See also three special issues on the rhetoric of science: "Rhetoric of Science," Special Issue of *Argumentation* 8 (1994); "Rhetoric of Science," Special Issue of *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 26 (1996); "Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science," Special Issue of *Southern Communication Journal* 58 (1993). For literature on the rhetoric of inquiry, see James W. Hikins and Kenneth S. Zagacki, "Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Objectivism: An Attenuation of the Claims of the Rhetoric of Inquiry," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 74 (1988): 201-28; John Lyne, "Rhetorics of Inquiry," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 71 (1985): 65-73; "The Culture of Inquiry," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 76 (1990): 192-208; John S. Nelson and Allan Megill, "Rhetoric of Inquiry: Projects and Prospects," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 72 (1986): 20-37; Herbert W. Simons, "Chronicle and Critique of a Conference," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 71 (1985): 52-64; *The Rhetorical Turn: Invention and Persuasion in the Conduct of Inquiry*, ed. H. W. Simons (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990). For literature on the rhetoric of medicine, see Heather D. Bell, Kathleen A. Walch and Steven B. Katz, "Aristotle's Pharmacy': The Medical Rhetoric of a Clinical Protocol in the Drug Development Process," *Technical Communication Quarterly* 9 (2000): 249-269; Celeste M. Condit and Melanie Williams, "Audience Response to the Discourse of Medical Genetics: Evidence Against the Critique of Medicalization," *Health Communication* 9 (1997): 219-235; Thomas J. Darwin, "Intelligent Cells and the Body as Conversation: The Democratic Rhetoric of Mindbody Medicine," *Argumentation and Advocacy* 36 (1999): 35-49; Michael J. Hyde, "Experts, Rhetoric, and the Dilemmas of Medical Technology: Investigating a Problem of Progressive Ideology," in *Communication and the Culture of Technology*, ed. M. J. Medhurst, A. Gonzalez and T. R. Peterson (Pullman, WA:

as a rationale for realism.[261] He insists that "no line can be successfully drawn between rhetoric and scientific knowledge."[262] To identify what is at stake in the debate, he states, "By means of the rhetorical analysis of the hard sciences—biology, chemistry, and physics—rhetoric of inquiry inserts itself into the inner sanctum of epistemological privilege."[263] In a sense, Gross's "insert" is a powerful retort echoing back to Plato. Rhetorical scholars have insisted for well over three decades that rhetoric is integral to science and medicine. They claim that conducting any kind of scientific inquiry entails an argument and a theory, which implies language, and that engaging in medical practices requires an argument and a discursive relationship.[264]

To clarify, the labels "rhetoric of science" and "rhetoric of medicine" can mean three different things. First, they can refer to the rhetoric that any inquiry or practice necessarily entails. That is, rhetoric is not only one way of knowing, but integral to all ways of knowing.[265] As philosophy traditionally has defined it, knowledge is justified

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Washington State University Press, 1990); "Medicine, Rhetoric, and Euthanasia: A Case Study in the Workings of a Postmodern Discourse," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 79 (1993): 201-224; Lisa Keränen, "The Hippocratic Oath as Epideictic Rhetoric: Reanimating Medicine's Past for Its Future," *Journal of Medical Humanities* 22 (2001): 55-68; John Lyne, "Contours of Intervention: How Rhetoric Matters to Biomedicine," *Journal of Medical Humanities* 22 (2001): 3-13; Roy Porter, "Perplex't with Tough Names': The Uses of Medical Jargon," in *Languages and Jargons: Contributing to a Social History of Language*, ed. P. Burke and R. Porter (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1995); Judy Segal, *Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2005); "Interdisciplinarity and Bibliography in Rhetoric of Health and Medicine," *Technical Communication Quarterly* 14 (2005): 311-318; Barbara F. Sharf, "Physician-Patient Communication as Interpersonal Rhetoric: A Narrative Approach," *Health Communication* 2 (1990): 217-231.

[261] Alan G. Gross, "Rhetoric of Science without Constraints," *Rhetorica* 9 (1991): 283-300.

[262] Gross, *Without Constraints*, 285.

[263] Gross, *Without Constraints*, 285.

[264] For a treatment of scientific argumentation, see Weimer, 5; for a treatment of medicine and a discursive relationship, see Hyde, *Medicine, Rhetoric, and Euthanasia*, 203.

[265] Here we discover an important intersection of the literatures on rhetoric of science and that of rhetoric as epistemology. Robert L. Scott's seminal piece from 1967, which suggested that rhetoric is a way of knowing, triggered an avalanche of critical and theoretical responses in speech communication journals

belief; such justifications are necessarily rhetorical. To justify a philosophical tenet is to make an argument. Alternatively, when knowledge is synonymous with empirically verifiability, then the human interpretation of empirical instruments is nevertheless rhetorical. There is a rhetorical dimension to a biochemist's use of his laboratory. Even with quantitative measurements, the process of knowing cannot get outside of language.

Second, the labels "rhetoric of science" and "rhetoric of medicine" also designate the language produced *by* a professional discourse community. As Wander explains, "Grant proposals, journal articles, and convention papers are designed to influence a professional audience (granting agencies, journal editors, and so on). In order to be successful, they must convince this audience that the research topic is worthy of study, the appropriate tools were used, and used correctly, and that the researcher knew what he or she was doing."[266] This language of/by science is either internal or external; it is either directed at an audience of peers or an audience of laypersons. Dilip Gaonkar summarizes, "The general aim of the RS project is to show that the discursive practices of science,

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("On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," *Central States Speech Journal* 18 (1967): 9-17). Because this essay, by his own account, is frequently misconstrued or misinterpreted, I would opt to use the following quotation from one of Scott's later publications to summarize his thesis on the subject: "I argue that the twentieth century answer to the seventeenth century question, 'How can one be certain?' is that one cannot. In contemporary physics (Heisenberg) and mathematics (Godel) as well as in politics, sociology, and psychology, uncertainty cannot be obviated. In such a world rhetoric has a genuine role" ("Epistemic Rhetoric and Criticism: Where Barry Brummett Goes Wrong," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 76 (1990): 300-303. For an introduction to the extensive literature on rhetoric and epistemology, see Barry Brummett, "A Eulogy for Epistemic Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 76 (1990): 69-72; Richard A. Cherwitz, "Rhetoric as a Way of Knowing: An Attenuation of the Epistemological Claims of the New Rhetoric," *Southern Speech Communication Journal* 42 (1977): 207-219; Richard A. Cherwitz and James W. Hikins, "Toward a Rhetorical Epistemology," *Southern Speech Communication Journal* 47 (1982): 135-162; "Burying the Undertaker: A Eulogy for the Eulogists of Rhetorical Epistemology," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 76 (1990): 73-77; James W. Hikins, "The Epistemological Relevance of Intrapersonal Rhetoric," *Southern Speech Communication Journal* 42 (1977): 220-227; Robert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later," *Central States Speech Journal* 27 (1976): 258-266.

[266] Wander, 227.

both internal and external, contain an unavoidable rhetorical component. Internal here refers to those discursive practices that are internal to a specific scientific language community; external refers to the discursive practices of that scientific language community in respect to its dealing with other scientific (or nonscientific) communities and society in general."[267] Third, the labels "rhetoric of science" and "rhetoric of medicine" delineate a subfield of rhetorical scholarship, manifest in the literature that examines the scientific and medical establishment's language practices and artifacts.

Because my dissertation is an analysis of the rhetorical strategies that groups of experts employ to be persuasive, the labels' second meaning is most relevant. "Rhetoric of science" and "rhetoric of medicine" designate the language produced by an expert community. Scientists and doctors are bound together by language practices that define their professional identity, both among themselves and to the outside world. Being fluent in this language marks an individual as a member of the expert community. It is interpreted as consistent with the community's shared practices and values. Recall from the previous chapter that certain language practices similarly define a community of academic historians. The same is true for the community of scientists; their ability to follow certain linguistic habits is imperative to establishing membership. Fluency in "academese" or "scientese" is a way of participating in professional communities.

The rhetoric of science and medicine thus has a sociological aspect. Scientists and medical professionals operate within expert communities that abide by certain implicit

[267] Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, "The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science," *Southern Communication Journal* 58 (1993): 267.

rules. Kenneth Zagacki and William Keith offer scientific revolutions as an example of how the professional community conducts itself.[268] They argue that "stages of scientific revolution are accompanied by particular rhetorical exigencies, which themselves give rise to rhetorical topoi that advance the process of scientific argument and change."[269] The implication is that scientists make deliberate rhetorical decisions based on audience, message and situational constraints. "Scientific topoi are requisites of doing science, revealed in the communicative choices and the persuasive tactics employed by scientists."[270] Michael Overington similarly argues that rhetorical analysis of scientific knowledge production is warranted because it involves argumentation before an audience. He conceptualizes this knowledge production as "a way of speaking about specific experiences before a limited and specially trained audience that is authorized to establish that discourse as knowledge."[271] Zagacki's and Keith's scientific revolutions as well as the authorization of knowledge that Overington identifies illustrate the significance of a rhetoric of expertise.

Another related way to approach the rhetoric of the scientific establishment is to examine methodology. As argued in previous chapters, a shared methodology is integral to a community of experts and its rhetoric. In the scientific community, universal adherence to methods of inquiry is imperative to "true findings."[272] Overington examines

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[268] Kenneth S. Zagacki and William Keith, "Rhetoric, Topoi, and Scientific Revolutions," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 25 (1992): 59-78.
[269] Zagacki and Keith, 59.
[270] Zagacki and Keith, 60.
[271] Overington, 144.
[272] William Keith and Kenneth Zagacki, "Rhetoric and Paradox in Scientific Revolutions," *Southern Communication Journal* 57 (1992): 168.

the persuasive element in this process, and notes the inherent irony in an objective standard of truth that comes quite close to *sensis communis*, a testability by scientists' collective agreement.[273] McGuire and Melia analyze the scientific community's habit of assent as a special nexus of author, text and reader.[274] They argue that "faced with refutation, writers of scientific texts rarely argue that they have been misunderstood by their critics. Rather, the dispute is said to be not about meanings intrinsic to the text, but about how the text relates to extra-textual matters."[275] In sum, the internal rhetoric of the scientific community serves many functions—identification, social cohesion, and methodological consistency; all such functions are part of the scientific community's rhetoric of expertise.

Martha Solomon's essay on the Tuskeegee Syphilis Project is an instructive example of these functions.[276] Specifically, she examines how scientists produce an audience of peers. Solomon argues that the lack of criticism against a deeply inhumane study can be partly attributed to the genre of scientific writing. "The generic conventions of scientific writing not only encouraged neglect of ethical questions but also played an important role in the study's continuation. […] Scientific writing employs rhetorical conventions which by their very nature tend to obscure or de-emphasize any ethical, 'non-scientific' perspective."[277] In her pentadic analysis of the Tuskeegee reports, Solomon highlights how, when the patients are rhetorically constructed as an *agency* for

[273] Overington, 143.
[274] McGuire and Melia, *Some Cautionary Strictures*, 94.
[275] McGuire and Melia, *Some Cautionary Strictures*, 93.
[276] Martha Solomon, "The Rhetoric of Dehumanization: An Analysis of Medical Reports of the Tuskegee Syphilis Project," *Western Journal of Communication* 49 (1985): 233-247.
[277] Solomon, 234.

the *purpose* of scientific discovery, both the authors and readers are relieved of ethical responsibility. The rhetors and audience members are united in the scientific community's rhetorical practices; these practices harbor powerful myths of progress and objective knowledge.

While the internal rhetoric of the scientific and medical establishment is ripe for rhetorical criticism, the focus of my chapter is on the rhetorical relationship between medical experts and the general public.[278] I am primarily concerned with the discourses that medical experts produce when they are speaking to a lay audience. This is indeed a hotly debated relationship, one that gets at the heart of my dissertation. Quite often, the most challenging form of argument in which an expert engages is that which refuses her expert vocabulary. When a doctor speaks to a patient, she must use different persuasive appeals than when speaking with a colleague.[279] Identifying those appeals—specifically their construction of expertise—and contrasting them with alternative strategies is the purpose of my chapter. How, I ask, do psychiatrists and depressives get us to accept that

[278] To this point, my discussion uses science and medicine if not interchangeably, as closely linked. They are of course not exactly the same, conceptually or in practice. But they enjoy a mutually beneficial rhetorical relationship. This relationship provides experts in both fields with a repository of persuasive tropes. For example, medicine highlights its relationship to biochemistry, physiology, etc., because doing so "taps" the status that natural sciences enjoy in Western culture. Conversely, the natural sciences frequently reference medicine as the warrant or rationale for their work. A research project in biochemistry may seem, to the public, more legitimate or worthwhile if it cures a serious illness. For the sciences, medicine is a potentially ethos-generating resource. It is as though science and medicine both count on the public's perception of a contagious relationship.

[279] The linguistic habits of doctors and patients are widely studied in the social sciences (Heather D. Bell, Kathleen A. Walch and Steven B. Katz, "Aristotle's Pharmacy': The Medical Rhetoric of a Clinical Protocol in the Drug Development Process"; Barbara F. Sharf, "Physician-Patient Communication as Interpersonal Rhetoric: A Narrative Approach."). Some analyses even emphasize the persuasive elements of those habits. For the most part, these works have a corrective orientation; their goal is to improve communication between patients and health care providers. My focus, instead, is on rhetorical tactics in conflict.

their interpretation of a particular condition, combined with their experience of dealing with it, render them medical experts?

Analysis: Biomedical Psychiatrist

The popular notion of a medical doctor is relatively modern; not until the Industrial Revolution did the white coat-wearing, stethoscope-wielding physician appear. At that time of technological advancement and professional specialization, "health care was transformed into a highly scientific endeavor requiring expert intervention."[280] Today, biomedicine is a scientific enterprise. Unlike traditional and homeopathic methods, it "considers biological entities more or less as equal to the sum of their anatomic parts (a view opposite to holism) and endeavors to elucidate molecular, physiological, and pathological mechanisms believed to form the basis of biological processes."[281] In terms of therapeutic practices, "biomedicine generally places an emphasis on interventions that treat biological pathologies as opposed to preventing illness or creating the conditions of health."[282] As the psychiatrist whom I analyze in this chapter says, biomedical allopathy is "a system of medicine that relies on *proven* remedies for treatment."[283]

Psychiatrists are physicians who, in addition to medical school and residency, have four years of specialized training in psychiatry. They are certified to diagnose and

[280] Barbara E. Willard, "Feminist Interventions in Biomedical Discourse: An Analysis of the Rhetoric of Integrative Medicine," *Women's Studies in Communication* 28 (2005): 129.
[281] Daniel P. Ezkinazi, "Factors that Shape Alternative Medicine," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 280 (1998): 1621-1622.
[282] Willard, 116.
[283] DePaulo, 220 emphasis added. I return to this psychiatrist's reliance on the trope of scientific proof in his definition. Specifically, I highlight how persuasive it is to ground one's expert practice in something that enjoys as much cultural capital as scientifically "proven" knowledge.

treat mental illness, including the use of prescribed medication. In this section, I explore how one psychiatrist, Dr. Raymond DePaulo, uses a variety of persuasive strategies to construct medical expertise. In my treatment of his book *Understanding Depression*, I focus especially on the dialectics between science and medicine, DePaulo's manipulation of academic writing, and his "intimate" rhetorical style. These rhetorical tactics, I argue, portray DePaulo as an able and extensively experienced expert with the public's interest in mind.

The most common strategy in DePaulo's rhetoric is the balance he strikes between science and medicine. More than a balance, it is a rhetorically sensitive oscillation: DePaulo's major tactic is to demonstrate that his medical expertise integrates both scientific theory and clinical practice. The very format of his book illustrates this. For example, Part Two is entirely dedicated to popular science. It is a lesson—complete with classic textbook graphics—in genetics and hormonal brain functions. It also introduces what DePaulo calls the "four sciences of depression": epidemiology, genetics, neuropharmacology, and brain imaging. Part Three subsequently is about different types of treatment. In a guidebook format, these chapters gently walk the reader through the basics of a hospital visit, explaining the process of rehabilitation and recovery. Further securing the connection between medicine and science—notably chemistry—Part Three also includes a whole chapter on antidepressant drugs. So, while one section of the book anchors the process of understanding depression in science, another reinforces the message that science must lead to medical care.

Science and Medicine

DePaulo negotiates a dialectic between science and medicine on two levels: social and personal. On a social level, he treats science and medicine as co-dependent institutions. He paints a compelling picture of the relationship between the scientific establishment writ large and a professional community of medical practitioners. Within this image are a variety of available tropes that DePaulo uses to his advantage. This facilitates constructing psychiatry as expertise. A very common scientific trope is *progress*, or gradual and continuous exploration covering more and more uncharted territory to serve humankind. DePaulo enthusiastically notes, "We're poised on the brink of some remarkable discoveries about depressive illness. That's because of the genetic technology and advanced brain imaging techniques that will allow us to understand brain structure and function in ways we could only dream about even in the late eighties, when many of these innovations still didn't exist."[284] Science, according to DePaulo, "unravels the secrets of depressive illness."[285] By using phrases like "the brain is still largely unexplored territory [and] our most important and mysterious organ," he affirms its importance.[286] DePaulo secures the relationship between scientific discovery and advancements in the clinical treatment of depression.

In rhetorically manipulating this relationship between the institutions of science and medicine, DePaulo is able to present psychiatry as a *scientific*—read: superior—form of medical expertise. He offers science as an answer to those things that puzzle clinicians

[284] DePaulo, 72.
[285] DePaulo, 73.
[286] DePaulo, 74.

as well as laypersons. For example, DePaulo frequently comments on how confusing depression can be. He writes, "It's difficult for many depressed patients to give an account of their illness when they are depressed. […] The confusion of the illness affects their ability to see things as they are. […] One of the most disabling aspects of depression is that often you don't know that you have it."[287] This ambiguity is a perfect space for expertise to flourish. Whenever a layperson—even someone who experiences an illness first-hand—is unable to understand it, the medical expert's role is highly significant. The implicit argument is that depression is fraught with uncertainty, and that the answer is more science. "We are closing in on what happens in our brains to cause depressive and bipolar disorders. The sequencing of the human genome, achieved in 2000 and 2001, is certain to provide us with new approaches to finding the genes responsible for depression."[288] Note the trajectory in DePaulo's forecast. Science has come far but much remains unknown; because the illness is still confusing, more science (e.g. genetic research) is needed.

DePaulo also highlights another principal trope in the rhetoric of science, viz., systematic epistemology and methodology. As mentioned earlier, adherence to method is what the scientific community claims as requisite for reliable, replicable and predictive results. DePaulo draws on this collective value when he comments on a psychiatric classification system. DePaulo writes, "A good classification system offers a framework in which to evaluate and treat these differences. A system not only offers a simple and

[287] DePaulo, 10.
[288] DePaulo, 251.

powerful way to approach the treatment of patients, but serves as a guide for research as well."[289] The classification system that he discusses specifically is the *DSM*, the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*, which categorizes depression in different ways. "The *DSM* III in 1980 was an important step forward in that it provided a mechanism for making reliable or reproducible diagnoses for clinicians and researchers who would attempt to make good the assumption of a brain disease underlying severe disorders of mental function."[290] In this excerpt, DePaulo makes a powerfully persuasive appeal to expertise. Not only does psychiatry have a system for knowing and practicing—for epistemology and methodology—but the system is the product of science!

It is important to note how DePaulo uses the word "expert" in his book. Indeed, he is one of the few rhetors in my dissertation who uses the term explicitly. When analyzing the other experts, I must typically reconstruct their understandings of what an expert is. DePaulo, by contrast, applies the term directly, always and only to scientists and psychiatrists: "My message to all readers is that you should know what the experts know and you should know what we *don't* know about causes, precipitants, and treatments for depression and manic depression."[291] He continues, "Trying to determine exactly where the lines should be drawn between mania and mixed mania is probably impossible even for expert diagnosticians."[292] This strategy permeates the text: "Some experts have argued that, when you come right down to it, all antidepressants are

[289] DePaulo, 47.
[290] DePaulo, 56.
[291] DePaulo, 2 original emphasis.
[292] DePaulo, 34.

basically the same."[293] Later he writes, "Some psychiatrists refer to themselves as psychopharmacologists, a term meant to indicate their expertise in the use of psychotropic medications."[294] According to DePaulo, a medical expert is a scientist. This equation of roles is central to his rhetorical strategy.

Establishing this dialectic between science and medicine on a social level supports DePaulo's rhetoric of expertise in several ways. I mentioned above that medicine highlights its relationship to biochemistry, physiology, etc., because doing so "taps" the status that natural sciences enjoy in Western culture. At the same time, there is a rhetorical pay-off for science. When science is portrayed as the answer to depressives' prayers, it means hope. Science becomes the hero for both clinical practice and patients with depression. "For some patients, just knowing that serious research in the causes of these conditions is being pursued offers reason for hope."[295] This sense of hope is a powerful justification for DePaulo's expertise. When he connects psychiatry to science's slow-but-steady mastery of a mysterious illness, it makes psychiatry seem noble. Such nobility is tantamount to an ethos-based appeal. By demonstrating that science serves the public's interests, DePaulo offers proof of eunoia, concern with the greater good, on behalf of the scientific establishment.

The importance of expert ethos moves my analysis to the second level where DePaulo balances science and medicine. On a personal level, he demonstrates the inextricability of being a scientist and being a doctor. For example, the book is filled with

[293] DePaulo, 178.
[294] DePaulo, 203.
[295] DePaulo, 5.

proofs of DePaulo's expert clinical experience—his "view from the trenches."[296] In fact, that is how he frames the book's purpose in the introduction: "This book presents my experience—as a psychiatrist who has seen in consultation, teaching, research, and treatment settings some 8,000 people—with clinical depression and manic-depressive illness."[297] The text repeatedly returns to the impact that clinical work has had on DePaulo's understanding of depression: "From the doctor's point of view, eating disorders—or smoking or alcohol or drug dependence—are distinguished from disease states."[298] Further, when describing a laboratory research study at Columbia University, he writes himself, a clinician, into the story "at the other end of the telescope in a clinic specializing in depression and manic depression."[299] Note the implication of expert collegiality, the idea that the scientists at Columbia and the specialist clinicians work at opposite ends of the same enterprise.[300]

The point for DePaulo is to emphasize the value of his own practical wisdom in conjunction with theoretical knowledge. Just as that balance operates on a social level between the institutions of science and medicine, it also enhances his self-portrait as an expert. Many of his personal anecdotes illustrate this: "When I was a first-year medical

[296] DePaulo, 4.
[297] DePaulo, 1.
[298] DePaulo, 128.
[299] DePaulo, 126.
[300] DePaulo's use of the pronoun "we" is indicative of how he conceptualizes an expert community. He writes, "In the pages that follow, I'll be talking about the progress *we're* making in treating patients with depressive illness, restoring them from the seemingly hopeless situations" (9 emphasis added). "*We* used to think that anxiety disorders were more common with unipolar depression, but *we* now know that they frequently appear in both depression and manic depression" (25 emphasis added). "If several major symptoms are present *we* can, with a fair amount of reliability, determine that someone is depressed" (23). Note the emphasis on praxis for a professional community; in these and other excerpts, DePaulo outlines how his particular cohort of experts operates.

student I also had the impression that ECT [electro-convulsive therapy] was outmoded and harmful, until one of my professors introduced me to a patient who was getting ECT. I witnessed firsthand the transformation of the patient from a hopeless individual back to a relaxed caring person."[301] DePaulo states in another section that psychiatrists "can also miss making a correct diagnosis if we rely too much on a textbook description of mania or even the most typical type of depression."[302] In these excerpts, we learn that clinical experience is as integral to medical expertise as "textbook" learning. As explained in previous chapters, practical wisdom, or phronesis, is a prerequisite for an expert's ethos. Should DePaulo overemphasize one side of the dialectic, he would not be as persuasive. For this reason, both are constantly present in his discourse: "I can't emphasize how powerful dependence is, or how enduring its impact. And this isn't an observation that comes out of my experience with patients alone. Research in the labs has established what happens in the brain when dependence takes hold."[303] Experience with patients and laboratory research are continually coupled. DePaulo cannot be without either the scientist or the clinician part of his expert identity, lest he lose favor with the audience.

In light of his book's lay audience, it is significant that DePaulo puts clinical experience on par with scientific knowledge. Consider how different his treatment of this balance would likely be in a peer reviewed publication. It is plausible that he would weigh the two differently, both on the social and personal levels. In contrast, when citing his credentials before a lay audience, DePaulo distances himself from the image of a

[301] DePaulo, 214.
[302] DePaulo, 168.
[303] DePaulo, 123-124.

"cold" scientist by balancing it with the ethos of a "warm" doctor. This becomes a demonstration that he cares about his patients; it is his rhetorical performance of concern.[304] The reader is invited to identify with the numerous patient stories that DePaulo includes.[305] So, while the conventionally academic stance of science may be objectivity and detachment, DePaulo's ethos *also* comprises "compassion, pragmatism, subtlety, and an obvious affection and respect for the many thousands of patients he has so effectively treated."[306] Thus an alternative set of attributes, or tropes, construct DePaulo's expert identity.

The Academic Standard

Even though *Understanding Depression* is designed for a popular audience, and many of its characteristics may be attributed to that purpose, it is important to recognize the subtle ways in which the book retains an academic format. Doing so allows DePaulo to speak to the general public while still marking himself as an academic author—again, a scientist. He demarcates fellow experts from what essentially amounts to constituents or patients. Put another way, to an academic reader DePaulo's scholarly writing habits are like a secret handshake inviting identification. The habits suggest that, because author and reader speak the same "language," they are (expert) colleagues. At the same time, constituents are those who simply recognize the academic form as different and special, and locate its user in a different and special category. They are the lay audience. In both cases, a particular writing format is a strategy for constructing expertise.

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[304] DePaulo, 63.
[305] DePaulo, 30-31, 142, 154.
[306] Kay Redfield Jamison, "Foreword," in *Understanding Depression*, by Raymond DePaulo (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002): viii.

One of the elementary habits of scholarship is to argue by definition. This includes not only defining terminology but also establishing categories and noting differential characteristics. For example, "Depression and manic depression are diseases, not behaviors."[307] DePaulo continues, "We define a delusion as a fixed false, idiosyncratic idea, or judgment, that is almost always so self-absorbing that it doesn't leave much room in the mind for anything else."[308] He explains, "Severe anxiety can be seen as a manifestation of depression. But I don't mean to suggest that all people with anxiety have depression. Anxiety disorders can also affect patients who have never had a clinical depression."[309] As illustrated in these examples, arguments by definition are germane to the genre of academic writing. More specifically, they belong to academic experts like professors of psychiatry. They are pedagogical in tone, which is to say that DePaulo shapes the expert-layperson relationship between himself and the reader; he is the one defining the terms.

Moreover, an argument by definition is a very persuasive way to stake out expertise. It distinguishes what is within the purview of a particular expert from what is not. DePaulo notes that a "painful experience is not a clinical depression. Bereavement is normal and it serves as a catharsis; death brings people together in mourning but also in love."[310] In this and other similar excerpts, DePaulo in effect determines that depression

[307] DePaulo, 120.
[308] DePaulo, 19.
[309] DePaulo, 17.
[310] DePaulo, 11.

is not "normal" or "natural."[311] Inherent in this negative definition—the classification of what depression is not—DePaulo "medicalizes" the condition, thus locating it within his domain of expertise.[312]

Closely related to arguments by definition is the use of dialectics. As explained in the chapter on historical expertise, dialectics is one of the most distinguishing features of academic writing. It is profoundly persuasive as an expert rhetorical strategy because it performs systematicity in an elegant and parsimonious way. Consider the following statements by DePaulo: "Just as a descending sense of self-worth and self-confidence is the central experience of the depressed state, an ascending or inflated sense of self is the crux of the manic state."[313] "Treatment can be pursued on two levels, tactical and strategic. On a tactical level, I'm talking about the basics of care. […] By strategic I mean that the treatment of a patient requires an overall game plan."[314] He additionally identifies "two different levels of diagnosis in medicine: the clinical level, and the level of cause (of symptoms) or, as it's known in the medical profession, the level of etiology."[315] These brief excerpts demonstrate that even the most complex subject such as depression is manageable when broken down at its natural joints, and examined from several angles. Once a topic has been subdivided, the dialectician defines the two parts against each other.

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[311] For DePaulo's application of the term "normal," see pages 11 and 14; for "natural," see pages 9 and 64-65.
[312] Condit and Williams.
[313] DePaulo, 25.
[314] DePaulo, 153.
[315] DePaulo, 169.

Another academic standard that DePaulo's work illustrates is the practice of contextualization. It is important for an expert to situate his subject matter historically and culturally. DePaulo repeatedly takes the reader on historical excursions noting influential scientists, major discoveries and different treatment methods for depression.[316] He also contextualizes his expertise in social epidemiology, analyzing the general statistics of depression in the United States. DePaulo writes, "In Western countries, males are two to four times more likely than females to commit suicide. More women make parasuicidal attempts than men, and they tend to be younger (18-30) and come from somewhat lower than average socioeconomic backgrounds."[317] Continuing this contextualizing of his expertise, DePaulo discusses the statistical differences between males and females, different ages, and different socioeconomic groups.[318]

This contextualization is a persuasive strategy in the rhetoric of expertise for several reasons. It demonstrates that the expert has a kind of "across-the-top" vision; he is able to reflect on his expertise with a sense of perspective. He knows where his work fits in the general scheme of things. For instance, DePaulo's portrayal of historical scientists and doctors indicates that he considers himself one of their direct heirs. He takes over where they left off. Some of DePaulo's external circumstances differ from Freud's, but their overall objectives cohere, viz., to improve mental health. Contextualizing an area of expertise also lends it a certain exigency. The intricate links between psychiatry and important social dimensions like age and gender are a way of saying: my expertise is

[316] See for example 20-21, 48-50, 81-84, and 210.
[317] DePaulo, 134.
[318] For gender differences, see 38-40; for age, see 40-43; for socioeconomic groups, see 43-45.

connected to things that are so important that they—and by association I—must not be ignored. This argument, however implicit, creates a sense of urgency, a need for DePaulo's expertise.

The idea of an urgency or exigency for expertise is a key rhetorical tactic. I have noted it in previous chapters as well. Readers will recall from Chapter Three that academic historians create an exigency for their expertise by emphasizing crises in US foreign policy. In DePaulo's case, generating exigency amounts to awareness raising. He claims that a disease as costly and debilitating as depression must be taken seriously by employers and policy makers. The condition effects everyone, yet not enough is "being done."[319] DePaulo notes, "We know that depression on the job exacts an enormous toll in lost productivity. The direct cost of depression to the United States in terms of lost time at work is estimated at 172 million days yearly."[320] He argues that "If we are to do this, though, the country will need to make a sizable investment, not only in money but also in talent. We would like to recruit our brightest young medical professionals and scientists to participate in the effort, but this can only happen if they have sufficient incentive."[321] These claims connect depression to two concepts of major importance in American society: money and science. DePaulo calls our attention to the deleterious consequences of disregarding his expertise. His argument establishes a need for experts, and announces what must be done to support their work.

[319] DePaulo, 8.
[320] DePaulo, 118.
[321] DePaulo, 72.

The Intimate Style: A Doctor-Patient Conversation

Somewhat in opposition to his adherence to the academic format is DePaulo's style or tone. The book is quite obviously designed for a popular audience; its style represents a clear departure from the writing that a psychiatrist would typically produce, such as a journal article or a conference paper. In his book, DePaulo speaks to the reader in a soft and compassionate voice. He is remarkably humble in his concessions of what remains unknown to psychiatry: "We are all in the dark about the fundamental brain and genetic mechanisms underlying these conditions. And to be honest, we have very little knowledge about how our treatments for depression work even though we've found that they are usually quite effective."[322] He continues, "Even we doctors and therapists are not able just to sit and listen to patients repeatedly threaten suicide forever. We, too, become fearful of losing the patient whom we care about and we also feel we are failing and will be blamed if the patient ever follows through on the threat."[323] In these concessions DePaulo confides in his readers. He admits to a professional weakness in a way that could potentially threaten his expert status. But, because the confiding gesture serves a rhetorical purpose, DePaulo includes it.

That purpose might best be characterized as a stylistic parallel between DePaulo's doctor-patient relationships and his author-reader relationships. This style changes the nature of the book's otherwise academic tone. In doctor-patient relationships, mutual identification and trust are imperative. A doctor cannot work without a patient's

[322] DePaulo, 3.
[323] DePaulo, 131.

compliance. Considering this dynamic, we discover a rhetorical strategy in DePaulo's use of an intimate and personal style. It buttresses his claim to medical expertise as a clinician. For example, he frequently addresses the reader directly as "you": "Maybe you're familiar with chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) because of all the attention it has received in the media in the last several years."[324] "If you're like most people you probably remember your adolescence as an exciting but possibly tumultuous and sometimes painful period."[325] Further, "When a loved one or a friend tells you that he or she is thinking of suicide, what are you supposed to do? How do you respond? If you're like most people, you'd say, 'Okay, let's go get some help.'"[326] DePaulo speaks to his reader as he would with a patient. To recognize the significance and purpose of this conversational trope, consider how starkly it contrasts with other formats. The norm in scientific writing is to bury not only the addressee, but the author as well, using the passive voice.

DePaulo integrates into his doctor-patient dialogue a gentle pedagogy. He educates the reader about different theories and concepts, in a sense introducing us to "science 101": "Typically, you inherit one copy of each gene from your mother, and one from your father. Your parents' copies come from your maternal or paternal grandparents. Thus, there are four copies of the genes that you can inherit."[327] DePaulo explains, "Two differing explanations have been proposed to account for [the association between socioeconomic deprivation and overall rates of depression]. One is the social

[324] DePaulo, 59.
[325] DePaulo, 142.
[326] DePaulo, 151.
[327] DePaulo, 91.

causation theory and the other is the social drift theory."[328] This level of instruction recurs throughout the book: "I use the word stress in both the layperson's and the medical sense of the word. If I refer to the stress response, I mean the body's physical and behavioral response to the event. If, on the other hand, I talk to a patient about a stressful event, then I am referring to an even or circumstance that he or she finds very upsetting."[329] DePaulo's pedagogy is reminiscent of a doctor explaining to his patient the prognosis and treatment. The line between patient and reader is blurred.

The style of a doctor-patient relationship recurs in DePaulo's writing when he addresses personal responsibility. It then becomes an argument for deference to his expertise. Consider the following disclaimer: "I can prescribe drugs prudently, I can assess how they are working, and I can give them in adequate doses for the right amount of time. I can make myself readily available to patients and provide them with supportive and even protective care […]. But I can't make the patient take the medicines correctly, or make the patient magically stop destructive behavior unless he or she is ready to work at it, too."[330] What DePaulo argues, in other words, is that, in order for him to exercise his expertise, requires full compliance. Patients are obliged to defer to his wisdom and experience. DePaulo even provides several cautionary tales about those patients who fail to comply: "One of my patients—a very bright school teacher—insisted that she wouldn't take any substance as unnatural as lithium, but unfortunately she had no compunction

[328] DePaulo, 44.
[329] DePaulo, 66.
[330] DePaulo, 235.

about doing cocaine because, as she said, it came from the ground."[331] DePaulo continues, "Another young woman regularly indulged in cocaine and took excessive amounts of Xanax and Valium as well, but told me that she wouldn't touch anti-depressants because she felt she could work her emotional problems out on her own."[332] Note the palatable condescension in these accounts, signaling the expert's shaming stance; patients who do not follow doctors' orders deserve what they get. The first woman was ignorant, the second emotionally deluded.

DePaulo finally implores, "You also need to accept the doctor's traditional, pastoral caring role, at least partially, and view us as modern competent practitioners in treating a diseased body or body part."[333] Deference, in short, is the major thrust of DePaulo's rhetoric of expertise. The take-home lesson is that understanding and curing depression is the business of experts. What his patients and readers of his book need above all else is medical expertise. What society needs is science. In the next section, I examine how those who suffer from depression respond to this argument. As I shall demonstrate, their descriptions and stories reveal a much different rhetoric of medical expertise.

Analysis: Depressives

All human beings are and have physical bodies. For most of us, those bodies at one point or another malfunction. It is during those times that we realize how little we know about the physiological processes that normally are taken for granted. I know that

[331] DePaulo, 249.
[332] DePaulo, 249.
[333] DePaulo, 198.

my body can run for about forty-five minutes in a hilly terrain before it is exhausted, sweaty, and winded. But I do not know the chemical reactions that turn a bowl of spaghetti into "running energy" or how heavy breathing transports oxygen to my blood. In the same way, I do not know what has gone wrong when my bad knee gives out. I know how painful it feels but I cannot explain technically the nature of the damage.

While it is true that my doctor can explain the nature of my injury, she could never know precisely how I experience it. This difference is the core of conflicting medical expertise. To understand it, one could pursue an analysis of epistemological foundations. Physicians' epistemology is different than the first-person epistemology of bodily experience. My dissertation, however, is about rhetorical strategies. Therefore, my objective is to trace how doctors and patients respectively formulate their experiences as claims to expertise. I am interested not in what they say about a particular illness, such as depression, but rather how their arguments construct medical expertise. This section analyzes the depressives' essays, focusing on how they situate their illness relative to everyday life, the use of narrative form and metaphorical description, and the rhetorical significance of an embodied epistemology.

The patients I analyze all suffer from depression. Some were struck by it seemingly "out of nowhere" in the middle of an otherwise contented life. Others have waged life-long battles. One became clinically depressed as a result of heart surgery. By virtue of personal, intimate, sometimes traumatic experiences, these individuals are experts on depression. More importantly, they construct a rhetoric of expertise that both relies on and sustains their experience. On this premise hinges my analysis' juxtaposition

of different medical experts. To put it in perspective, the depressives' experiential rhetoric of expertise is comparable to the rhetorical strategies used by the 9/11 witnesses in Chapter Three. Both the depressives and witnesses construct their claim to expertise around bodily experience. Both are experts because they know what an experience *feels* like. Witnesses *smelled* and *heard* the 9/11 events in a way that makes their persuasive strategies entirely different from academic historians'. In the present chapter on depression, the comparison is between the rhetoric of personal experience and that of medical training (and therapeutic experience). It is once again important to point out that depressives understand what the public defines as a medical expertise. To my knowledge, they do not call themselves "experiential psychiatrists." To them, as to most of us, doctors hold a monopoly on the category of medical expertise. They are the ones with accreditation and a set of professional guidelines. What they lack is that ambiguous claim to "having been there." Personal, embodied experience, which carries a lot of cultural credence, is not a warrant for doctors since they have not experienced depression; it is not an available means of persuasion in their rhetoric of expertise.

Family and Daily Life

Unholy Ghost, the book that I use to represent an alternative to the medical establishment's rhetoric of expertise, includes essays by both depressives and close family members. This editorial decision clearly marks the place where the authors locate depression, viz., in ordinary life. Even though I have chosen to focus on those writers who personally suffer from depression, the diversity of perspectives is important to note. The first thing that the reader learns about depression is not neurophysiology or

pharmacology but the impact that depression has on day-to-day experiences. As one author writes, "The shadows of nightfall seemed more somber, my mornings were less buoyant, walks in the woods became less zestful, and there was a moment during my working hours in the late afternoon when a kind of panic and anxiety overtook me."[334] Another echoes this sentiment, "I felt like a guest in someone else's falling-apart life—unanswered phone calls, unopened mail, rotting fruit on top of the refrigerator, and something unidentifiable and reeking inside, piles of dirty dishes, tumbleweeds of dust, books I didn't remember reading, furniture I couldn't remember buying, pictures of friends and family that seemed to belong to a stranger."[335] Depression, from this perspective, is more about living than it is about illness or treatment.

The reason why locating depression in daily life serves the depressives' rhetoric of expertise is its powerful invitation to identify. Everyone can identify with unopened mail and dirty dishes; the groundwork for persuasion is laid simply because the reader connects to the author's mundane experience. Moreover, private life is something that an ordinary person can master to a point of being an expert; it does not require special training. Every individual presumably "knows" herself. There is a level of unquestionable authority when a person speaks about her personal life. The reader recognizes herself in the depressives' depictions and grants them a certain credibility.

Family is an affect-oriented trope with which the depressives make their argument. Maud Casey, for instance, appends her own story with excerpts from the diary

[334] William Styron, "From *Darkness Visible*," in *Unholy Ghost*, ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001), 118.
[335] Maud Casey, "A Better Place to Live," in *Unholy Ghost*, ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001), 284.

that her mother kept during her daughter's most depressed periods. Casey says, "I am doing research, trying to find out what the experience of my depression was like for other people."[336] Another essayist explains, "Unless you are rich, and can convalesce in a sanatorium estate (where visitors come down a tired, oceanside lawn to find you at your easel), you have to keep going when you're depressed. That means phone calls, appointments, errands, holidays, family, friends, and colleagues."[337] As a trope, family is strongly enthymematic. The reader knows on an emotional level what neglecting family obligations entails. This creates a persuasive connection between rhetor and audience—persuasive precisely because it operates implicitly.

We might ask what the differences are between the depressives' use of family as a rhetorical strategy and DePaulo's case narratives. After all, he too discusses how families are affected and how they should cope. What separates the two strategies is the difference between a hypothetical and a flesh-and-blood testimony. The essayists offer their intimate accounts of depression as a gesture. It is a great risk to share details that make one vulnerable. However, the reward for taking that risk is the persuasive power it brings. DePaulo's pedagogical examples, even when he names them and assures the reader of his extensive therapeutic experience, are case studies. They remain clinical and intangible, their pain beyond the reader's empathy. By contrast, Casey describes her vision of herself and her sister in a way that refuses detachment, revealing her visceral self-contempt: "She was my fairy-princess and my tentacles slithered out of their alien pod, wrapping

[336] Maud Casey, 281.
[337] Virginia Heffernan, "A Delicious Placebo," in *Unholy Ghost*, ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001), 13.

themselves around her."[338] With the kind of risk it entails to reveal this personal imagery, we are more likely to believe her. The persuasiveness of her story generates a kind of expertise that is fundamentally contingent on personal testimony. Because she produces such a testimony in the essay, she becomes rhetorically an expert in the experience of pain.

Narrative Form

The way that writers situate their depression in the middle of an ordinary life is inseparable from their heavy use of narrative form. Almost all the authors offer their life experiences as a story, complete with main characters like mothers, spouses, psychiatrists and close friends. The depressives allow the reader to consider illness in a chronological sequence. Sometimes, this chronology is rather explicit. One author incorporates dated diary entries during her pregnancy.[339] At other times, the influence of time is more subtle. One women writes, "There are times when I feel like I've known depression longer than I've known myself. […] I've always been aware that something in my life was not quite right, if not totally wrong. My scales were never balanced."[340] Another woman recounts her childhood tendencies toward depression: "When my father's twenty-seven-year-old godson shot himself, it had seemed to me like the mysterious act of a grown-up who had seen things that I, at the age of eleven, hadn't. But even then I knew those mysterious things might be waiting for me, and when I was two years older than he would ever be, I

[338] Maud Casey, 283.
[339] Lauren Slater, "Noontime," in *Unholy Ghost*, ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001), 92-93.
[340] Meri Nana-Ama Danquah, "Writing the Wrongs of Identity," in *Unholy Ghost*, ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001), 174.

could understand the general impulse."[341] A third woman describes the moment when she realized that depression had periodically shaped her past: "Without knowing it exactly, I had felt this way before. Sitting on the steps of the concrete shower/bathroom unit at Camp Coniston when I was chubby and eight […]. It came back: at sixteen, after my first breakup, outside a high-school dance, when the lacrosse captain Carl told me he had slept with someone on his summer abroad. […] I sank again during my sophomore year in college and called [my mother] during the long weekends spent entirely in my room."[342] These excerpts reflect a narrative trajectory, a sense that depression progresses throughout a lifetime.

Persuasive narratives are strategically punctuated by significant episodes. So is the case with depressives' stories. Many of them incorporate major incidents that shaped both subsequent events and the experience of depression itself. One author notes, "I date the beginning of what I would later understand to be major depression to Tessa's marriage and the being dumped by the architect, but I do it the way you locate the spirit of a decade in some vivid, attention-focusing event Woodstock, say, or Watergate."[343] Others speak more agnostically about discovering past depressions. Styron's essay searches for an "initial triggering mechanism" like his withdrawal from alcohol, his sixtieth birthday, or dissatisfaction with his writing productivity.[344] Alvarez dramatically narrates his suicide attempt over a Christmas holiday; he notes the daily events that took place between the time he swallowed sleeping pills and a disastrous New Years Eve

[341] Maud Casey, 286.
[342] Heffernan, 14-15.
[343] Lesley Dormen, "Planet No," in *Unholy Ghost*, ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001), 235.
[344] Styron, 123.

party.[345] Virtually every one of the writers has a "path of depression" story, dotted at irregular intervals by important landmarks.

The fact that personal experiences lend themselves to narrative form may seem so natural as to make commentary awkward. What is worth analyzing, however, are the specific characteristics of that form. How do theories of narrative discourse inform my inquiry on medical expertise? Specifically, what features of narrative are important to the rhetorical strategies of expertise? Since these questions could easily inaugurate a different research project, let me speak briefly about two such features: sensemaking and identification. Both are integral to narrative and likewise integral to the rhetoric of expertise.

As Walter Fisher theorizes, symbols communicated as stories give order to human experience.[346] His narrative paradigm suggests not only that human beings inherently are storytellers but that activities which are typically attributed to rational argument exist in aesthetic communication as well. Stories, in short, are sensemaking devices. They facilitate understanding, relating a "truth" about the human condition.[347] Many instructive examples of this can be found in the depressives' essays. When they offer a story of their illness, or a particular triggering event, the authors search, however tentatively, for a satisfactory rationale. One woman suggests, "If depression came into my life attached to heartbreak, as one virus piggybacks another, it soon asserted its independence, bringing

[345] A. Alvarez, "From *The Savage God*," in *Unholy Ghost*, ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001), 218-224.
[346] Walter R. Fisher, *Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 63.
[347] Fisher, 62-63.

conclusions to my mind that were captious, adamant, and dark."[348] This writer goes on to say that, "I wasn't depressed at all. I had broken free, in fact, and was out from under some social tyranny. I was let loose into a liberty of desperate unhappiness, which was in fact glory" (Heffernan, 16). Another woman concludes, "Because I am mentally ill, I've decided it's essential hat I get an abortion. Can a mentally ill woman be a good mother? It's such a sane question; I'd like to take a poll."[349] A third woman poses a series of questions attempting to make sense of her depression: "Did depression find me because of my stepfather's touch? Did depression rush to fill the shocked space left when he withdrew his touch? Or was depression a consequence of my essential chemical constitution? Or did events themselves create the chemistry? I don't know."[350] The depressives' narratives reach for acceptable reasons; their authors seem to test different rationales—perhaps by speaking them aloud—that might invest otherwise senseless suffering with a purpose.

This narrative sensemaking is a part of the depressives' rhetoric of expertise. It is a demonstration of how a person understands and masters her experiences. In other words, it is a means of proof in the rhetoric of expertise. At the same time, as Fisher explains, the narrative paradigm equalizes experts and laypersons by positing them as discursive partners.[351] Lay audience members are not mere observers; they are active participants in the meaning-making function of a story. So, while depressives build their expert status by narrating a personal experience and by making sense of it, they also

[348] Heffernan, 10.
[349] Slater, 91.
[350] Dormen, 239.
[351] Fisher, 72.

invite the lay audience—the readers—to identify. Identification between rhetor and audience is key to narrative.[352] It is possible to identify with a story and its main characters in an entirely different way than with a formal argument. Imagine how awkward it would be to attempt "consubstantiality" with a case study in a psychiatric journal.[353] Personal experiences are radically different from statistical analyses. Because the readers of *Unholy Ghost* have personal experiences of ordinary life, we can identify with the depressives' trauma, even when we cannot identify with the experience of depression itself. We can imagine a rupture of normalcy because we understand normalcy. Because we identify at least partially with the experience of depressives, we find them persuasive. Because we find the narration of their experience persuasive, we grant them expertise—an experience-based kind of expertise rather than a professional kind.

Metaphorical Description

One of the most noticeable things about the depressives' essays is their reliance on description. They do not argue the validity of their perspectives by providing warrants or data. They simply state the nature of their experiences, almost in a presumptuous manner. This, of course, is a strategy for claiming expertise of the experience. These descriptions are matter-of-fact and almost always metaphorical. Depression is a "flickering basement light," a "game of telephone" in which "the message gets lost as it travels, eventually affecting cellular metabolism, hormone balance, and the circadian

[352] Fisher, 75.
[353] Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 21

system, the clock that determines cycles of rest and activity."[354] Depression is "a place that teems with nightmarish activity. It's a one-industry town, a psychic megalopolis devoted to a single twenty-four-hour-we-never-close product."[355] Depression is "deadness […] but also a hyperawareness, a needle on the floor, shining like the highest wheedling note of a violin; a person's face all funny, in separate pieces, the isolated mouth moving, the blink of en eye excruciating, the silky crash of lashes."[356] Metaphorical description here functions as a kind of narrative "argument" by definition. It establishes definitions for an alternative theory of illness.

Similarly, the authors metaphorically describe the transformation they underwent while ill. One states, "I was in a last-straw zone. On that day, I shipped way out, leaving the secular shores of sanity behind me."[357] Another contrasts two versions of himself: "From being a living person with a distinct personality I began to feel more or less like an outline of that person—and then even the outline began to fade, erased by what had happened inside. I felt as if I was vanishing—or more accurately, had vanished."[358] He explains, "I felt spectral—the personality that had been mine for fifty-five years was simply no longer there—or it there, it was fragmented, it was dust particles swirling around, only occasionally and briefly cohering."[359] One woman observes, "My heart pumped dread. It was an actual substance I could feel coursing through my

[354] Heffernan, 12; Chase Twichell, "Toys in the Attic," in *Unholy Ghost*, ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001), 23.
[355] Dormen, 236.
[356] Slater, 91.
[357] Heffernan, 13.
[358] Larry McMurtry, "From *Walter Benjamin at the Dairy Queen*," in *Unholy Ghost*, ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001), 69.
[359] McMurtry, 70.

bloodstream—some days a barely-there awareness, other days a carbonated liquid that seemed to have replaced my blood."[360] Note that the woman whose heart "pumped dread" does not provide any justification or warrant for the claim. From an argumentation perspective, she does not substantiate it. What, then, is the virtue of a metaphorical description in the rhetoric of expertise?

To begin, metaphors are linguistic devices that rely on the contagion of meaning. They transpose meanings from one object or experience to another order of objects or experiences. Saying that depression is a flickering basement light—as in the example above—transposes meaning from the reader's/hearer's experience with flickering basement lights onto depression. Readers apophantically understand the "tenor," depression, by way of the "vehicle," the basement light.[361] Contrary to classical theories of figurative language, metaphors are far more than ornamentation; they are integral to linguistic and cognitive processes.

The authors of *Unholy Ghost* use metaphors strategically to explicate the experience of depression. As part of the rhetoric of their expertise, they describe what the illness *feels* like, what the body goes through in a depressive state. Much has been written about the relationship between bodily experiences and metaphor.[362] To summarize, consider two different directions for the relationship. In one, bodily experiences give rise to metaphors. In the other, metaphors structure the ways in which we experience the world. For example, human beings are thoroughly familiar with the bodily experience of

[360] Dormen, 230.
[361] I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936).
[362] Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Life By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

physical containment. "We are intimately aware of our bodies as three-dimensional containers into which we put certain things (food, water, air) and out of which other things emerge (food and water wastes, air, blood, etc.)."[363] This embodied knowledge produces a series of containment metaphors. Conversely, a language that continually references the body as a container, likely causes its users to experience the body that way. These two directions are not necessarily mutually exclusive; the reality is probably a combination or cycle of meaning and experience.

There is also a third possibility in the depressives' use of metaphor as a rhetorical strategy, viz., a theorizing function. Metaphors not only structure the way we experience something but the way we interpret it. In other words, while the writers' metaphors do not generate an experience of depression for the reader, they do generate a viable theoretical understanding of it. They enthymematically invite the reader to realize an experience through the use of a familiar vehicle. To further unpack metaphors' theorizing function, consider what Anthony Paul calls I.A. Richards' "indispensability thesis."[364] According to Richards, the co-presence of the tenor and vehicle results in meanings that could not be attainable without their interaction.[365] Metaphors, so understood, aesthetically communicate things that literal meaning—if such a thing is possible—cannot. Depression, described metaphorically by those who experience it personally, can perhaps be theorized only in that form. This notion has profound implications for the rhetoric of expertise. It posits metaphor as an aesthetic resource for talking about a

[363] Johnson, 21.
[364] Anthony M. Paul, "Metaphor and the Bounds of Expression," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 5 (1972): 143.
[365] Richards, 100.

subject that is uniquely ambiguous or incompletely theorized by science. Moreover, it foregrounds certain epistemological claims in the depressives' rhetoric of expertise.

Experiential Epistemology

Part of their rhetoric of expertise are the essayists' frequent references to bodily experience—something mentioned earlier in the chapter. For instance, bodily experiences are present in the depressives' narratives of daily life and are subject to metaphorical description. In short, bodily experiences are the depressives' ways of knowing, their expert epistemology. As one woman notes, "I've studied the properties of each drug in the laboratories of my mind and body, and have made some unsettling but ultimately consoling discoveries."[366] Another writer emphasizes the physical pain of depression: "I feel the pain. And pain exists in the present tense only. It has no past, it has no future, just a never-ending now—NOW—where is relief?"[367] For both authors, bodily experience is an epistemological foundation. But, even more significant, referencing it is a powerful discursive strategy in the rhetoric of expertise.

This trope is another rhetorical strategy that the depressives share with the 9/11 survivors analyzed in Chapter Three. For the survivors, recounting a lived experience—smelling the smoke inside the towers, hearing the roar of the jet engine, etc.—means claiming expertise. For depressives, lived experience is likewise a form of proof. What distinguishes the two groups of experts—one historical and one medical—is the potential for successful transmission. They have different approaches to the teaching of expertise.

[366] Twichell, 22.
[367] Slater, 85.

9/11 survivors indicate that, while they cannot teach their process of knowing (such embodied knowledge of trauma exists only in primary form), they can and must teach its object. They have a duty to spread their unique perspective. They are experts teaching a particular and important lesson.

Depressives, by contrast, seem not to believe that any part of their expertise can be taught. Without personal experience of depression, the condition is impossible to understand. One claims, "I say, 'It's back, depression's a real mental illness you know,' and he nods. He doesn't know."[368] Another writes, "Over and over, I would say I was sick—sick with any documented ailment that came into my head, any ailment I could think of except 'depression,' which no one, no matter what the brochures with grainy girls' pictures and the word 'reuptake' say, will ever believe is a real sickness."[369] Many indicate that words themselves fall short of conveying depression: "What words could I come up with to describe the bitterness I felt toward myself for my failings? Words were too small."[370] "To be depressed is not to have words to describe it, is not to have words at all, but to live in the gray world of the inarticulate, where nothing takes shape, nothing has edges or clarity."[371] Verbal expression is dismissed as inadequate: "Whatever I say sounds like a bad soap opera. I recount the five hospitalizations, the slow suck of depressions, the slashes on the arms, and none of that captures the experience. How can I explain it?"[372] For these authors, the impossibility of sharing what they know may

[368] Slater, 90.
[369] Heffernan, 9.
[370] Dormen, 237.
[371] Maud Casey, 284.
[372] Slater, 80.

possibly even compromise their expert status. If the experience of depression cannot be communicated, how likely is the reader to believe the "expert"?

On the other hand, the incommunicability of experiencing depression is a challenge that the depressives extend to science. By suggesting that depression can only be known by those who experience it with their own bodies and minds, the depressives question the psychiatrists' expertise. They implicitly accuse the medical establishment of missing the mark. One author states, "As for suicide: the sociologists and psychologists who talk of it as a disease puzzle me now as much as the Catholics and the Muslims who call it the most deadly of mortal sins."[373] Another echoes his concern with scientific terminology: "One of the many things I hate about the word 'depression' is the assumption of blankness attached to it, as if the experience of depression is as absent on the inside as it looks to be from the outside."[374] To these writers, truly understanding depression is beyond the scope of science. It is beyond scientific measures. Depressives incorporate this indictment of the medical establishment's lack of expertise in their own claims to expertise. In the concluding section, I examine this and other major tensions in the rhetoric of medical expertise.

Conclusions for the Rhetoric of Medical Expertise

Expertise is rhetorically constructed and struggled over by those who compete with each other for affirmation and authority. It is about being persuasive. My dissertation examines the rhetorical strategies that different groups use in order to claim

[373] Alvarez, 228.
[374] Dormen, 236.

expertise. Specifically, this chapter focused on the rhetorical construction of medical expertise. I compared two types of medical experts in the context of dealing with depression: a psychiatrist and a group of depressives. By analyzing how they frame expertise on the subject of depression, I identified several characteristic tactics. These tactics constitute two distinct rhetorics. In this final section, I highlight a few recurring themes, and comment on how they unite and divide the field of medical experts.

First, both the depressives and the psychiatrist emphasize the importance of personal experience. This is a major strategy in both rhetorics of expertise. What distinguishes them is the source and nature of the experience. For essayists, medical expertise must be more than specialized training; it is not enough, they imply, to study depression in theory. It does not tell the whole story. Understanding depression, that is, being an expert on the subject, requires personal exposure. When depressives say personal experience, they mean the visceral, physically painful kind. Only someone who has known depression in and through her own body and mind fully comprehends it. Science and medicine as forms of expertise are helpful but incomplete.

For Dr. DePaulo, personal experience is an equally powerful element in the rhetoric of expertise. It is what allows him to identify not only as a scientist, but as a clinician. As we learn several times in his book, DePaulo has extensive experience treating thousands of patients. He is an *experienced* psychiatrist. Experience is a more at arm's length for him than for depressives, because he is in control. To understand the difference between the depressives notion of experience and Dr. DePaulo's, let us take a lesson from basic English grammar. In an active clause, the subject is that which

performs the predicate; it is the doer of the verb. In the phrase "John suffers," John is the subject of the predicate "to suffer." In addition, some clauses take an object—dative or accusative depending on the language structure—that is affected by the predicate. For example, the phrase "Depression struck Lisa" posits Lisa as the object of the predicate "struck." She is not the subject of the clause, nor in control of its action. What is the point of this grammatical detour? It illustrates the difference between DePaulo's and the depressives' expert experience. DePaulo is experienced as a doctor; he collects professional experience deliberately, even with pride. Metaphorically speaking, he is the subject of a predicate. In contrast, depressives are struck by the experience of depression. They are the object of the imagined clause. Their record of experience is not a collection of accomplishments but a story of survival.

Another way to approach the notion of experience is phronesis, part of a rhetor's ethos. Practical wisdom is integral to the rhetoric of expertise for both depressives and the psychiatrist. The former, as just explained, draw much of their persuasiveness from the difference between theoretical knowledge and lived, bodily experience. DePaulo, conversely, foregrounds his clinical experience to balance his reliance on laboratory science. Working with patients "in the trenches" equips him prudently to apply "a rational principle to practical situations that call for choice about action."[375] Lived experience, or phronesis, is powerfully present in both the depressives' and DePaulo's rhetoric of expertise.

[375] Craig R. Smith, "*Ethos* Dwells Pervasively: A Hermeneutic Reading of Aristotle on Credibility," in *The Ethos of Rhetoric,* ed. M. J. Hyde (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), 10-11.

A second theme in this chapter is the reluctance to share expertise. Both depressives and DePaulo indicate that certain experiences (see above) have put them in a unique position to understand depression. This expert vantage point, they imply, cannot be replicated or reconstructed. To be sure, DePaulo nobly states that he hopes to impart some of his expert knowledge to the lay public. In several places, however, he indicates the unfeasibility of this project. He writes, "It is not possible for a doctor or anyone else to compress twenty years of medical training and experience into a half-hour or even a half-day."[376] Of course, a natural follow-up to this statement would be to ask whether it is possible to condense medical training into a book designed for the general public. DePaulo's rhetoric safeguards the credentials that make him a member of the biomedical establishment; doing so strategically privileges his medical expertise. Depressives likewise put little faith in the possibility of imparting what they know. Their essays reflect a deep commitment to the notion that depression can only be understood "from the inside." Again, a lack of experience is what separates the audience, the lay public, from expertise on depression.

A third theme in my analysis is the use of aesthetic forms, particularly narrative and metaphor. Both DePaulo and the essayists integrate storytelling and figurative description in their persuasive moves. Since narrative and metaphor are typical ways of conveying intimate and personal struggles, they make perfect sense in the depressives' essays. I address those aesthetic rhetorical choices extensively in the analysis section. For DePaulo, however, the turn to aesthetic form is more noteworthy; even he uses narratives

[376] DePaulo, 198.

and metaphors to talk about depression. In addition to numerous patient stories, the book includes a variety of animations of depression, that is, phrases wherein depression assumes subjectivity. Depression "hits," "masquerades," "warps reasoning," and "saps your ability to think clearly."[377] Furthermore, in DePaulo's account, neurotransmitters come alive and speak: "They say to the cells with whom they connect via synapses: 'Do more' or 'Do less of whatever you are doing!' Norepinephrine is a classic inhibitory neurotransmitter. It says, 'Slow down!'"[378] DePaulo's "depression story" features a few major characters, not unlike the depressives' narratives.

The commonalities I just described—emphasis on personal experience, reluctance to share expertise, and reliance on aesthetic forms—are significant because they are surprising. Specifically, they are surprising in light of how little else DePaulo and the authors of *Unholy Ghost* have in common. DePaulo is a biomedical heavy-weight; he is a psychiatry professor at Johns Hopkins, one of the nation's most prestigious medical schools. As such, his medical expertise has its feet firmly planted in Western culture's most established institutions: natural science and post-industrial professionalization. Far from this institutionally-sanctioned medical expertise is the limited but powerfully persuasive expertise of depressives. The authors I analyzed in this chapter are not doctors; they are poets and journalists. Their persuasiveness as experts lies in cultural affirmation of lived, embodied experience. It is remarkable, therefore, that their rhetorical

[377] DePaulo, 12, 59, 15, 13.
[378] DePaulo, 81.

strategies are so similar to Dr. DePaulo's. And it is in these similarities that we can begin to develop a vocabulary for the rhetoric of medical expertise.

To conclude, doctors are not the only bidders for medical expertise; those who experience an illness like depression first-hand also strive for the public's acknowledgment. Their physical experiences of pain and humiliation become warrants in an argument for expert status. Depressives employ the available means of persuasion to make us believe their stories. What my chapter ultimately asks is, what distinguishes these stories from biomedical rhetoric? As much as medicine clings to natural science and ideals of objectivity, it remains inextricably discursive. Indeed, the appeal itself to an objective and scientific foundation is a persuasive move. Representatives of biomedicine, including psychiatrists like Dr. DePaulo, maintain expertise through a rhetorical strategy. It is that strategy which ensures an expert-layperson relationship with the American public. Medicine as a professional domain makes the rhetorical nature of expertise evident. It illustrates how much power the public grants to those we consider to be credible experts, including over our minds and bodies.

CHAPTER FIVE

WIKIPEDIA AND THE *ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA*: THE RHETORIC OF INFORMATIONAL EXPERTISE

Since its inception in 2001, the use of *Wikipedia* is an irrepressible issue on college campuses. It is in every bibliography in every "research" assignment. Consequently professors revise lectures on source evaluation, pleading with students to be critical information consumers. Nevertheless, the attraction to *Wikipedia* is powerful. *Wikipedia* is so irresistibly accessible. It's so immediately gratifying. It's so easy. In the fall of 2006, the National Communication Association's list serve CRTNET featured a brief dialogue between Shannon Vanhorn of Valley City State University and Richard Olsen of the University of North Carolina Wilmington. At stake were instructional policies regarding the use of *Wikipedia* for course assignments. Should college instructors permit students to use *Wikipedia* as a reference? Under what conditions? How ought we use it ourselves?

Curricular policy, however interesting, is less pressing for my purposes than *Wikipedia*'s impact on the culture of expertise. Conventional thinking says that a person who is a credentialed expert in a subject matter speaks and writes about that subject. This has long been the philosophy of non-fiction writing. But *Wikipedia*'s "anyone can edit" policy is a radical departure from that logic. It challenges the traditional ways in which information and knowledge are managed and disseminated. On *Wikipedia*, scholars and laypersons are indistinguishable; one edits the other's work with no special designation for degrees or affiliation. This is a recurring target of comedian Stephen Colbert's satire.

When news spread that Microsoft had paid consultants to publish flattering information on *Wikipedia*, in essence advertising the company, Colbert coined the term "Wikilobbying." His television program *The Colbert Report* made audiences an offer: "I'll give five bucks to the first person who goes on *Wikipedia* and changes the entry on Reality to "Reality Has Become A Commodity." And to those who say, 'That's not what Reality is,' I say 'Go look it up on *Wikipedia*.'"[379] Colbert's humor contains a serious question, viz., What are *Wikipedia*'s standards for reliable information? Why the enormously positive response to the subversion of accreditation? What effect will it have on the dissemination of expertise as we know it?

Agnostics suggest that *Wikipedia* and traditional reference sources like the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* function as fundamentally different discursive activities. It is possible, they claim, that the public uses *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* for different purposes, to learn about different kinds of topics. This division of the information market, to use an economic logic, would mean that *Wikipedia* does not compete with other encyclopedias. Others posit that there may be more than one audience for reference materials; the readers of *Encyclopaedia Britannica* may be a different group than Wikipedians. And perhaps the twain shall n'er meet. Be that as it may, the point of a rhetorical analysis is to understand why and how—regardless of whether the two are "actually" competing—their discursive identities are constructed. The rhetorics that construct *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* respectively as informational experts also contain a certain enmity. Put differently, the tone of tension is present even if

[379] Quoted in Nora Miller, "Calling Out the Symbol Users: Wikipedia Revisited," *ETC* (April 2007): 148.

statistics reveal a different story. Even if in reality they two are not competitors for the same audience, they are portrayed as such in the media. For example, an article in *The New Yorker* quotes *Britannica* CEO Jorge Cauz saying, "*Wikipedia* is to *Britannica* as 'American Idol' is to the Juilliard School."[380] Journalist Mick O'Leary writes, "With all of the information on the Internet, why is this well-intentioned reference source treated so badly? Because, while most of the nonsense on the Web knows its place, *Wikipedia* has the chutzpah to deem itself a real encyclopedia."[381] This claim to "real encyclopedia" expertise begs the question: How does *Wikipedia* challenge traditional forms of information dissemination through an alternative rhetoric of expertise?

My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. It investigates how expertise is negotiated as a function of the rhetorical situation, its participants and constraints. I ask: What rhetorical strategies do different groups employ to compete for expert authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another? In this chapter, I focus on the rhetorical strategies of informational expertise, specifically the emergence of alternative reference sources and the challenges they pose to traditional reference publications. I contrast *Encyclopaedia Britannica* with *Wikipedia*.[382] By analyzing texts

[380] Stacy Schiff, "Know It All: Can *Wikipedia* Conquer Expertise?" *The New Yorker* 82 (31 July 2006): 36-43.
[381] Mick O'Leary, "Wikipedia: Encyclopedia or Not?" *Information Today* (Sep 2005): 49.
[382] In other words, my comparison of these encyclopedias posits them as separate and singular entities. This brackets the thousands of individual contributors to *Wikipedia*, as well as the various publication stages to which *Britannica* is subject. For the purposes of my analysis, the two can be readily distinguished and operationalized. An alternative approach might have been to compare *Wikipedia* with *Britannica*'s online version to eliminate the possibility that my conclusions identify differences between reference publication on- and offline. This concern is superseded by the importance of comparing the two publications in their most "essential" forms. While *Wikipedia* does not exist offline, *Britannica* has been a hard-copy publication since 1768. A principal claim to its ethos, I argue in this chapter, is precisely this venerable history. To use the online version would be misdirected. Even though the information itself is almost the

produced by and about these publications I examine how expertise is constructed. I include both meta-discourse (i.e., information that the publications produce about themselves) and three different entries, or "articles," from each publication.[383] I complement this with some media commentary about the publications and their relationship.[384] For the articles, I compare and contrast how *Wikipedia* and *Encyclopaedia Britannica* define 1) time, an abstract idea, 2) photosynthesis, a concrete and scientific phenomenon, and 3) censorship, a controversial subject.[385]

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same on and offline, *Britannica*'s organization and level of interactivity—central to my analysis—are radically different.

[383] As historian Roy Rosenzweig attests, "writing about *Wikipedia* is maddeningly difficulty." See Roy Rosenzweig, "Can History Be Open Source? Wikipedia and the Future of the Past," *Journal of American History* 93 (2006): 119. For a rhetorical critic, the multiple layers of text make *Wikipedia* a virtual funhouse. As a result of hyper linking and the multi-user philosophy *all* text is open to edits. This creates a prolific and ongoing text machine. At the basic level, *Wikipedia* publishes content--information about a topic—such as hypochondria or ice cream. Almost all topical articles are subject to public editing. A tab marked "Edit this page" allows users to change information about hypochondria and ice cream. These edits, in turn, are the topic of discussion on so-called talk pages. On the talk pages, users do not discuss the subject matter, but rather the editorial practices. Contributors and administrators post their reactions to what has been added or revised. There are, however, discussion pages where different subjects can be discussed and debated substantively. Finally, *Wikipedia* publishes information about itself and its policies; these pages are both descriptive and prescriptive. *Wikipedia* administrators, or *Wikipedia*ns, instruct users on courteous and productive practices. To some extent, even these "project pages" are subject to editing and discussion. The result is a sophisticated and highly self-reflexive process of rhetorical production. In addition, *Wikipedia* is subject to constant change. Like any rhetorical critic who chooses online texts for analysis, I risk obsolescence. Note, however, that my objective is not to evaluate *Wikipedia* as a web community or even to analyze it generally as a rhetorical artifact.

[384] This chapter relies on some secondary sources such as articles from the popular press as a complement to the original analysis. There are several reason for this inclusion: 1) It is in the media that representatives of *Wikipedia* and *Encyclopaedia Britannica* engage each other directly. Unlike some of my dissertation's earlier experts, notably the political experts in chapter two, encyclopedists do not often interact with each other. The ways in which *Britannica*'s spokespersons, for example, comment on the *Wikipedia* movement in the press is significant for my analysis of competing rhetorics of expertise. 2) When *Britannica*'s and *Wikipedia*'s representatives comment on their work in the media, it is a statement of methodology that is otherwise difficult to find, particularly in *Britannica*'s case. 3) Relatively little scholarship exists about *Wikipedia* in the fields of communication and rhetoric; an inaugural analysis like my chapter must be as inclusive as possible if it hopes to grasp this complex text.

[385] Other comparisons of *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* exist. These studies, however, generally focus on the accuracy of the former in relation to traditional sources. The most widely cited study was published in *Nature* magazine. See Jim Giles, "Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head," *Nature* 15 (December 2005): 900-901. A group of experts was asked to assess 42 scientific entries from *Wikipedia* and *Encyclopaedia Britannica* respectively. The entries did not identify the source. Findings reported that

This chapter differs from the preceding ones in some significant ways. It is not situated in the context of a specific subject matter. While the Chapter Two focused on the rhetoric of political expertise and Chapter Three on the rhetoric of historical expertise, the present chapter transcends disciplinary lines. Because it examines the construction, ownership and proliferation of information, it integrates political, historical and medical matters. *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* both contain articles that fit within those categories. Note, however, that I am principally interested in *how* the two construct themselves as expert resources. I study what they publish about a particular topic only in so far as that content reveals something about the rhetorical construction of informational expertise.

The notion of an "informational expert" is somewhat confounding. It is not quite like being an expert on caterpillars or Shakespearean sonnets. Rather, informational expertise raises complex questions of specialization and generalism, of content and process. Consider, for example, whether an informational expert is a master of a particular subject matter or an expert on the process itself of managing information. Unless we can say that information management *is* a subject matter, I propose that an informational expert is a procedural expert. And while this orientation is a departure from

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an average *Britannica* article contained about three errors, while the same average article in *Wikipedia* contained four. The Nottingham University Business School conducted another study in which *Wikipedia* articles were distributed to 30 academic subject specialists and 24 nonexpert volunteers; according to the findings, the experts rated the articles higher on accuracy than did the nonexperts. See L.B., "Wikipedia's Stock Rises," *School Library Journal* (Jan 2007): 24. Subsequent popular magazine articles have likewise undertaken their own comparison shopping. See Robert Eiffert, "Wikipedia, The Review: How the Online Behemoth Compares to Standard Reference Works," *School Library Journal* (March 2006): 82-83. My analysis differs from the abovementioned comparisons in that it focuses on the rhetorical struggle over expertise, not the accuracy of different encyclopedias. I examine how *Wikipedia* challenges traditional forms of information dissemination through an alternative rhetoric of expertise.

the rest of my dissertation, the chapter is no less important. Thus far I have focused primarily on experts' rhetorical invention; this chapter shifts perspective, and examines the role of disposition, another part of the classical canon, in the rhetoric of expertise. Since my dissertation's ultimate goal is to offer a theory of the rhetoric of expertise, disposition must have a prominent place, especially given that we live in the so-called information age.

In the following section, I survey the history of encyclopedias. This contextualizing gesture introduces readers to a rather complex publishing ideology. It is imperative to understand how encyclopedic experts historically and in the present have constructed themselves and their relationship to the public. Many of the ideological assumptions that structure today's encyclopedia's are products of historical factors. The section on encyclopedic history is followed by my analysis of *Wikipedia* and *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Unlike previous chapters, the analysis section does not separate the chapter's two artifacts. Instead, I weave my reading of the two texts together, noting how their responses to each other form a rhetoric of expertise. Using the critical probes laid out in Chapter One, I focus especially on methodology, anonymity and community, audience participation, and the rhetoric of play. Finally, I conclude with a few remarks about the differences and similarities between *Wikipedia*'s and the *Encyclopedia Britannica*'s forms of expertise.

A Brief History of the Encyclopedia

The history of the encyclopedia is fraught with tension between hubris and populism. It chronicles a culture's desire to understand itself in a comprehensive way and

disseminate that knowledge. As Robert Collision notes, a fundamental hope of encyclopedic publishing is that it is "possible to compile a work that would supersede all other books and render them unnecessary."[386] Indeed, etymology reveals encyclopedists' ambition; the word "en-cyclo-pedia" is a Latinization attributed to Quintilian meaning a round or circle of all human knowledge and education.[387] Around 1244, a Dominican friar named Vincent of Beauvais, who published the encyclopedia *Speculum Majus* (*The Great Mirror*), is said to have defined encyclopedic knowledge as "all that is worthy of contemplation."[388] This definition, and its normative emphasis, survives. It inspires those who deride publications like *Wikipedia* for including articles about, for example, Barcaloungers and meatballs.[389] As Richard Yeo acknowledges, encyclopedists ascribe to a guiding myth of a "work containing the collective knowledge of a community which might be put together again if all other books were lost."[390] To encyclopedists, the circle of learning is a claim to immortality.

In order to understand the history and philosophy of encyclopedias, as well as their relationship to the idea of expertise, we must begin by recognizing their creators' moral and pedagogical aspirations. The populist beginnings of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* must not be overlooked, even now that the work enjoys a high-culture literary status. In the eighteenth century the European Enlightenment, with its free and open

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[386] Robert Collision, *Encyclopaedias: Their History Throughout the Ages* (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1966), 2.
[387] Richard Yeo, *Encyclopaedic Visions: Scientific Dictionaries and Enlightenment Culture* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6.
[388] Yeo, 5.
[389] At the time of writing, each term has an entry in *Wikipedia*.
[390] Yeo, 3.

exchange of ideas, introduced a revolutionary approach to information. As Yeo explains, "The encyclopaedias of the eighteenth century were a practical embodiment of the notion that knowledge should be accessible to a wide public and, as such, their purpose was not just to collate knowledge used by elites, but to facilitate conversation and communication."[391] What had previously been "dictionaries of arts and sciences" became more extensive texts, whose goal was to make science, literature, philosophy, etc., publicly accessible. In line with this ideology, Enlightenment encyclopedias were typically written in the vernacular rather than in Latin. Their contents were addressed to a much wider audience than their predecessors.

The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* is an Enlightenment encyclopedia, founded in 1768 in Edinburgh, Scotland by an engraver, a printer and an editor. Andrew Bell, Colin Macfarquhar and William Smellie published the first edition, which contained forty-five principal subjects with a total of thirty lengthy articles. After many editions and a hundred and forty years, the encyclopedia's eleventh edition was the last published in the United Kingdom in 1911. For almost thirty years following, it was owned and marketed by the American department store Sears Roebuck, before becoming affiliated with the University of Chicago in 1941. In 1974, the *Britannica* underwent major structural changes. A three-part set was released, consisting of the *Propaedia*, the *Micropaedia*, and the *Macropaedia*. To date, the *Macropaedia* is a 17-volume set of long articles, the *Micropaedia* a 12-set volume of short articles, and the *Propaedia* outlines the major

[391] Yeo, 12.

categories of human knowledge. In addition, the *Britannica* adapted to the introduction of digital technology in 1994 by offering a CD-ROM, and in 1997 with an online version.[392]

The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* is the oldest continuously published encyclopedia in the world, and has long been the principal reference source in the English-speaking world.[393] To many it has "come to define what an encyclopedia is."[394] Despite its firm historical anchoring, however, the *Britannica* has not been impervious to mounting threats from new information technologies. Its early online versions struggled with both purpose and identity as they tried to keep up with information users. For example, the *Britannica Internet Guide* was initially a search directory of websites, an effort to guide internet users through the rapidly expanding World Wide Web. Susan Clark explains that "this was an attempt to extend *Britannica*'s brand name to the Internet with a search directory of quality sites in keeping with *Britannica*'s mission 'to select, organize, and present the best information.'"[395] A few years later, the encyclopedia also published its entire text online, restricted by subscription to higher education institutions. Not until 1999 did *Britannica* launch its free website: www.Britannica.com. The site was well received by the public, but its medium transformation—the sudden appearance of old information in a new format—raised questions. The shift from printed to online encyclopedias is not just about creating a virtual presence; it is not just about being

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[392] For an instructive overview of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*'s history, see Dorothy Auchter, "The Evolution of the Encyclopaedia Britannica: From the Macropaedia to Britannica Online," *Reference Services Review* 27 (1999): 291-299; Jeff Loveland, "Unifying Knowledge and Dividing Disciplines," *Book History* 9 (2006): 57-87.
[393] Auchter, 291.
[394] Yeo, 170.
[395] Susan E. Clark, "In Search of the Right Formula: Encyclopaedia Britannica Ventures from Print to Online to Both," *Reference and User Services Quarterly* 41 (2001): 136.

available on the web. Rather, online encyclopedic publishing also highlights the complexity of different types of information. To clarify with a small example: Britannica.com does not have an entry for "paper clip." *Wikipedia* does. Even *Britannica*'s "book of the year" additions do not correspond to the information that other virtual encyclopedias publish. Precisely what that difference implies regarding content and culture is one part of my investigation of the rhetoric of informational expertise.

Wikipedia is a novelty in more than one sense. It is not only a new species of encyclopedia, but an interactive form of online communication. Founded in 2001 by James Wales and Larry Sanger—the latter of whom later denounced the project—it is currently one of the ten most popular websites in the world.[396] According to its records, *Wikipedia* contains 8.2 million articles in 253 languages.[397] It is maintained by a large community of volunteers and operated by the Wikimedia Foundation, a non-profit organization that also features Wikinews, Wikiquotes, Wikibooks, and Wiktionary. The prefix "wiki" denotes open software, which allows any user to edit a page or create a new entry.[398] This openness is *Wikipedia*'s raison d'être and the heart of its claim to expertise. It proudly calls itself the "free encyclopedia that anyone can edit."

Wikipedia's pride resonates in important ways with earlier encyclopedias' ambitions. The same philosophy that undergirds the "circle of learning" and the ideal that all human knowledge can be compiled seems to fuel Wales's enthusiasm. In order to promote his product, he asks skeptics to "imagine a world in which every single person

[396] Katherine Mangu-Ward, "Wikipedia and Beyond," *Reason* 39 (2007): 18-29.
[397] Figures current as of September, 2007. See *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Wikipedia," available at: http://en.*Wikipedia*.org/wiki/*Wikipedia* (accessed September 25, 2007).
[398] Mangu-Ward.

on the planet is given free access to the sum of all human knowledge."[399] Additionally, *Wikipedia*'s article about itself describes "an effort to create and distribute a free encyclopedia of the highest possible quality to every single person on the planet in their own language."[400] In an interview, Wales states simply that "We make the Internet not suck." In these excerpts, it appears that the Scotsmen who founded the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and Jimmy Wales have a lot in common as experts of information; their beliefs in what their encyclopedias will accomplish are comparably astronomical.

Related to the tension between hubris and populism is another dialectic: specialization and generalization. At stake in this second dialectic is whether or not it is possible to be both comprehensive and generally accessible, while simultaneously maintaining scientific and intellectual depth. Collision summarizes the challenge:

> There is something in the discipline imposed that confronts the specialist with an interesting problem. Is it possible to condense the salient points of his subject in readable fashion in only a few hundred words? The controversies so familiar to him—can they be explained in such a way that the 'man in the street' can appreciate them and their significance without paying more attention to the questions they raise than to the main outlines of the subject?[401]

Collision invites us to ask: Is it possible for a specialist to make herself generally intelligible? In a modern context, should the public perhaps demand that she try? If she

[399] Mangu-Ward.
[400] See *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Wikipedia," available at: http://en.*Wikipedia*.org/wiki/*Wikipedia* (accessed September 25, 2007).
[401] Collision, 227.

cannot, should information that is written for the general public be authored by someone other than the specialist? These are the questions of informational expertise that link the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and *Wikipedia*.

In *Britannica*'s early years, generalism was still considered a virtue. Before the scientific and industrial revolutions, being knowledgeable in a wide range of topics was prized higher than being "expert" in a specific subject matter. (Indeed, the word "expert" was originally employed in its adjectival, rather than nominal form to mean general competency in a technique, not a theory). The emergence of specialized professions changed the status of generally erudite writers and public intellectuals. So too for encyclopedists, whose ancestors were generalists. The three men who founded the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* were well-educated but by no means scientists as we now understand the term. Beginning in the early 19th century, however, contributors were invited experts.[402] What they wrote for the *Britannica* were "treatises," long essays designed as general introductions to, for example, biology. The essays were much longer than what the modern reader would expect in an encyclopedia. They were meant to be read rather than used for reference. They instructed the reading public in topics of interest such that "any man of ordinary parts, may, if he chooses, learn the principles of agriculture, of astronomy, of botany, of chemistry."[403]

For this reason, encyclopedias in the 18th century were charged with "peddling superficial information rather than profound accounts of knowledge."[404] They clashed

[402] Yeo, 253.
[403] Loveland, 67.
[404] Yeo, 247.

with the novelty of scientific discovery, which made details and specificity imperative. Decades, even centuries later, when specialization had grown further in importance, encyclopedias were criticized for being too technical, making themselves inaccessible to a lay public. Contributing scientists had lost some of their ability to speak to non-scientists. Today, one of the most common accusations against *Wikipedia* is that it elevates trivia to an unwarranted status. By devoting entire articles to the paper clip, for example, *Wikipedia* does indeed seem to "peddle superficial information."[405] Important to note here is the inescapable and irresolvable tension between what is generally intelligible and what is sufficiently specific in any historical or modern encyclopedic undertaking. We still recall the Dominican friar, asking anxiously what is "worthy of contemplation." In an encyclopedia, what should be included, and how should it be organized?

The organization of information has always been a major concern for encyclopedists. During the middle ages and the Renaissance, encyclopedias were typically governed by a thematic structure. Subjects were presented in a hierarchy such as the seven disciplines of the liberal arts, the faculties in a university, or the cosmological chain of being topped by "divine things."[406] This structure reveals and perpetuates a view of knowledge as orderly, even teleological. In its prime, it inspired beautiful art reflecting epistemological and ontological visions. As science and discovery advanced, however, the hierarchical organization became untenable. What was known about a particular topic

[405] This superficiality, however, may be less a lack of depth than an unmerited attention to things with limited significance.
[406] Yeo, 22.

changed so rapidly that encyclopedists could not keep up. Chemistry, for example, was quickly becoming inseparable from the other natural sciences in a way that must have flustered encyclopedists. In that time of change, an alphabetical organization seemed more flexible and adaptive. It also allowed for easier reference use, as the habits of encyclopedic reading changed. Rather than reading entire treatises on a science, users began to search directly for specific answers. This approach to using encyclopedias still thrives. A modern reader is more likely to go and look something up in the encyclopedia than she is to read it cover to cover.

It is important to note how the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and *Wikipedia* respectively respond to the challenge of organization. It is what most distinguishes them from each other. Additionally, it gets at the heart of this chapter's analysis of the rhetoric of informational expertise, viz., disposition. From its inception, *Britannica* was designed to use both a thematic and an alphabetical structure. This tactic is arguably why it endured so long. Its alphabetical order facilitates continuous revision. The thematic approach of earlier encyclopedias remains in *Britannica*'s treatises (see above). By also incorporating long essays , *Britannica*'s editors retained the idea that sciences must be considered systemic and integrated.[407] Even as empirical breakthroughs were making their jobs difficult, the editors did not want to chop up scientific articles into tidbits. Interconnectivity was an ideal that *Britannica* prized and continues to safeguard.

For that reason, the introduction of virtual hyperlinks into encyclopedic writing is revolutionary. It is an essential difference between an online and a hardcopy

[407] Yeo, xv.

encyclopedia. Hyperlinks are those parts of an html document that a user "clicks on" to access a different page. They take us from place to place on the Internet. Using hyperlinks online is now so commonplace, so integral to our computer habits, that describing them seems almost odd. Nevertheless, the impact of hyperlinks on encyclopedias cannot be overstated. For centuries, encyclopedists labored tirelessly to facilitate cross-referencing. They created indices and intricate ways of getting from shorter articles to longer essays and from one article to another. Connecting one piece of information to another is messy, confusing, and arduous. It is also imperative in the learning process. The advent of hyperlinks made cross-referencing both instant and infinite. There is no limit to how many hyperlinks an online encyclopedia can feature in one article. For example, the *Wikipedia* article that defines "dance" as "movement used as a form of expression, social interaction or presented in a spiritual or performance setting" contains a hyperlink on the words movement, expression, social interaction, spiritual, and performance. By clicking on any of the words, a user moves to a different but related topic.

The emergence of hyperlinks in online documents brings my historical overview up to date. It turns attention to the irreducible difference between the two encyclopedias that is the focus on my rhetorical analysis. *Wikipedia* is a moving object. It is accessible to a world-wide audience of participants, and the hyperlinking makes contributions "virtually" limitless. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, in contrast, is static. It is frozen in

time from the point of going to press.[408] Until a new edition is released, or the "book of the year" amends any problems, nothing can be challenged, withdrawn, or added. *Britannica*, like all conventional writing, is the target of Plato's scorn. It "can neither defend itself nor come to its own support."[409] While *Wikipedia*'s organization of information is in constant flux, *Britannica* retains its age-old format.[410] There are costs and benefits to both.

In the rhetoric of encyclopedic, or informational expertise, above-mentioned issues of hubris and populism, specialization and generalism, structure and accessibility play key roles. They are integral to *Wikipedia*'s and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*'s persuasive appeals. Primarily, they are issues of rhetorical disposition. That is, they pertain to the management and organization of a message. The next section focuses on the specific ways in which management and organization construct two different rhetorics of informational expertise.

Analysis: Encyclopedic Experts

The actual articles featured in *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* are, perhaps surprisingly, not so different. Both texts conform to an encyclopedic style or voice. Both contain diagrams and pictures, *Wikipedia* more than *Britannica*. *Britannica*'s articles contain fewer redundancies. Both offer historical background information. Both end every article with a bibliography; *Wikipedia*'s version is more up-to-date and

[408] O'Leary, 53.
[409] Plato, *Phaedrus*, trans. A. Nehemas and P. Woodruff (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1995), 81.
[410] Remarkably, however, hyperlinking is a move away from linear writing, perhaps more consistent with the vision of a "circle of learning" as in the original ideal of an en-cyclo-pedia.

includes citations for newspapers and magazines as well as scholarly sources. The differences between *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, in short, are not primarily a matter of content. It is not what is published that distinguishes them. The major difference between the two encyclopedias is information management. Moreover, it is precisely in the managerial strategies that the encyclopedias' rhetorics of expertise emerge and compete.

Expert Methodologies

As mentioned in earlier chapters, demonstrating intentionality in one's practices is central to the rhetoric of expertise. An expert needs to be able to theorize his/her methodology in order to "prove" competency and accountability. The senators analyzed in Chapter Two, for example, explicate how they exercise their expertise through voting and deliberation. The psychiatrist studied in Chapter Four explains clinical procedures as a way of reassuring his patients and readers. Experts offer these theories as a means of persuasion. Likewise, *Wikipedia* is highly cognizant of its own practices, and presents this self-reflexivity as expertise. To begin, the site does a great deal of meta-posting, publishing information about what Wikipedians do and why. It states, "To understand *Wikipedia*, it is easiest to think of this website as having two types of pages: pages that are part of the encyclopedia itself, and pages of the community (used by contributors to help build and operate the encyclopedia). […] *Wikipedia*'s community pages include instructions, help pages, policies, guidelines, discussion forums, places to make requests,

pages to report problems, and user pages."[411] In many ways, the so-called community pages are *Wikipedia*'s way of explicating its expert methodology.[412]

Wikipedia encourages all contributors to adopt this level of self-reflection. The invitations to participate are always tagged with a notice to comment and, in a way, reveal one's agenda. Under "safe behaviors," Wikipedians are told that "Other editors need to understand your process, and it also helps you yourself to understand what you did after a long leave of absence from an article. Please state what you changed and why."[413] The policy states, "If one of your edits has been reverted, and you change it back again, it is good practice to leave an explanation on the talk page and a note in the edit summary that you have done so."[414] In the discussion pages, contributors lay out what they have added and editors explain how they have edited. The form is equivalent to a scholarly paper that begins with first assumptions. Furthermore, there are guidelines for dealing with behaviors that disrupt *Wikipedia*'s preferred practices: "Inappropriate changes are usually removed quickly, and repeat offenders can be blocked from editing."[415] Such policy statements are tantamount to a theory of expert method.

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[411] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Welcome to Wikipedia," available at: http://en.*Wikipedia*.org/wiki/*Wikipedia*:Welcoming_committee/Welcome_to_*Wikipedia* (accessed September 20, 2007).
[412] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Five Pillars," available at: http://en.*Wikipedia*.org/wiki/*Wikipedia*:Five_pillars (accessed September 20, 2007). The community pages include policies such as the "neutral point of view" and the "five pillars that define *Wikipedia*'s character."
[413] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Simplified Ruleset," available at: http://en.*Wikipedia*.org/wiki/*Wikipedia*:Simplified_Ruleset (accessed September 20, 2007).
[414] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Talk Page Guidelines," available at: http://en.*Wikipedia*.org/wiki/*Wikipedia*:Talk_page_guidelines (accessed September 20, 2007).
[415] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "What Is Wikipedia?" available at: http://en.*Wikipedia*.org/wiki/*Wikipedia*:Introduction (accessed September 20, 2007).

In contrast, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* does not comment on its practice of informational expertise. More specifically, it does not make such commentary concomitant with the substantive content. It does not make its publishing process public to the same extent as *Wikipedia*. Instead, it emphasizes how its form of encyclopedic work parallels academic scholarship. *Britannica* imports some of the academy's ethos by demonstrating that its content is scholarly work. For example, it profiles itself as an encyclopedia of specialization and credentials, noting that "most serious encyclopaedias" rely on "outside specialists for articles."[416] As Director of Corporate Communications Tom Panelas claims, "We don't have an article on extreme ironing, and we shouldn't. *Wikipedia* does what it does, and their strengths come at a cost. The cost of piling up large numbers of articles is a high level of inaccuracy, sloppiness, and just pain poor articles."[417] Panelas insists that such qualities of mind as skepticism and curiosity "do not occur naturally in the population, even among well-educated people. It takes years of training to acquire them, which is why there's a rigorous laying on of hands between our senior editors and the junior ones."[418] Panelas' remarks reveal the way *Britannica* competes rhetorically with *Wikipedia*'s popularity.

A significant difference between *Wikipedia*'s and *Britannica*'s experts is motive. It is of course difficult to determine exactly why a person engages in a behavior; nevertheless, there is a recurring set of motives to which informational experts attribute their work. Wikipedians are often characterized as "amateurs of scholars [who] care

[416] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., s.v. "Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries."
[417] Paula Berinstein, "Wikipedia and Britannica," *Searcher* (March 2006): 16-26.
[418] Berinstein.

passionately about a subject and want to share their knowledge."[419] They are "interested," and their knowledge is not a specialty but a "hobbyhorse."[420] As Robert Levine explains, *Wikipedia* is "the online encyclopedia that anyone can edit, but in practical terms, it is mostly a cadre of devotees who contribute to the site and obsess over it."[421] Wikipedians do what they do for fun. This affective motive, which both Wikipedians and outsiders mention, is radically different from the neutrality of conventional scholarship. Scholars, including those who write for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* are explicitly dis-interested. They are not supposed to feel passion for their discoveries. The deep-rooted ideal of objectivity requires experts, particularly scholars, to deny personal investment.[422]

Expertise, according to *Britannica*, is principally the product of the expert's historical record. It is a status and practice developed over time, in this case centuries. While *Britannica* does not comment publicly on expert practices, as does *Wikipedia*, it offers an extensive account of its history as "the oldest and largest English-language general encyclopaedia."[423] The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* collection includes an article about itself, which is the closest it comes to meta-publishing. The article is dominated by an historical timeline of the encyclopedia's different phases. The story begins with the first edition in Scotland and moves through generations of editors and PR struggles. The

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[419] Ann Kirschner, "Adventures in the Land of Wikipedia," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 53, 13 (17 November 2006): sec. B, p. 10-11.
[420] Eiffert, 83; Mangu-Ward.
[421] Robert Levine, "The Many Voices of Wikipedia, Heard in One Place," *New York Times*, 7 August 2006, sec. C, p. 4.
[422] Even though Wikipedia borrows the cache of objectivity with its NPOV (Neutral Point of View) policy, such a stance is difficult to maintain in reality. Just as it is in traditional scholarship. Rosenzweig notes: . "Even if 'neutrality' is a myth, it is a 'founding myth' for Wikipedia much as 'objectivity' […] is a 'founding myth' for the historical profession." See Rosenzweig, 122.
[423] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., s.v. "Encyclopaedia Britannica."

article reads, "An outline of the scope and history of encyclopaedias is essentially a guide to the development of scholarship, for encyclopaedias stand out as landmarks throughout the centuries."[424] *Britannica* even claims that encyclopedias "are worth preserving—even those that appear to be hopelessly out-of-date—for they contain many contributions by a large number of the world's leaders and scholars."[425] Important to note here is how *Britannica*'s autobiographical timeline instills a sense of progress in the reader. As we are taken through the encyclopedia's developmental stages, we recognize gradually how it reached its current cultural status. This is a rhetorical strategy, a means of impressing upon the reader how expert methodology is a scholarly practice with venerable history. For *Britannica*, truth belongs to experts with a documented historical record.

Central to *Wikipedia*'s expert methodology, in contrast, is the notion that truth emerges from dialectical confrontation. This conviction is more than a theory on *Wikipedia*; it is a habit of expert-engagement. One of the most prevalent arguments that *Wikipedia* makes for its expertise is that two minds are better than one. Moreover, the idea is that two *lay* minds are better than one mind with a diploma. "*Wikipedia* appeals to the authority of peer-reviewed publications rather than the personal authority of experts. […] Disagreements should be resolved through consensus-based discussion, rather than through tightly sticking to rules and procedures."[426] In line with the site's own emphasis on dialectics, there is virtually no magazine or newspaper article about *Wikipedia* that does not mention "consensus." One journalist writes, "If you combine your knowledge

[424] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., s.v. "Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries."
[425] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., s.v. "Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries."
[426] See *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Wikipedia." *Wikipedia*, s.v. "What Wikipedia is Not," available at: http://en.*Wikipedia*.org/wiki/*Wikipedia*:What_*Wikipedia*_is_not (accessed September 25, 2007).

with my knowledge, with the knowledge of 7,000 or so others around the world, chances are good that we are collectively a whole lot smarter than we are individually."[427] Another writer echoes the same experience, claiming that the most powerful insights she gleaned from *Wikipedia* "could never have been plucked from *Britannica* or any traditional reference source. That knowledge comes only from the act of sharing."[428] The point is that individuals' ideas clash with one another so as to generate expertise collaboratively.

Dialectics is the classical theory that when one idea collides with another, a higher order of insight rises from the ashes. This approach to expert knowledge—to epistemology and pedagogy—appears in different forms throughout Western intellectual history. If it might be said to have begun with Socratic elenchus, *Wikipedia* turns it into a form of online constructivism. The way in which *Wikipedia* hosts information reveals what it believes about reality, viz., that it is a social negotiation. Truth on *Wikipedia* rises from multiple interactions between opposing arguments within the discourse community. It is a process of collaborative invention rather than the property of a single person. Note, for example, how *Wikipedia* acknowledges the inevitability of mistakes. "Be sure to read the above pages! They are very important, and they will help you – even if you're not perfect the ~~first~~ ~~second~~ tenth time."[429] The "strike through" on the words "first" and

[427] Kinley Levack, "If Two Heads Are Better than One, Try 7,000 with Wikipedia," *EContentMag.com* (April 2003), available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.ebscohost.com (accessed December 2, 2007).
[428] Kirschner.
[429] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Welcome to Wikipedia."

"second" in the sentence testify to *Wikipedia*'s dialectical ambitions. The site's hope is that the presence of many voices will adjust inaccuracies.[430]

Wikipedia's constant reference to the dialectical process links its rhetoric of expertise to that of scientists. The link is *sensis communis*, an essential practice in the scientific community. Among scientists, truth value is assigned to a theory that withstands the community's tests. When a chemist discovers a new compound, she brings it first to her chemist colleagues for evaluation. Through rigorous deliberation, the community distinguishes true discoveries and scientific facts from false ones.[431] Note how formally similar this process is to *Wikipedia*'s interactivity. A posting is accepted as true if it endures the community's scrutiny. Both the scientific community and *Wikipedia* identify this critical dialectic as a path to accuracy.

The notion of accuracy highlights an important feature in rhetorical expertise, viz., trust. Both *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* rely on trust as a vital expert trope, albeit in different ways. For the latter, trust is couched in traditional, patriarchal appeals – "trust me, I'm an expert." The public is encouraged and expected to trust *Britannica*'s content because its authors are "busy and serious people."[432] *Britannica* claims that "in using a reputable encyclopaedia, the reader is inclined to accept the

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[430] In addition, *Wikipedia*'s public reaction to vandalism and abuse demonstrates how deep its faith in the dialectical process are. For example, the revelation of a major scandal wherein a contributor posted under a fictional persona was met by many *Wikipedia*ns with mild annoyance. That the contributor had purported to have credentials that he in reality did not, raised little concern for devout *Wikipedia*ns. Many seemed to agree that, if the person's contributions withstood the community's editorial reviews, they deserved to remain. See Noam Cohen, "A Contributor to Wikipedia Has His Fictional Side," *New York Times*, 5 March 2007, sec. C, p. 5.

[431] William Keith and Kenneth Zagacki, "Rhetoric and Paradox in Scientific Revolutions," *Southern Communication Journal* 57 (1992): 168.

[432] Berinstein.

authenticity of any article he or she happens to read. Subconsciously the reader is aware that the highly organized staff of scholars credited for the work must inevitably have ensured the severe scrutiny of all material."[433] Note the call for deference when *Britannica* insists further that "readers of modern encyclopaedias are rarely aware of the numerous aids that have been provided to make their search for information so easy and efficient."[434] The *Encyclopedia Britannica* reassures the public that, even when we are unaware of how its expertise functions, we can trust it. Asking for trust, and incorporating trustworthiness into its persuasive strategy, are integral to *Britannica*'s rhetoric of expertise.

In a more subtle or less deferential sense, trust is part of the rhetorical force of *Wikipedia* as well. Its notion of "network trust" is about community practices.[435] It is a description of how trust emerges in a community when there is consistent adherence to accepted practices. Those who participate in *Wikipedia* trust that their work will be treated with respect as long as it retains high quality. They trust that their postings on the "talk pages" will be treated with civility. They trust other participants and visitors not to vandalize the site. When vandalism occurs, *Wikipedia*'s reprimands reaffirm the importance of trust: "You are requested to stop doing mischief. Please do not do that, it is really bad. I trust that you will listen to reason. May God bless you so that your 'creativity' finds expression in good endeavors."[436] In response to a publicized incident

[433] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., s.v. "Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries."
[434] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., s.v. "Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries."
[435] Cormac Lawler, "A 'Resource Review' of Wikipedia," *Counselling and Psychotherapy Research* 6 (2006): 216.
[436] Lawler, 216.

of vandalism, one administrator said that the case "is about the community, the trust the community depends on in terms of being able to review the work we each do."[437] So while *Britannica* insists that the public trust and defer to a singular "authority," *Wikipedia* asks the participating public to trust itself. In both versions, trust is integral to expertise. Unlike *Britannica*'s familiar model—delineating providers and consumers of information—*Wikipedia* links, even hyper-links, trust and expertise in a (public) community.

Anonymity and Community

There is a tension in the rhetoric of expertise between owning one's work and submitting it to a larger, ongoing discourse. Put differently, there is a rhetoric of expertise to claiming authorship, but there is an equally powerful rhetoric of expertise grounded in anonymity. Both *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* publish articles anonymously; the authors do not get personal credit for the contents. This anonymity is important to note, since authorial credit is so central to scholarship. Conditioned by professional norms, academics are acutely aware of authorship – being first author or second, having our names associated with a particularly prestigious journal, etc. We are judged by the quality and quantity of our names in print. What, then, motivates encyclopedic anonymity? What alternative pay-off is there for Wikipedians and scholars who give their work to encyclopedias? To begin, anonymous expertise is difficult to interrogate. Along with the impersonal encyclopedic tone, anonymity wields a sort of absolute truth. The absence of an individual author who might conceivably be

[437] Cohen.

misinformed makes content seem unimpeachable. Experts in both *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* rely on this as a rhetorical force field.

Moreover, in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, anonymous articles are a tradition. Since the encyclopedia's 18th century inception, all materials have been published without the authors' signatures. And, in the early years, this was not a major concern. As Nora Miller notes, "Only after the development of movable type and modern publishing methods did authorship acquire a legal and universal meaning. Copyright laws established the right of the person who penned a work to profit from it and control its publication."[438] One reason why *Britannica* does not feature contributors' names thus may be that it never has. As stated earlier, maintaining certain historically-mandated practices is integral to *Britannica*'s expertise. It uses appeals to continuity in a rhetorical relationship with the public.

Another potential reward for being an "anonymous expert" is in the ethos it generates. If an author's name is not attached to his/her article, ownership of said work is uncertain. If personal ownership is uncertain, the expert can claim that he/she donates the work to the public, in a sense offering it for the greater good. Both *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* make these arguments. They construct the product of their expertise as a public service. Miller confirms this: "Wiki authors understand that the recording of information by any one of us really only builds on the efforts of all the other thinkers, readers, and writers who have gone before. It embraces the process nature of reading and writing, preferring the constantly-evolving-but-never-finishing to the static

[438] Nora Miller, "Wikipedia and the Disappearing 'Author,'" *ETC* (January 2005): 37.

and rapidly obsolescing 'product'"[439] Once again the role of ethos—specifically eunoia—in the rhetoric of expertise is evident. Anonymity creates the impression not only of accuracy and trustworthiness, but of virtue. An expert that can claim to submit her work for the community's betterment is likely a rhetorical success.

Anonymity may seem antithetical to community. However, *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* both illustrate that this is not the case. Indeed, within their rhetorics of expertise, community trumps individualism. It is to their respective communities and expert methodologies, as stated above, that they attribute intellectual quality. For that reason, maintaining community is a priority, especially for *Wikipedia*, which does not have off-line resources for social or professional cohesion. It states, "*Wikipedia* is an online encyclopedia and, as a means to that end, an online community of people interested in building a high-quality encyclopedia in a spirit of mutual respect."[440] It notes that "Every user is expected to interact with others civilly, calmly, and in a spirit of cooperation."[441] When such a spirit is abused, *Wikipedia*'s self-policing community adjusts. "Given that there is no official structure policing the quality of articles, the *Wikipedia* community has spawned its own rules, procedures and values, which continue to evolve."[442] Katherine Mangu-Ward describes this process: "The evolution of a praise/shame economy within *Wikipedia* has been far more effective at keeping most users in line than the addition of formal rules to deal with specific conflicts."[443] The

[439] Miller, 39.
[440] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "What Wikipedia is Not."
[441] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "What Wikipedia is Not."
[442] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Simplified Ruleset."
[443] Mangu-Ward.

Wikipedia community, like the scholarly community to which *Britannica* contributors belong, serves many functions—both social and professional. What I identify here is how two communities of experts can exist without names, without personal authorship. This is not to imply that being anonymous before the general public means a lack of personal relationships among the experts; to be sure, regulars on *Wikipedia* "know each other." I do not doubt that friendships form online as they do in the scholarly community. Even when proper names are subordinated as part of a community of experts' rhetorical strategy, that community can thrive.

Audience and Participation

Two of my dissertation's critical probes pertain to audience: who the target audience is for different kinds of expertise, and what response experts expect from that audience. In the case of informational expertise, the audience, potentially any user of reference materials, is rather diverse. *Britannica*'s audience consists of "the curious and intelligent layman [sic]."[444] *Britannica* states broadly that "People look to encyclopaedias to give them an adequate introduction to a topic that interests them."[445] *Wikipedia*'s audience, on the other hand, is narrower. It comprises primarily intellectuals in their late twenties and thirties, predominantly college students and academics.[446] These intellectuals are typically male and English-speaking.[447] In short, Wikipedians are in most cases exactly who we think they are. They have access to the internet. They are proficient

[444] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., s.v. "Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries."
[445] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., s.v. "Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries."
[446] Berinstein.
[447] Rosenzweig, 127.

in the use of wiki software and other computer applications. And they have the time that sustained participation requires.

On *Wikipedia*, the distinction between experts and audiences is blurred. The roles of reader and writer change very quickly; it is not always clear who provides information for whom. This dynamic is *Wikipedia*'s defining characteristic. It distinguishes the *Wikipedia* encyclopedia from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, as well as from the other kinds of experts examined in my dissertation. *Wikipedia*'s invitation to the public to participate is a departure from how informational expertise typically works. The lay public is not asked to keep its distance. *Wikipedia* says, "It's nice to have you aboard. We're glad you wish to help develop this encyclopedia. We hope you enjoy participating in the *Wikipedia* community as much as we do."[448] The invitation furthermore asks the public to spread the gospel: "Encourage others, including those who disagree with you, likewise to Be bold!"[449] Wikipedians encourage the public to become informational experts, just like them.

What is noteworthy is how *Wikipedia* does more than simply ask the public to get involved. It systematically teaches us how to participate, and what specific tasks must be undertaken. The introductory page of *Wikipedia* states, "How can I help? Don't be afraid to edit—anyone can edit almost any page, and we encourage you to be bold! Find something that can be improved, whether content, grammar, or formatting, and make it better!"[450] The same page gives a set of 5-step instructions on making "your first edit

[448] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Welcome to Wikipedia."
[449] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Simplified Ruleset."
[450] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "What Is Wikipedia?"

now." *Wikipedia* tells the public what contributions are needed for the site calling attention to specific informational gaps. Some articles begin with a notice that "this article needs additional citations for verification." The article on photosynthesis, for instance, invites users to "please help improve this article by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed." Nothing comparable to this hortative discourse appears in *Britannica*.[451] *Wikipedia*'s informational expertise is inseparable from its interactive structure. Its novelty in the public sphere and challenge to traditional forms of reference publication would be moot without the inclusion of the general public's input.

Nonetheless, there is a remarkable tension on *Wikipedia* between democratic practices and exclusivity. In fact, the site's populist ideals may not always correspond to the reality of its participating community. *Wikipedia* claims inclusiveness calling itself the encyclopedia that anyone can edit; it claims to eliminate the line between expert and layperson. We must ask, however, who is this "anyone"? To be sure, including "every single person on the planet" is a laudable goal.[452] But if in reality most Wikipedians are affluent, well-educated, English-speaking white males, that reality must be recognized. And it must be part of the conversation about *Wikipedia*'s potential and claim to expertise.

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[451] The political activists in chapter 2, however, have several things in common with *Wikipedia*ns in eliciting public participation. Recall, for example, that the National Council of *La Raza* publishes on its website voter guides and talking points. It too instructs its constituents, or the audience of its expertise, on how to become engaged.

[452] See *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Wikipedia."

In addition to time and resources, contributing to *Wikipedia* takes technological savvy. It demands more than substantive knowledge. In order to edit the article on the French Revolution, a person would need to know more than the fact that insurgents stormed the Bastille July 14, 1789. She would need a particular *techne*, knowledge of how to use the site. There is a methodological skill to *Wikipedia*'s informational expertise that the public may lack, even those segments of the public who wish to share their passion for 18th century France. If so, it may not make much difference how enthusiastic *Wikipedia*'s invitations are. Although there are pages on *Wikipedia* that address this gap the entry barrier is not completely eliminated. Posting on *Wikipedia* is not as easy as it sounds. As one novice user points out, "Undergirding the *Wikipedia* is an intricate system of procedures and methods, in fact a whole world of Open Source software out of which *Wikipedia* grew and which now has a life of its own."[453] What is most remarkable, however, are the arguments that Wikipedians make while considering how to update their site. According to Kirschner, users debate "whether an easy word-processing-like format might alienate some of the 'old-timers,' who seem to consider technical prowess as something approaching a moral litmus test."[454] Evidently, expertise can only be so democratic and/or invitational without being compromising. And *Wikipedia*'s experts appear to have chosen technology as the means for selection. Those who cannot operate the necessary software are excluded. As always, systemic barriers that go unspoken are just as effective in screening public participation as explicit norms of exclusion.

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[453] "Venturing into the Land of Wiki: Experiencing the People's Information Revolution," *Logos* (17 February 2006): 102.
[454] Kirschner.

Scholars represent *Wikipedia*'s personae non gratae; they are not welcome on the site. This is especially noteworthy considering the implications for expertise. Brock Read notes that "not all of *Wikipedia*'s most-active contributors want academics in their club. They argue that an army of hobbyists, teenagers, and even the occasional troll can create a more comprehensive, more useful, and possibly even more accurate resource than can be found in the ivied halls."[455] When asked whether he thought *Wikipedia* was anti-elitist, WikiMedia CFO claimed to prefer the term "anticredentialist."[456] The idea is not to give special privilege to those with credentials and degrees. This anti-credentialism, democratic as it sounds, may in fact be an additional form of exclusion. It is not the same as the one discussed above; scholars are not necessarily being kept off *Wikipedia* because they cannot operate the software. Rather, scholars may bring with them certain undesirable connotations – intellectual snobbery, theoretical heavy-handedness, etc. Theirs may be a conflicting kind of expertise, one that belongs in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and the like. Thus the limits of even radical openness define *Wikipedia*'s expertise, allowing its members to distinguish themselves.

Certainly, skepticism between *Wikipedia* and the academy is mutual. For a number of reasons, many scholars choose not to contribute to *Wikipedia*. Its postings do not count toward the tenure and promotion. They are shorter and more fragmented than the traditional scholarly publication. And there is always the risk that the work might be torn apart by a layperson to whom the scholar is unused to answering. As one *Wikipedia*

[455] Brock Read, "Can Wikipedia Ever Make the Grade?" *Chronicle of Higher Education* 53,10 (27 October 2006): sec. A, p. 31-36.
[456] "Beware the 'Anticredentialist' Wikipedia," *Library Journal* (December 2005): 15. See also Mangu-Ward.

critic notes, "to many professors, it seems to be a waste of time to negotiate with people who in any other context would be taking a class from them."[457] The reasons why more scholars do not embrace *Wikipedia* are less significant than asking why Wikipedians react with such skepticism toward those scholars who do. It prides itself, after all, on being the encyclopedia that "anyone can edit." This apparent discrepancy begs the question of what it is that Wikipedians appreciate about their site: Is it the accuracy and quality of the content? Or are users perhaps even more driven by the desire to "stick it to the man"? (Or, more poignantly, stick it to the experts?) Is *Wikipedia*'s tension between inclusion and exclusion a challenge to tradition, or the emergence of an alternative, though equally elitist, expertise?

Play with/and Tradition

In its construction of expertise, *Wikipedia* relies on a rhetoric of play. This sets it apart from other experts investigated in my dissertation who frame their expertise as serious, potentially a matter of life and death (e.g., the psychiatrist in Chapter Four). A rhetoric of play is a stance, a way of assuming a posture relative to subject matter. The playful tone suggests that a link of accountability may be rhetorically undone. For example, the *Wikipedia* logo is a jigsaw puzzle shaped like a sphere. Angled as though turning on its axis, the sphere is almost unmistakably a globe. The icon's polysemy implies a variety of things: that *Wikipedia* is international, that interactive construction of knowledge is a global effort, etc. The image of a puzzle, too, carries several connotations: mystery, the piece-by-piece progress of discovery, and play. A jigsaw puzzle is a toy, a

[457] Read.

game. The ultimate definition of expertise that the logo offers is play; compiling pieces of information is *Wikipedia*'s international game.

Wikipedia uses this rhetoric of play, of fun and games, to stimulate audience participation. It welcomes users by encouraging them to "have fun."[458] As an example of rhetorical play, the site offers so-called "sandboxes," in which new users practice posting before editing a real article. The sandboxes are "for editing experiments."[459] They are modeled to look like regular articles but are designed specifically for non-serious posting. They are for practice—or, as the term implies, for child's play. *Wikipedia* reassures the audience that no amount of fun can damage the site: "You can't break *Wikipedia*. Anything can be fixed or improved later. So go ahead, edit an article and help make *Wikipedia* the best information source on the Internet."[460] Remarkably, the same page that lists policies also includes the suggestion to "ignore all rules." It says, "Every policy, guideline or any other rule may be ignored if it hinders improving *Wikipedia*."[461] The same argument that characterizes *Wikipedia* as fun, and assures participants that fun can cause no permanent damage, ultimately prioritizes play over policy. This is key to *Wikipedia*'s invitational rhetoric; its constant self-correction—the interactivity that lets all users edit each other—lets administrators urge participants to be bold, less serious, more playful.

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[458] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "List of Policies," available at: http://en.*Wikipedia*.org/wiki/*Wikipedia*:List_of_policies (accessed September 20, 2007).
[459] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Editing Wikipedia: Sandbox," available at: http://en.*Wikipedia*.org/w/index.php?title=*Wikipedia*:Sandbox&action=edit (accessed November 21, 2007).
[460] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "What Is Wikipedia?"
[461] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "List of Policies."

The rhetoric of play is a strategy, a rhetorical line of defense for *Wikipedia*'s expertise. Play, which compared to *Encyclopaedia Britannica*'s solemnity is rather unassuming, deflects attention from *Wikipedia*'s recurring problems.[462] For example, when asked to comment on *Wikipedia* vandalism, founder Jim Wales was casually dismissive. With a "boys will be boys" attitude, he characterized the controversies as "growing pains" for *Wikipedia*. This shrugging gesture circumvents public scrutiny of the events. If the founder himself does not worry, why should we? By not appearing too alarmed, Wales protects *Wikipedia*'s Achilles heal: inaccuracy and sabotage. A site as open as *Wikipedia* is extremely vulnerable. A user can literally add or alter any content. Therein lies critics' principal concern; what if something blatantly erroneous slips past administrators? What level of reliability can reasonably be expected? Fraud, slander, and distorted information are serious offenses in the publication of information. Yet Wales' response is comparable to that of a teacher whose students have pulled a silly, but harmless prank.[463]

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[462] A few incidents of *Wikipedia* vandalism or misuse are widely publicized: A contributor using the pseudonym Essjay edited thousands of *Wikipedia* articles as well as mediated disputes. He purported to be a tenured professor of religion specializing in canon law; in reality, Mr. Ryan Jordan was a 24-year old college drop-out from Louisville, KY. See Cohen. In 2005, a man named Brian Chase suggested on *Wikipedia* that journalist John Siegenthaler, who once worked for Robert Kennedy, was intimately linked to the John F. Kennedy assassination. Siegenthaler, who months later discovered the misinformation and complained to Jim Wales, criticized *Wikipedia*'s lack of accountability in *USA Today*. See Jon Udell, "Wikipedia's Future," *Infoworld.com*, 9 January 2006, p. 30.
Another blogger named Alex Havalais, director for the informatics school at the University of Buffalo, logged onto *Wikipedia* under the pseudonym "Dr. al-Halawi," and inserted thirteen minor errors into different *Wikipedia* entries—including the claim that Frederick Douglass lived in Syracuse, NY for four years. He reports that, after two and a half hours, every error had been corrected by site visitors. See Kathy Ishizuka, "The Wikipedia Wars," *School Library Journal* (Nov 2004): 25. In addition, there have been reports of Senate office staff deleting or altering WP entries about political opponents. See Eiffert, 82.

[463] Both the nature of the vandalism, and the public's reaction, suggest an attitude of play. For example, an article about President George W. Bush included the word "jerk" twelve times; in the essay on Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the word "pianist" had been changed to "penis." Responding to these seemingly

Play may be *Wikipedia*'s method for creating a discourse that challenges conventional forms of informational expertise. Traditionally, the objective of encyclopedias was to summarize and organize existing knowledge. It was not to publish new discoveries or data. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* confirms this orientation, as does *Wikipedia*. One of *Wikipedia*'s more emphatic policies is the "no original research" rule.[464] Only previously published facts that can be linked to several reliable sources may be included.[465] Thus not even the world's leading scientist can post a new discovery; this would constitute original research. However, there may another way of thinking about *Wikipedia*, an alternative to the idea that the site simply reproduces. While *Wikipedia* claims only to publish pre-existing knowledge, it is in effect doing something quite different. It actually generates information that is distinguishable from a traditional print encyclopedia. And the distinction is not reducible to media; *Wikipedia*'s expertise is not new or different only because it appears online. Indeed, *Wikipedia*'s informational expertise is a shift in reference publishing writ large. The very act of presenting information about topics that are not included in traditional encyclopedias *is* a construction of new expertise. It is a performative argument explicating the kinds of things about which one can be an expert. For example, something like YouTube or

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puerile transgressions, Craig Whitney, the New York Times' standards editor, said that "you can only shake your head." See Katie Hafner, "Lifting Corporate Fingerprints from the Editing of Wikipedia," *New York Times*, 19 August 2007, Late Edition.

[464] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "No Original Research," available at: http://en.*Wikipedia*.org/wiki/*Wikipedia*:No_original_research (accessed September 20, 2007).

[465] The policy defines original research as "editors' personal views, political opinions, and any unpublished analysis or synthesis of published material that appears to advance a position." The policy mandates that "any facts, opinions, interpretations, definitions, and arguments published by *Wikipedia* must already have been published by a reliable publication in relation to the topic of the article." It does not comment on the potentially problematic notions of "fact," "interpretation," or "reliable publication."

"couch surfing," which more or less require a playful attitude, can be subject to expertise in *Wikipedia*. Through the rhetoric of play *as* expertise, *Wikipedia* asserts: these topics warrant encyclopedic publication.

Conclusions for the Rhetoric of Informational Expertise

Expertise is constructed rhetorically in a struggle over authority, power, and cultural influence. My dissertation investigates that struggle, specifically the rhetorical strategies that different groups use against one another. This chapter focused on the rhetorical construction of informational expertise and the emergence of alternative reference sources. I assessed the challenge that texts like *Wikipedia* pose by comparing two types of encyclopedias: the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and *Wikipedia*. My analysis combined three articles from each publication, as well as meta-discourse (i.e., information that the publications produce about themselves), and some media commentary. By identifying how the two reference sources manage and disseminate information—both substantive and self-reflexive—I theorized how they construct themselves as experts. In this concluding section, I suggest what the two artifacts reveal about informational expertise.

Because this chapter was about informational expertise, it emphasized the significance of disposition. Whereas the previous chapters focused primarily on different experts' rhetorical invention, this chapter expanded the dissertation's scope to include rhetoric's managerial functions. It is important to recognize that, as much as this chapter polemicized the two texts, they nevertheless have a lot in common. It is not in *what* they publish that *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* differ. For example, between

their articles about photosynthesis a fair amount of overlap exists. *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* do not disagree significantly about levels of carbon dioxide or the importance of chlorophyll. What does set them apart is everything else – how content is compiled, how it is organized for the reader, who gets to write and edit it, when it is updated, etc. These are important concerns. And they are concerns of rhetorical disposition – informational expertise.

The principal difference of expertise between the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and *Wikipedia* is indeed disposition. One is static and the other dynamic. One is in its fifteenth edition since 1768 and the other reinvents itself by the minute. *Britannica*'s approach to information exists in a frozen format. It compiles the best writings from scholars with the highest renown and freezes the outcome. Its hardcopy format is both the result of and the perpetuating force in this tradition of publishing. Put differently, *Britannica* reflects the ideal that, when information is deemed accurate and valuable, it can be kept that way; the fact that it continues to publish information based on that ideal sustains the ideal. *Britannica*'s expertise requires absolutely no dialogue. The audience receives information. We look up concepts like photosynthesis and censorship but, once we have ingested the material, we cannot comment or reciprocate. Deference is the response that *Britannica* invites. It asks its audience to acquiesce to trust the expert.

Just the opposite is true for *Wikipedia*. It cannot exist without the audience's commentary and reciprocation. Its interactive system of hyperlinks and edit-buttons lets the audience become participants; it blurs the distinction between user and producer. This, in the rhetoric of informational expertise, is a radical move. And this is why

Wikipedia requires scholarly attention: not because it might divert our students' attention to trivial things but because it forces scholars to examine fundamental assumptions about the production of expertise. Encyclopedic interactivity threatens, thereby makes us aware of, the accepted order of symbolic interactions. While we think of knowing as prior to speaking, *Wikipedia* enforces a dialectic. If knowledge—indeed reality—is actually socially constructed, speaking can come before knowing, as it does on *Wikipedia*. *Wikipedia* offers this rhetorical working and reworking as a form of expertise, as a means of being expert.

On the other hand, *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* are strikingly similar in terms of ethos. Both appeal to eunoia, a concern with the greater good, in a way that concurs with traditional encyclopedic ideals. Recall that the original goal of encyclopedias was to compile all human knowledge and make it public for the betterment of civic life. *Britannica* and *Wikipedia* both embody this aspiration but with different results. The former grounds its claim to public service in "valuable" information; *Britannica* screens the mass of available information for the public's good. This function, according to *Britannica*, constitutes expertise. *Wikipedia*, in contrast, represents the argument that everyone has something to contribute; its claim to eunoia is inextricably linked to interactivity. *Wikipedia* claims to serve the public by letting it be heard, by accommodating a plurality of experiences in something as prestigious as an encyclopedia. Ultimately, both *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* offer themselves as something noble. They are their creators' gift to humanity. It is a remarkable rhetorical feat that *both* manage to align this idea with the encyclopedic tradition.

The encyclopedic tradition is significant for both *Britannica* and *Wikipedia* as a condition for rhetorics of expertise. It represents the trope of time which the two use in very distinctive ways. *Britannica* draws much of its credibility as an expert from a long and well-lived life. It continually references the importance of a documented historical record in arguments about accountability. Time, according to *Britannica*, is a testament to quality. It is what has fine-tuned expert practices of reference publication. A spokesperson explains:

> This business about how often things are revised, which everyone asks all the time, tends to miss important things about the craft of encyclopedia making. Encyclopedias are not newspapers and should not be newspapers. […] Part of being reliable means that you don't go chasing every intellectual fad.[466]

Britannica relies on the trope of time in a particular sense, what might be termed *diachronos*, extended time. As a rhetorical resource, *diachronos* is proof of something worth preserving.

Once again, *Wikipedia* is just the opposite. It too folds time as a trope into its rhetorical strategy; but it does so in a much different way. *Wikipedia*'s time is fast, so fast in fact as to make one think of increasingly rapid increments approaching infinity. The site can be updated as quickly as a user can click the edit button. New articles appear almost as quickly as the phenomenon being defined hits mainstream pop culture. As one journalist writes, "*Wikipedia* has harnessed the power of 'now' on the Web through its

[466] Berinstein.

army of thousands of contributors."[467] It constantly updates itself to follow new trends. The speed of *Wikipedia*, and its invitation to participate, make the site a continuous rhetorical exigency. There is always an imperfection marked by urgency. Every article that requires updating or revision calls for a rhetorical response. Rhetorical agility, or the ability to keep up with an ever-changing culture, is a way for *Wikipedia*'s expertise to maintain its own importance.

Each of these text is in its own way emblematic. *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* represent different moments in time. Their rhetorics of expertise are products of different cultural movements. Some argue that *Britannica* originally embodied the possible good in British imperialism.[468] It was a promise of leadership and enlightenment, however problematic those ideals turned out to be. As *Britannica* proudly announces, "a great encyclopaedia is inevitably a sign of national maturity and, as such, will pay tribute to the ideals of its country and its times."[469] Likewise, media analysts frequently use *Wikipedia* as a symbol for the new world wide web, Web 2.0.[470] Along with sites like YouTube and MySpace, which let internet users post their own content, *Wikipedia* represents a new generation of web-based interactions. These interfaces are allegedly more collaborative, more productive, less unidirectional and commercial than earlier versions. *Wikipedia*, in short, exists in public discourse as a symptom or triumph of our

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[467] "Venturing into the Land of Wiki," 102.
[468] Yeo, 1.
[469] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., s.v. "Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries."
[470] Tim O'Reilly of O'Reilly Media is generally credited with coining this term. See Tim O'Reilly, "What is Web 2.0," (30 September 2005), available at: http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.html (accessed December 2, 2007).

times. Whichever attribute is more appropriate—whether *Wikipedia* is a blessing or a curse—the site invites us to evaluate the encyclopedic project. By its intervention in popular discourse, *Wikipedia* raises questions of authorship and anonymity, specialization versus general erudition, comprehensive information versus universal accessibility. The intersection of *Wikipedia's* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*'s rhetorical strategies challenges Americans' conceptions of informational expertise.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION: THEORETICAL POSTULATES OF THE RHETORIC OF EXPERTISE

American culture depends on a system of expertise. We exchange expert services and goods for money and status, outsourcing some of the most important parts of our lives. All of us depend on a variety of experts in everyday matters. We give them power over our lives by voting for them, by paying them and by acknowledging their interpretations of the world. This is the way we manage a highly specialized and professionalized society. Doctors, lawyers, technicians, scholars, accountants and politicians participate in that culture. They are experts to whom we delegate and defer. Reliance on expertise now has become so commonplace that it is impossible to avoid.

Conventional wisdom defines an expert as someone who knows more about a topic or can perform better than the average person. Expert chess players and expert musicians are those individuals who practice their craft with greater proficiency than the general population. The cognitive sciences and many other academic disciplines confirm this view by approaching expertise as an autonomous ability. Their theories center on the mental or motor-skill mastery of a subject matter. These approaches are not incorrect. Indeed, real knowledge, experience, training, skill and qualification are part of expertise. But, as I have argued, existing theories of expertise are incomplete. They do not reflect the complexity of the concept, partly because they isolate it from its social and discursive contexts. Expertise is more complex than psychologists and sociologists would have us believe. It is not simply about one person's skills being different from another's. It is also fundamentally contingent on a struggle for ownership and legitimacy. Thus, expertise is

subject to rhetoric. S/he who successfully persuades the public that s/he is an expert, and that s/he is a better expert than another, earns credibility, acknowledgement and power. Being recognized as an expert generates financial gain and social status. Experts use the available means of persuasion to make a case for the legitimacy of their expertise. To be an expert, in short, is to rhetorically gain sanctioned rights to a specific area of knowledge or experience.

The question posed in my dissertation is: What rhetorical strategies do experts use to compete with each other for authority and legitimacy? In each chapter I focused on a particular context for expertise—politics, history, medicine, and information. Within each context I analyzed two groups offering competing claims for expertise. Chapter Two focused on competing rhetorical strategies in the U.S. immigration reform debate of 2005-2006. Using immigration as a contextual foil, I examined public statements made by two kinds of political experts: professional politicians Ted Kennedy and Bill Frist on one side and, on the other side, two activist groups—the National Council of *La Raza* and the Minuteman Project. Chapter Three analyzed rhetorical strategies in the tension between academic history and collective memory, specifically surrounding September 11, 2001. Two essay collections claiming historical expertise were juxtaposed. The first is *History and September 11th*, a compilation of articles written by academic historians.[471] The second text is *September 11: An Oral History*, which contains personal narratives by survivors, rescue workers and close friends of 9/11 victims.[472] Chapter Four explored the

[471] Joanne Meyerowitz, ed., *History and September 11th* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003).
[472] Dean E. Murphy, *September 11: An Oral History* (New York: Doubleday, 2002).

rhetorical strategies of medical expertise, specifically relating to depression. Two discourses were analyzed: *Understanding Depression* by Raymond DePaulo, professor and chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, and *Unholy Ghost*, a collection of first-person narratives written by sufferers of depression.[473] Finally, Chapter Five interrogated different rhetorical strategies of expertise in the disposition of information, particularly alternative, emergent media sources such as *Wikipedia*. The chapter analyzed old and new assumptions about expertise by contrasting *Wikipedia*'s artifacts and commentary with the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

To unpack the claims to expertise in each of the artifacts, I deployed a series of critical probes. As explained in Chapter One, the probes reflect the distinctiveness of a rhetorical approach to studying expertise. One question focused on the construction of *ethos*. Another inquired about the integral role of the audience. Importantly, the probes served as a tool for getting beyond the surface of the artifacts being analyzed. They allowed me to see through the claims that different experts make, for example, about Congressional decisions and anti-depressant medications, and understand what those claims reveal about the rhetorical construction of expertise. In short, the probes were a methodology for interpreting experts' discursive techniques. They were heuristically valuable tools for discovering the many rhetorical strategies for gaining expertise.

[473] Raymond DePaulo, *Understanding Depression* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002); Nell Casey, ed., *Unholy Ghost* (New York: Perennial, 2001).

In this concluding chapter, I offer a series of theoretical postulates responding to my dissertation's central question: What rhetorical strategies do experts employ? The postulates are a way of beginning to frame a theory of rhetorical expertise; by drawing parallels between different experts from different chapters, I identify recurring trends in the rhetoric of expertise. The postulates thus represent what I consider to be my dissertation's most exciting discoveries. They reveal what may be termed, "unlikely allies." The unlikely allies are experts that are connected by the similarities of their rhetorical strategies. Their rhetorical means of constructing expertise trump other differences. While many of the experts analyzed in this study seem to be quite different from one another, my analysis demonstrates that they have a great deal in common rhetorically. Indeed, the recurring use of the same rhetorical strategies through vastly different fields of specialization suggests that experts qua experts constitute a rhetorical community—that their discourses constitute a rhetorical genre. Only a focus on discourse allows us to discern these patterns. Rhetorical criticism lets us see, for instance, what a psychiatric expert has in common with a senator and an historian; it reveals that the arguments for expertise that a 9/11 witness makes are strikingly similar to those of a Wikipedian. Rhetorical analysis enables us to discover that experts face similar rhetorical challenges regardless of their subject matter. Among other things, experts must establish rhetorically a relationship with other experts. They must explicate their ways of knowing and acting as experts. They must create a sense of urgency around what they offer as experts. And somehow they must situate themselves in the midst of "everyday life." These, I submit, are rhetorical prerequisites in the process of constructing expertise. They

are what experts need to achieve rhetorically in order to be received as experts. In the next several sections, I delineate the postulates comprising my theory of rhetorical expertise.

Expert Networks

All experts strategically associate themselves with other experts as well as with other areas of expertise. This is my first theoretical postulate. It identifies a contextualizing strategy that serves several purposes. First, these associations allow experts to import cultural capital from a field or academic discipline that enjoys high status. They are arguments by association. Just as young "wannabe" celebrities gain pop culture credibility by being seen with established super stars, so too do experts associate themselves with higher-status experts. The psychiatrist in Chapter Four illustrates this tactic. His repeated references to medical science capitalize on science's cultural cache. Referring to himself and the expert scientists in the medical community, he states, "We're poised on the brink of some remarkable discoveries about depressive illness. That's because of the genetic technology and advanced brain imaging techniques that will allow us to understand brain structure and function in ways we could only dream about even in the late eighties."[474] In addition, the psychiatrist discusses his extensive experience not only in the clinical setting, but in research laboratories as well. By associating himself with two interrelated expert communities—medical and scientific—Raymond DePaulo reaps the rhetorical benefits of both.

[474] DePaulo, 72.

Academic historians make a similar associative gesture by referencing other scholars. In their case, however, referencing other experts takes the form of in-text citations. The essays analyzed in Chapter Three include multiple citations of research in history as well as political science and economics. Citing sources is a form of scholarly inter-textuality that creates a network of expertise. Beyond academic methodology, however, historians are a noteworthy example because they straddle the line between different kinds of expertise. They associate themselves both with other academics and with political experts. Because their scholarship is politically significant—their discoveries potentially have implications for political, economic and social policy—their expertise allows them to associate with many different specializations. One historian argues explicitly that historians use their expertise to advise policy makers.[475] By providing perspective and context, they help political experts reach informed decisions.

Politicians also link themselves with other experts, particularly other major political actors. As explained in Chapter Two, Kennedy and Frist both discuss their collaborations with other politicians, including the president. By demonstrating how closely associated they are with other experts politicians "borrow" legitimacy. This is particularly true when personal, even fraternal, relationships are emphasized. However, strategic associations of expertise serve other rhetorical purposes than allowing one expert to borrow cultural capital from another. They also create a structure or chart of expertise in the public mind. It is almost as though experts offer the American public a

[475] Michael H. Hunt, "In the Wake of September 11: The Clash of What?" in *History and September 11th*, ed. J. Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 8.

map representing where experts are located relative to each other. This mental map illustrates for the public how expertise organizes society. It functions much like one of those transparent tourist maps that superimposes an image of how something used to look onto another image of the object's current form. The map is an instructional tool for joining two distinct mental and visual concepts. But instead of superimposing the original picture of something like the Forum Romanum onto what today lies in ruins, the American public imposes a map of expertise onto their perception of how society functions. We thus discern how one type of expertise relates to another and how they operate as a whole.

This postulate emphasizes that rhetoric depends on identification and division. It suggests that in order to construct oneself as an expert, one must demonstrate the location of one's expertise in a network. Experts strategically identify with other forms of expertise that have significant cultural capital. As much as the rhetoric of expertise is contested—experts compete with one another for legitimacy and power—it is also associative. Note that this rhetorical strategy is not reducible to various formal expert associations: professional networks and guilds are a familiar and well-established way for experts to organize. What this postulate claims, however, is that experts refer to their relationships with other experts as a rhetorical tactic. They demonstrate to the public that their expertise is linked to other forms of expertise for which the public has high regard. Thus expertise is indeed a rhetorical and social rather than exclusively an autonomous phenomenon. Contrary to existing theories of expertise, the concept cannot be fully understood as an individual capacity. It is not simply about skills or credentials, but also

the deliberate referencing of the systems that verify those credentials. Experts reference each other as an argument demonstrating how they operate as a social network.

Expert *Techne*: Explicating Epistemology and Methodology

All experts explicate their epistemologies and methodologies; this is a persuasive effort. They state what they know, how they know it and how they practice or implement what they know. Because the notion of expertise is so closely related both to knowledge and to the practice of a craft, references to epistemology and methodology are a key rhetorical strategy. Indeed, they are persuasive indicators of an expert *techne*. A *techne*, or an art, is a productive activity that can give a theoretical account of itself. In the *Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle defines an art as a "reasoned habit of mind in making" or a "productive quality exercised in combination with true reason."[476] Aristotle uses architecture to illustrate his point. It produces or makes things according to a set of rational principles for which it can give a theoretical account. Similarly, the experts analyzed in my dissertation offer their epistemologies and methodologies as principles of a *techne*.

Medical experts associate their epistemological and methodological accounts with foundational principals of science. This is particularly evident when the psychiatrist in Chapter Four comments on the psychiatric classification system: "A good classification system offers a framework in which to evaluate and treat these differences. A system not only offers a simple and powerful way to approach the treatment of patients, but serves as

[476] Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics,*, trans. and ed. G. A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), Book 6, chapter 4; Aristotle, *Ethics*, trans. J.A. K. Thomson (Baltimore: Penguin Books Ltd., 1955), 175.

a guide for research as well."[477] Describing himself as a doctor and a scientist—explicating epistemological and methodological mastery—proves to the audience that psychiatrists are indeed experts.

Likewise, politicians and activists explicate their expert practices by discussing various standard procedures of the American political system. Specifically, they recount where in the system their achievements and contributions fit. Discussing in detail how party hierarchies, committee collaborations and Congressional decision-making work is a way of demonstrating political expertise. As quoted in Chapter Two, Bill Frist states, "After consulting our various caucuses and the people who are interested, […] in the very near future we will bring that bill back to the floor of the United States Senate, […] we will have appropriate procedure with debate and amendment, and then we will pass a bill that will be comprehensive."[478] Ted Kennedy makes a similar methodological reference, explaining that "this is the way that the Senate should work and has worked at the times that we dealt with the great civil rights issues and Medicare and education issues."[479] These excerpts reflect the idea that familiarity with the political system is a form of expertise. Explaining how the political system works means explicating an expert method; it says, "This is how we *do* our expertise."

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[477] DePaulo, 47.
[478] "U.S. Senators Bill Frist and Harry Reid Hold a Media Availability After Meeting with the President," April 25, 2006, Transcript, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com. (accessed February 27, 2007).
[479] "Members of the Senate Hold a News Conference on Immigration Bill Cloture Vote," May 24, 2006, Transcript, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com. (accessed February 27, 2007).

By comparison, historians and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* present their academic ways of knowing less by explicit commentary than by implicit performance. While they do not lay their epistemological or methodological cards on the table, they reveal them through the ways in which they "do" scholarship. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, historians' practices follow the typical academic model. The editor of *History and September 11th* is also the author of the introductory and concluding chapters. In the introduction she relates the history and conception of the project, previews each of the essays and rationalizes the inquiry by situating it in an academic and sociopolitical context. The book includes a table of contents, an index of terms and acknowledgments to the editorial and publishing staff. And just as the book is an illustration of academic habits, so too is each chapter, beginning with a reader invitation followed by a thesis statement and a preview. Likewise, all *Britannica* articles follow the same format. They mimic an academic methodology to generate the impression that encyclopedic experts are scholars. *Britannica* does not make methodological commentary concomitant with substantive content. It does not make its publishing process public to the same extent as *Wikipedia*. Rather, both the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and the historians' essays are implicit descriptions of academic ways of knowing and practicing. Like all expert methodologies, they are to some extent formulaic.

Perhaps more surprising than the epistemological and methodological accounts of academic experts (i.e., the psychiatrist and historians) are the ones offered by alternative experts. The historical witnesses in Chapter Three and the depressives in Chapter Four both discuss epistemology, but not in the manner that we typically expect from experts.

Instead, they posit lived, embodied experience as the epistemology of their first-person expertise. They offer their ways of knowing as inextricably linked to their bodies. They know things because bodies know things. The witnesses have historical expertise because they felt the Twin Towers tremble, heard the jet engines roar and smelled the smoke. One of them recalls, "You could smell the jet fuel. Lots of smoke. Lots of confusion. Lots of sunlight from the windows illuminating both."[480] The depressives similarly have medical expertise because their bodies know the fatal incapacitation that depression causes. One woman describes her experience metaphorically: "My heart pumped dread. It was an actual substance I could feel coursing through my bloodstream—some days a barely-there awareness, other days a carbonated liquid that seemed to have replaced my blood."[481] For several of the experts analyzed in my dissertation, the explication of epistemology includes the body.

In sum, the reason why experts explicate their epistemologies and methodologies so elaborately is that doing so creates the impression of a *techne*. It suggests to an audience that expertise exists and that the expert is real. If a *techne* is defined as a productive activity with rational principles, perhaps the establishing of rational principles in conjunction with almost any productive activity constitutes a *techne*, or indeed an expertise. To illustrate, recall from Chapter Five that *Wikipedia* publishes copious information about how the site works. Its "community pages" describe at length how the

[480] Murphy, 18.
[481] Lesley Dormen, "Planet No," in *Unholy Ghost*, ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001), 230.

encyclopedia is run, what constitutes permissible behavior, etc. These are *Wikipedia*'s rhetorical proof of a "reasoned habit of mind in making" an online encyclopedia.

When experts discuss what they know, how they know it and what they do with their knowledge, their accounts establish "criteria of demarcation."[482] These criteria distinguish one type of expert activity from another. And thus they delineate a special area of expertise. Experts imply, "I am an expert in this particular area because I have a rational account of what it is." The question is: How deep does this rhetorical construction of expertise go? Does the explication of epistemology and methodology—rational principles—indicate the existence of a *techne* or expertise or does it constitute them? Does the explication persuade the lay public that a form of expertise exists, or does the persuasive gesture itself toward a form of expertise produce what it implies? Of course these questions may be the ultimate issue at stake in my dissertation. As always, the answers depend on a set of circumstances. Some experts' epistemology and methodology—such as psychiatrists', historians' and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*'s—are well established by a cultural tradition. Their rational principles may in fact reference a *techne* that exists independent of experts' persuasion that it does. But to what purpose? Other forms of expertise—like *Wikipedia* or the witnesses and the depressives—may be so new or so alternative that the referencing of a *techne* indeed creates its referent. Moreover, the answer here is likely not a simple one. Even a form of expertise whose *techne* is well established requires persuasive referencing of its principles if it is to

[482] Bjørn Hofmann, "Medicine as Techne – A Perspective from Antiquity," *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 28 (2003): 411.

continue to enjoy cultural status. Related to these questions of epistemology and methodology is the issue of pedagogy.

Expert Pedagogy

One of my dissertation's critical probes originally asked whether experts seek more to persuade their audience that they are in fact experts or to teach their audiences their expertise. As the dissertation progressed it became evident that this was not the appropriate question. All experts analyzed in my dissertation attempt to persuade the public that they are experts. Indeed, as the section above discusses, this persuasive move is fundamental to expertise. One cannot be an expert in all senses of the term without participating in its rhetorical construction. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this is political expertise, as represented by both senators and activists. For them, the reward for a successful persuasive appeal to expertise is political support. The rhetorical success of their expertise is measured in number of votes or recruited members.

A more productive question about pedagogy emphasizes the difference between experts who teach the *object* of their expertise and experts who teach a *process*. Put another way, some experts teach the public what they know, but none teach how they know it. And very few teach the public how they practice their expertise. As an example, consider the historians in Chapter Three. By explaining the political, social and economic factors of the historical context that precipitated 9/11, they impart the object of their expertise. They teach the audience what they know—the product that their expertise renders. Likewise, the psychiatrist shares with his audience what he knows but not how he knows it. His book is a product of his expertise; it represents what scientific and

clinical methods have produced. And, as explained in the previous postulate, a discussion of epistemology is a part of that effort. Note, however, that the psychiatrist does not instruct the reader in his epistemology or methodology. He does not teach the scientific or clinical processes of his expertise. He talks *about* scientific ways of knowing but does not teach readers how to replicate those practices. The book is not a "how-to" text about psychiatry. Indeed, the format of the artifact—a book designed for the general public—makes such instruction unfeasible.

Note also that neither witnesses nor depressives share with their audience how they know what they know. They teach the object or product of their expertise. They do not instruct us in the process by which they have expertise. How could they? In their cases, the privileged position of first-person expertise makes it impossible to impart epistemology. Several textual excerpts bespeak this privilege and the impossibility of sharing the perspective that comes with lived experience. One witness says, "You have no idea what that scene was like. No picture or video can convey the pandemonium."[483] Another states, "People don't really understand what I've been through, which is probably better."[484] Similarly, one of the depressives recounts, "I say, 'It's back, depression's a real mental illness you know,' and he nods. He doesn't know."[485] Without personal experience of trauma survival or depression, the experience is impossible to understand. Thus, that form of expertise is unavailable to the public. Only the outcome of

[483] Murphy, 116.
[484] Murphy, 139.
[485] Lauren Slater, "Noontime," in *Unholy Ghost*, ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001), 90.

the experience is teachable: a personal story, replete with metaphorical descriptions, references to physical senses and declarations instead of arguments.

To understand this pedagogical distinction further—the difference between teaching a product and teaching a process or practice—we must examine what responses are expected from different rhetorical strategies of expertise.

Audience Responses: To Defer or Not To Defer?

Experts invite the public either to defer or to participate. In other words, one of the functions of experts' rhetorical strategies is to ask the audience to acquiesce or to get involved. Most of the experts analyzed in my dissertation present deference as the most appropriate audience response. The senators invite the citizenry to elect political representatives, putting the actual decision-making powers in expert hands. The psychiatrist, too, asks for a deferential response from the public. He states, "You also need to accept the doctor's traditional, pastoral caring role, at least partially, and view us as modern competent practitioners in treating a diseased body or body part."[486] The message of deference is that curing illness is the business of experts. Likewise, *Britannica* responds to *Wikipedia*'s popularity by emphasizing that encyclopedic publishing is best left to the experts. It claims that such qualities of mind as skepticism and curiosity "do not occur naturally in the population, even among well-educated people."[487] Thus, the message to the public is: leave expertise to the experts.

[486] DePaulo, 198.
[487] Paula Berinstein, "Wikipedia and Britannica," *Searcher* (March 2006): 16-26.

There are many reasons why deference is the response that a majority of experts invite. It is possible that our culture has gone so far into specialization and professionalization that the general public really cannot be expected to participate in most forms of expertise. Perhaps deference is the most efficient and productive way to organize political, medical, legal and academic endeavors. Perhaps experts are the stewards of a post-industrial, information-saturated society. At least historically this has been the predominant cultural attitude. Popular belief assumes that the point of experts is selective deference: What do we have experts for if not to delegate certain responsibilities and tasks to specially-trained individuals? Another likely reason, however, why most experts invite a deferential response from their audience is that expert status has both material and symbolic value. And that value depreciates as more people are inducted into the expert class.

That calculus, though, is only valid for certain kinds of expertise. Some experts do invite their audience to participate. Moreover, when they elicit active participation, they provide concrete instructions. Political activists, for example, explain exactly how they want the American people to become involved. They offer instructions for how the public might pursue various courses of action. On its website the Minuteman Project teaches visitors how to start a new chapter and how to send a fax to local representatives. The National Council of *La Raza* similarly publishes instructional material online, notably the *NCLR Voter Guide* and the *Toolkit for Advocates*. The organization vigorously encourages participation: "You must continue to be involved. Call and write your senators today! They need to hear from their constituents about the importance of

comprehensive immigration reform and what is means to your families, neighbors, and communities."[488] With the voter guide and the toolkit for advocates the NCLR not only encourages participation but facilitates it. As explained in Chapter Two, activists' pedagogy is hortative or invitational. They call the public to join and provide the tools to do so. The distinction discussed earlier between teaching the product of expertise and teaching methodology thus aligns with the response that experts elicit from the public.

Wikipedia is my dissertation's other example of experts who invite participation. It publishes ample information about its expert practices—how the site works and what the rules are. In fact, the strategically blurred distinction between experts and laypersons is a defining characteristic of *Wikipedia*'s expertise. It distinguishes *Wikipedia* from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* as well as from the other experts. *Wikipedia*'s invitation for the public to participate is a departure from how informational expertise typically works. The site does not ask the public to defer. Rather, it says, "it's nice to have you aboard. We're glad you wish to help develop this encyclopedia. We hope you enjoy participating in the *Wikipedia* community as much as we do."[489] The invitation encourages the public to join *Wikipedia* as informational experts.

A pivotal difference between the invitational experts—*Wikipedia*, the Minuteman Project and the National Council of *La Raza*—and the other experts analyzed in my dissertation is that the former's success hinges on popularity. Invitational experts have to

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[488] National Council of *La Raza*, "Talking Points on Comprehensive Immigration Reform and Our Community's Response," March 31, 2007, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/publications/detail/38130/ (accessed April 1, 2007).
[489] *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Welcome to Wikipedia," available at: http://en.*Wikipedia*.org/wiki/*Wikipedia*:Welcoming_committee/Welcome_to_*Wikipedia* (accessed September 20, 2007).

retain active popular support in order to be viable as experts. Their expertise is rhetorically contingent on broad and general identification. *Wikipedia* claims to reflect and contain "the people's" knowledge; it elevates to encyclopedic status those things that the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* dismisses. Likewise, both the MMP and the NCLR imply that their political agendas represent the people's wishes because, unlike elected politicians, they are part of the people. The appeal to identification is a petition for the public to grant political expertise and leadership. Because invitational experts offer themselves as the alternative to an established form of expertise, they must continually demonstrate their intimate contact with the public. By contrast, the other experts analyzed in my dissertation become more powerful the more the public defers. Participation from the public threatens the material and symbolic value of their expertise. The more the senators, scholars, and scientists persuade the public that their knowledge and experience is rare and special, the more their expertise is worth. Scarcity is a persuasive tactic that creates the impression of a special providence.

A Necessary and Fitting Response

Experts identify and/or construct a rhetorical situation in which their expertise is the most fitting response. This fifth theoretical postulate uses Lloyd Bitzer's definition of the rhetorical situation as "a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about

the significant modification of the exigence."[490] Bitzer explains, "Any exigence is an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be."[491] As my dissertation demonstrates, experts strategically generate a sense of urgency or necessity to which their expertise is the ideal response. They present themselves as uniquely capable of doing that which is "waiting to be done" thus correcting that which is "other than it should be." Expertise becomes the solution to a problem or the answer to a question.

Political activists create this sense of urgent need by identifying how previous policy efforts have failed. Both the NCLR and the MMP criticize what professional politicians have done or not done about immigration reform as a means of generating exigency. The latter states, "This [immigration] is a problem that our elected political officials, from the White House down to state governorships and local city councils, have ignored.[492] The NCLR likewise dismisses one immigration policy initiative as "a laundry list of mean-spirited and intrusive provisions concocted by the most radical immigrant restrictionists in Congress.[493] In both excerpts, criticism serves as a warrant for the organizations' own expertise. Their expertise is rhetorically framed as an alternative response to a political exigency.

Wikipedia, too, constructs itself as the alternative to an antiquated or flawed form of expertise. It emphasizes the public's potential to contribute informational expertise,

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[490] Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1 (1968): 6.
[491] Bitzer, 6.
[492] Jim Gilchrist, *Minutemen: The Battle to Secure America's Borders* (Los Angeles: World Ahead Publishing, 2006), 21.
[493] National Council of *La Raza*, "NCLR Terms Sensenbrenner Bill 'Appalling,'" News Release, Dec 8, 2005, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/news/detail/35482/. (accessed March 5, 2007).

contrasting their approach with more traditional ways of publishing information in scholarly reference sources. *Wikipedia*'s exigency lies in the limitations for which it criticizes publications like the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Its expertise is a fitting response to a rhetorical situation in encyclopedic publishing. That rhetorical situation is the need to publish and disseminate information in more vernacular and accessible ways.

The significance of the relationship between expertise and a rhetorical situation lies in the sequence—what begets what? Bitzer's basic idea is that an urgent or imperfect situation demands a fitting response thus giving rise to rhetoric. But, for those who are in the business of producing and marketing rhetoric, the impression of an exigency in the audience's mind is advantageous. It behooves rhetors to create the idea that their artifacts respond to an urgent need. If this approach is unsuccessful, the artifacts seem to have no purpose. They seem to be responses with nothing contextual in which to fit. As an analogy, consider the publication of tabloid magazines. As media commentators note, it is unclear whether magazines print gratuitous sex and violence because the public wants those things, or if the public wants those things because they are marketed to us. It is clear, however, that claiming that their product responds to an existing need serves publishers' interests. If they make this claim successfully, their magazines make sense as cultural artifacts. If they are unsuccessful, their products appear to have no exigency—thus no purpose. For experts, an exigency is an implicit warrant. It makes expertise both worthwhile and important—a much needed response to a critical situation. It benefits experts to persuade the public that an exigency exists because when it does, expertise is fitting and necessary.

For many experts the same argument that generates an exigency for expertise serves as an appeal to eunoia. By demonstrating how they fulfill an urgent need experts purport to serve the greater good. They claim to offer something that neither laypersons nor other experts could. For example, the depressives from Chapter Four and the witnesses from Chapter Three characterize their motives for testifying as a moral obligation. The world needs to know the non-scientific story of depression as well as the non-political/non-academic version 9/11. Both groups of experts claim to speak from a sense of duty. And both intimate that this responsibility to tell one's story must be fulfilled despite the inadequacies of words. Even those things which words cannot fully communicate—perhaps especially those things—must exist along with accounts from other experts. A similar argument regarding duty is made by the political activists who associate their work with a civic mandate. They imply that, since elected officials continue to disappoint, alternative efforts must be made. This claim is couched in terms of the greater good. The activists' appeals to eunoia are linked to the argument that they serve an underserved purpose.

Eunoia is an important rhetorical concern for all experts. It is an argument for legitimacy and purpose in the rhetoric of expertise. For *Wikipedia* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, appeals to serving the great good draw on a foundational myth of encyclopedic publishing. As explained in Chapter Five, encyclopedias reflect Enlightenment ideals: "a practical embodiment of the notion that knowledge should be accessible to a wide public and, as such, their purpose was not just to collate knowledge

used by elites, but to facilitate conversation and communication."[494] They are vehicles of free and widely accessible information. Both suggest that their creators consider them to be a gift to humanity. *Britannica* grounds its claim to public service in the screening of information. Distinguishing valuable knowledge from trivia, according to *Britannica*, constitutes informational expertise. *Wikipedia* represents the argument that everyone has something encyclopedia-worthy to contribute, the compilation of which is informational expertise. *Wikipedia* claims to serve the greater good by appreciating and incorporating the public's experiences.

Scholars, too, reference the desire to serve as part of their rhetorics of expertise. The psychiatrist repeatedly mentions his noble intentions. He announces that he supports intense scientific research surrounding depression in order to minimize suffering. By demonstrating that science serves the public's interests, gradually mastering a mystery of nature, the psychiatrist offers proof of eunoia not only for himself but for the medical establishment. Similarly, the historians' expert eunoia coincides with their appeal to an advisory function. They imply that their service to society lies in preventing us from repeating past mistakes. Providing the benefit of historical reflection is the historians' claim to expert utility. Thus they identify a political or social exigency as their scholarship's rationale. As the essays' editor states, "Our authors comment on the dangers of forging or analyzing policy without keen awareness of history, and they tell cautionary tales involving critical moments in the past."[495] Because current events have

[494] Richard Yeo, *Encyclopaedic Visions: Scientific Dictionaries and Enlightenment Culture* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 12.
[495] Meyerowitz, 2.

historical precedents, historians serve the greater good. This argument concurs with the idea that academic historical expertise is a response to a present exigency in "everyday life."

Expertise and/in "Everyday Life"

My last theoretical postulate is about the relationship between expertise and "everyday life." By "everyday life" I mean the confluence of persons, events and objects that constitutes an ordinary reality—the things that make up day-to-day life. This postulate states that all experts must orient themselves and their subject matter relative to the audience's everyday experience. Indeed, all experts must situate and embed their expertise deeply in that experience. This rhetorical strategy is what makes expertise both relevant and accessible. Without it, expertise is doomed to be discarded or ignored. Importantly, this contextual grounding cannot happen without a rhetorical effort on the part of the expert. S/he cannot relate his/her subject matter to the public's everyday life without a carefully crafted message. Whether or not some forms of expertise are actually more relevant than others is not the issue; all experts face the task of persuading the audience that their daily lives depend on expertise.

Wikipedia achieves this relevance by way of its contributors and their interests. The articles reflect those objects, events and experiences that constitute everyday life. For example, both "house work" and "boredom" have their own *Wikipedia* entries. Additionally, *Wikipedia*'s popular accessibility means that use of the site is part of its relation to everyday habits. The site presents itself as the handy reference tool that responds to everyday informational needs. It markets itself as an easily accessible way of

incorporating reference information into daily life. Anyone can look up anything at any time.

Along similar lines, the witnesses and the depressives locate their lived experiences—their expertise—in the midst of everyday life. The former describe how the events of 9/11 interrupted what was otherwise a normal day. One witness recalls, "I went to the cafeteria every morning to get Ed's breakfast. That was the routine. Everything for me that morning was like clockwork."[496] Another witness says, "I had taken off my shoes, like I do most every morning. This pair was new and in particular need of being broken in."[497] These descriptions invite the audience to imagine their own daily routines. They then locate a form of historical expertise in the disruption of that experience. Similarly, the depressives in Chapter Four relate how periodic bouts of illness punctuate life. Their arguments for medical expertise are not grounded in neurophysiology or pharmacology but the impact that depression has on day-to-day habits. One of them states, "I felt like a guest in someone else's falling-apart life—unanswered phone calls, unopened mail, rotting fruit on top of the refrigerator, and something unidentifiable and reeking inside, piles of dirty dishes, tumbleweeds of dust, books I didn't remember reading, furniture I couldn't remember buying, pictures of friends and family that seemed to belong to a stranger."[498] These objects—dishes and dust—are undeniable parts of everyday life. Thus the association that experts establish between their expertise and these objects makes expertise undeniably relevant. The audience recognizes witnesses'

[496] Murphy, 32.
[497] Murphy, 80.
[498] Maud Casey, "A Better Place to Live," in *Unholy Ghost*, ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001), 284.

and depressives' expertise as the function of suspended normalcy. What they know and what they have experienced exist in stark contrast to the mundane.

Political experts connect awareness of everyday experience with an appeal to identification. They contextualize their expertise by describing the American public to itself. The NCLR states, "At the end of the day, the Latino community and the rest of the country want effective immigration reform that brings order and fairness to our system."[499] Senator Frist perhaps surprisingly agrees: "The American people want us to secure the border. We can't have hundreds of thousands of people running across that lower border of the United States of America, and we've got to get control of it."[500] The Minuteman Project and Senator Kennedy echo these sentiments. The orienting of a political agenda relative to the everyday life of the public is a constitutive strategy; political experts demonstrate that they understand their audience. They know what the public needs and wants because they themselves are a part of that public. Specifically, politicians and activists identify with the public through the same argument that allows them a representative relationship; by claiming to be consubstantial with the public they propose to represent it.

Being a successful expert requires that one locates one's expertise at the center of everyday life and not at the periphery. The more relevant an expert makes him/herself seem to the public, the more powerful s/he will be. Consider the difference between

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[499] National Council of *La Raza*, "NCLR Commends Senate for Historic Immigration Vote," News Release, May 25, 2006, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/news/detail/39627/ (accessed March 5, 2007)

[500] "Conference with Senate Republicans," Sept 20, 2006, Transcript, The Federal News Service, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007).

academic experts and political experts. When scholars address each other—that is, when they write for a peer audience—they do not make their expertise relevant to the public's everyday life. In those circumstances, relevance is not part of the rhetorical effort. Scholars do not need to establish a connection between everyday life and their expertise. Of course this changes as soon as they address the general public. Then they face the same rhetorical challenge as other experts, as illustrated by my analysis in Chapters Three and Four. Political experts, by contrast, are constantly confronted with the need to be publicly relevant. Every initiative that they pursue must have some impact on people's lives; therein lies the argument for the initiative's value. In short, all experts who address the public must ensconce their expertise so centrally in everyday life that its relevance and importance cannot be refuted.

Implications

The six theoretical postulates discussed above are my dissertation's answer to the question: What rhetorical strategies do different groups employ to compete for expert authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another? The postulates are also the foundation of a rhetorical theory of expertise. They take up the conclusions from each chapter, which trace differences and similarities between the experts analyzed, and build on the idea of rhetorical parallels. These parallels, I argue, must be interpreted as indicators of the fundamentally rhetorical nature of expertise. Each postulate offers a lesson about what experts "do" rhetorically and the challenges they face as a category of specialists. My postulates highlight what rhetorical scholars investigate: recurring patterns in the persuasive use of language. Moreover, my postulates move our limited

understanding of expertise beyond the superficial differences between seemingly different experts. They theorize the generic patterns that emerge in the use of certain rhetorical strategies to construct and manage expertise.

At the beginning of my dissertation, I proposed to study the notion of expertise as a rhetorical construct. This was a foundational assumption throughout the analyses that followed. Now at the conclusion what I offer is a theory of the available means of persuasion; my claim is that certain rhetorical strategies recur across contexts and contents of expertise. Whether someone is a political, historical, medical or informational expert, it appears that some arguments, tropes, and appeals comprise the stock persuasive means. These arguments and tropes are not specific to particular areas of expertise; they are *common* topics rather than *special* topics. As the postulates in this chapter theorize, these appeals entail references to networks of experts, the explication of expert *technes*, the construction of a pedagogical philosophy, the invitation to the lay public to defer or to participate, the creation of a rhetorical situation for one's expertise, and the grounding of that expertise in everyday experience. Moreover, the stock persuasive appeals transcend not only context but other differences as well. As different as Senators Frist and Kennedy are politically, their appeals to political expertise are strikingly similar. And as different as Dr. DePaulo is from a poet who suffers from depression, they both emphasize lived experience as critical to medical expertise. And as little as the stereotypical Wikipedians have in common with the scholars who contribute to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, they all operate in the context of encyclopedic publishing. This context makes available certain rhetorical strategies for constructing expertise in the disposition of information.

Perhaps the most important postulate is the one about explicating an expert *techne*. As stated above, all experts explicate their epistemologies and methodologies as a persuasive effort. Doing so gives the audience the impression of a *techne*—a productive craft with a set of rational principles. This referencing of a *techne* is a way to claim that expertise exists. It delineates an area of expertise that an expert manages on the public's behalf. The question is: Does the explication of epistemology and methodology—rational principles—indicate the existence of a *techne* or expertise or does it constitute them? Is an expert an expert because s/he possesses a *techne* which can be persuasively referenced, or does she become an expert in the rhetorical process of referencing a *techne*? Does claiming that expertise is a rhetorical construct mean that no "real" or material foundation exists?

While these questions about symbols and referents are important, they ultimately are outside the scope of my dissertation. My question is not "What is expertise?" but "What rhetorical strategies do experts employ?" This is the real issue for rhetorical scholars. In other words, my conclusions explain how expertise works rhetorically; I do not evaluate the phenomenon's ontology. Avoiding the vortex of "Is it all rhetorical?" I approach expertise as a malleable, discursive, contextual *and* real concept.

What, then, are the implications for what my dissertation calls the "unlikely allies"? If expertise is a rhetorical construct and certain rhetorical strategies of expertise recur cross-contextually, what does that imply? Why is such an observation significant? As members of contemporary American culture, we need to understand the unlikely allies and their rhetorical practices because of the power that experts have over our lives. More

specifically, we ought to acknowledge how that power is rhetorically wielded. If we recognize that certain arguments and appeals "belong" to the rhetoric of expertise—i.e., that we are likely to hear them from those presenting themselves as experts—we might be more cognizant of experts' tactics. What I am proposing is a sort of generic awareness. Whenever you hear these claims being made, beware: someone is attempting to construct expertise and/or construct themselves as an expert. Imagine a person who explains to you in detail what s/he does for a living and why it is critically important for the good of society. S/he hold you hostage at a social event, rhetorically building a case for a kind of expertise. S/he expounds on the "rationale principles" of this expertise, nods strategically at other related experts and enthusiastically explains why your life needs what s/he provides. You instantly recognize these rhetorical moves. They are familiar indicators of a rhetorical creature: the expert. What I am suggesting is that, if we understand expertise in terms of a rhetorical genre, we might be more critical as consumers and citizens—both of expertise and of rhetoric.

Too, there are important implications of my findings for the larger study of rhetoric. There are lessons about the strategic use of language. Much of my dissertation draws on core concepts in the rhetorical canon: ethos, argument by association, dialectics, refutation, etc. Classical theories contribute to my analytical methodology. But the concept of expertise as I approach it is much broader and more complex than those terms. For example, expertise is not reducible to ethos because ethos does not account for all the other tropes that the experts analyzed in my dissertation use. Even as a rhetorical construct, expertise is not the same as simply being persuasive. In Chapters Three and

Four I explain that witnesses and depressives do more than simply attempt to be persuasive. They do more than invite the audience to accept their interpretations of an experience. Indeed they offer those interpretations as alternatives to more established forms of historical and medical expertise. Their arguments for expert status are designed to compete with other experts. Recall that the original question of my dissertation emphasized the strategies that experts use in conflict with one another. Different experts present alternatives views of the world. And the public ultimately chooses and validates one over the other. Put another way, expertise is rhetorical partly because it is subject to tension; it exists on contested ground where one expert's arguments contend with another's.

In the process of exploring such contested grounds, one concept has captivated my scholarly interest for years. I call it "the Special." It is a highly pliable term for a single, principal thing that everyone has and everyone seeks. It is different for each person. For a trauma witness, the Special is a personal memory, a lived experience, a connection to a unique but horrific moment. Having that memory acknowledged as a form of historical expertise means that someone else recognizes the witness's Special. For an activist, a burning passion and a political cause constitute a Special. It is worth the activist's time and labor, and somehow it connects him/her to a greater purpose. When what the activist does is considered political expertise, his/her Special becomes an alternative to more established forms of politics. To wit, experts' Special is their expertise. Expertise is one way to understand how people use rhetoric to carve out a piece of the world and make it their own. It is one term and one set of assumptions that allow

rhetorical scholars to study the Special.[501] By studying the rhetoric of expertise, we learn about the rhetoric of the human condition.

The postulates delineated in this chapter represent my theorizing of rhetorical expertise. They demonstrate the rhetorical parallels that connect seemingly different kinds of experts through argument. But of course answers beget more questions. With the foundation of a theory of rhetorical expertise, new issues and problems arise.

Future Research

These six postulates expose many potentials areas for future inquiry. Because each chapter examines a different context for expertise, these projects vary greatly in scope and subject matter. Pursuing them means building on the theoretical foundation that my dissertation provides. First, one might explore something called "expert functions." These are the roles that experts assume and the identities they perform in different capacities. Recall from Chapter Three how the historians couched their expertise in terms of social and political utility. They present themselves as relevant to policy makers because they offer lessons from the past. Thus they construct for themselves a kind of advisory expert function. The notion of an expert function, while not part of my focus on the strategies that experts use to construct expertise and to compete with one another, seems worthy of study. An expert function is about locating oneself as an expert relative to various other social, political, or economic systems. Other expert functions that warrant scholarly investigation include the reporting function of the politicians in

[501] And to do so without calling it "the Special," which is likely to get a junior scholar laughed out of the National Communication Association.

Chapter Two, the paternalistic function of medical experts, and the managerial function of informational experts.

Second, a concept that my dissertation mentions, but that requires more rigorous attention is dialectical tension in the rhetoric of expertise. As argued in Chapter Two, politicians and activists oscillate strategically between the tropes with which their ideology is typically associated and those tropes' opposites. The Minuteman Project and Bill Frist reference America's immigrant heritage as a counter-weight to their predictably conservative anti-immigration arguments; the National Council of *La Raza* and Ted Kennedy note the importance of law enforcement while promoting humanitarian immigration policies. This dialectical tension reappears in Chapter Four when the psychiatrist intersperses references to medical research with emphasis on clinical counseling and family. As a balance to his rhetorical use of science, the psychiatrist belabors the value of a social network in managing depression. In Chapter Three another, slightly different, dialectical tension emerges. The historians alternate between different dimensions of their identities and agendas. On one hand, their essays conform to academic standards of neutrality. They follow certain scholarly practices to ensure that no personal attachment or bias exists. On the other hand, many historians reveal what seems like a personal commitment when expressing the hope that their work will allow political decision makers to learn from the past. My question is: What can rhetorical scholars learn about a discourse by recognizing that is it characterized by dialectical tensions?

Third, I am intrigued by the idea that different kinds of expertise have different myths of origin. For example, professional politics often is associated with Western

myths of progress and democracy. The story that elementary school children learn every year begins with Athens, moves through America's founding fathers, and lands somewhere between the Civil Right movement and 9/11. Medical expertise subscribes to a different myth. Its story, too, follows a trajectory from Hippocrates through the empiricists and into our contemporary fusion of natural sciences and biomedicine. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and even *Wikipedia* share a myth of origin, albeit with different spins on the notion of "popular." Both belong in an Enlightenment tradition that prizes free and publicly accessible information. And scholars have their own mythic imagined community. Their foundational heroes are also to be found in Antiquity and perhaps among the early scientists. What, then, is the purpose of a myth of origin? Certainly a historical record lends credibility to something like expertise, but what else?

Fourth, two online trends merit further exploration. They might be thought of as either conflicting or complementary models of virtual expertise. First, the "expert for hire" model is represented by websites like WebMD, where visitors access information about illness and wellness and "ask the experts." Another example of this kind of online expertise is a webpage published by the University of Texas at Austin. The Office of Public Affairs compiles a directory of the university's faculty and staff that is searchable by topic. Visitors locate the expert and/or expertise that they seek from the comforts of their own homes. The other model of virtual expertise follows a "do it yourself" approach. A few of the experts analyzed in my dissertation illustrate this model, notably *Wikipedia*, the Minuteman Project and the National Council of *La Raza*. As explained in previous chapters, these websites are specifically instructive, encouraging visitors to get

involved and explaining how to do so. And there are other sites with a similar orientation. The hardware chain Home Depot—whose slogan is "You can do it. We can help."—features a page on its website where handypersons ask "certified professionals" about home improvement. As implied in the company motto, the expert is the customer. My question as a rhetorical critic is: What do these alternative trends suggest about our culture of expertise, particularly as other parts of our culture become digital? What conflicting or complementary rhetorical strategies sustain the two models?

Concluding Remarks

The six postulates presented in this chapter are my dissertation's answer to the question: What rhetorical strategies do different kinds of experts use to compete with each other for authority and legitimacy? Whether the experts I analyzed make these rhetorical moves because they are experts or if they are experts because they do them may not be answerable. The point is that whatever their subject matter, experts engage their audience through a series of arguments that construct expertise. Put differently, experts have a finite set of rhetorical moves in their repertoire. All experts strategically associate themselves with other experts and areas of expertise in order to "borrow" cultural capital. All experts explicate their epistemology and methodology to generate the impression of a *techne*. All experts assume some pedagogical stance that determines the extent to which they impart their expertise to the public; this stance also prescribes either deference or participation as the most appropriate public response. All experts create a demand for their expertise by identifying (and/or constructing) a rhetorical situation in

which it is the most fitting response. Finally, all experts make themselves relevant and accessible by situating their expertise relative to the public's experience of everyday life.

Experts are everywhere, pleading with us to vote for them or to pay them or to listen to them or to defer to them in other ways. We give power to experts because it is convenient and efficient. What is more, we give power to experts because that is what they invite and expect us to do. In this process, experts employ the available means of persuasion. They adapt to audience constraints. They compete with each other for the public's trust. They make an argument for the validity and relevance of their expertise. The notion of a "rhetoric of expertise" connotes something systemic—a pattern, a rhetorical form, a genre. It means that experts with a wide variety of different specialties face the same rhetorical challenges and employ the same rhetorical strategies. In addition to all the other things that comprise expertise—knowledge, experience, skill, etc.—there is also an element of persuasion. My dissertation begins with the idea that expertise is both culturally pervasive and fundamentally rhetorical. It ends with a deepened understanding of both dimensions as well as their political, social and scholarly implications.

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